"A powerful overview of 50 years of policy."
Shlaim's usual appreciation for complexities and contradictions and his keen sketches of the principal Israeli actors make this very readable book one of the best and most illuminating accounts of Arab-Israeli relations in years. Foreign Affairs
Optimism about the prospects for a Middle East peace agreement has accompanied the recent election of Ehud Barak as Israel's prime minister, but if this book is any indication, the war over Israel's history is likely to rage on. Shlaim (War and Peace in the Middle East, etc.) is a leader among revisionist historians who are challenging Israel's most cherished myths about itself: that it has been a peaceful nation forced into war by bellicose Arab neighbors incapable of accepting its existence. A professor of history at Oxford, he covers relations between Israel and the Arabs from Israel's 1948 War of Independence to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's electoral defeat this past May. Rarely have as many fresh details been presented together about Israel's inner political scene and the Jewish state's contacts with the Arab world in its early years. Shlaim ably sets out the belief, shared by Israeli leaders of all political stripes, that the country had to build up an "iron wall" of strength and security in order to bring Arab leaders to the negotiating table (Shlaim himself thinks the iron wall was a mistake). But Shlaim's revisionist enthusiasm too often gets the better of him: he fails to marshal the necessary evidence to support his contention that Arab rulers were "prepared to recognize Israel, to negotiate directly with it, and even to make peace with it." Shlaim's explanations of Arab political constraints, especially the pragmatism of Arab rulers relative to the extreme anti-Israel sentiment of the Arab street, is illuminating. But his view of Palestinian terrorism as a reaction to Israeli militarism is far too simplistic. Revisionism is one thing, but Shlaim employs a double standard: while he tends to view Israeli leaders, most notably Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, as villains, he heaps praise on the "realism" of Arab leaders. A comprehensive, balanced history of Israel's history with its Arab neighbors needs to be written, but this is not it. Photos not seen by PW. (Sept.) Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.
Publishers Weekly - Publisher's Weekly
In the last two decades, Shlaim (international relations, St. Anthony's Coll., Oxford Univ.) has emerged as a leading figure among the Israeli historians challenging the Zionist account of the birth of the Jewish state and the country's policies toward the Arabs. In this path-breaking book, he presents a detailed account of Israel's failed relationship with the Arab world over the past 50 years and offers a sophisticated critique of Israel's "Iron Wall" strategy. The author relies on a variety of primary sources, including documents in the Israel State Archives and Britain's Public Record Office, as well as interviews with key personalities to provide readers with a highly original and objective account of Israel's foreign policy toward the Arab world. Highly recommended for academic and public libraries.--Nader Entessar, Spring Hill Coll., Mobile, AL Copyright 1999 Cahners Business Information.
Shlaim (international relations, Oxford U., England and one of the early "revisionist" or new historians of Israel) offers a chronological account and evaluation of the first 50 years of Israeli policy towards the Arab world. Includes a chronology and a prologue discussing the state's Zionist foundations. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
A comprehensive revisionist history of Israel's foreign policy, insisting that an "intransigent," often belligerent Jewish state mishandled relations with its neighbors. Shlaim (International Relations/Oxford Univ.) has criticized the US's allegedly anti-Arab policies in the past (War And Peace in the Middle East, 1994), and this book covers such diplomatic events unfamiliar to Americans as the 1978 Leeds Castle Conference in the UK. The title comes from early Zionist militant Ze'ev Jabotinsky, but Shlaim sees Jabotinsky foes like David Ben-Gurion assuming the same defensive, antagonistic attitude toward Arabs. For a century, Zionist policy courted and became associated with hated colonial and foreign powers, from the Ottomans and British to the Americans. Even if it weren't a Jewish country slicing its thin dagger through the vast Arab and Muslim Middle East, Israel made itself (politically speaking) a foreign invader to be ejected, Shlaim argues. Sidestepping anti-Israel manifestations in the UN and Europe, Shlaim writes that "Israel had won wide acceptance, not only in the United States, for its version of the Arab-Israeli dispute: the violence of its opponents was ‘terror'; its own was ‘legitimate self-defense.' " A retaliatory raid on King Hussein's birthday is thus "devastating." While Shlaim documents his material thoroughly, many statements require explanation. For example: Shimon Peres had "a clearer appreciation of the declining utility of military force in the modern world." Does the author mean that NATO wasted conventional military power in Bosnia because diplomatic formulas like "land for peace" are more effective, or does he mean that Peres, who brought Israel itsnuclear weapons, thinks that nonconventional weaponry is less of a factor after the Gulf War and proliferation of missiles from China and the former USSR? Carefully annotated, but Shlaim never solidly establishes his difficult thesis in this lengthy history.
