The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body
Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno­ logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a consequence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism.
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The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body
Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno­ logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a consequence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism.
54.99 In Stock
The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body

The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body

by Richard M. Zaner
The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body

The Problem of Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of the Body

by Richard M. Zaner

Paperback(Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1971)

$54.99 
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Overview

Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno­ logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a consequence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9789401030168
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Publication date: 11/05/2011
Series: Phaenomenologica , #17
Edition description: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1971
Pages: 306
Product dimensions: 6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.03(d)

Table of Contents

I: Marcel’s Theory of the Body as Mystery.- I: Introduction.- II: The Theory of the Body-Qua-Mine as Mystery.- III: Critical Remarks.- II: Sartre’s Ontology of the Body.- I: Introduction.- II: The Ontological Dimensions of the Body.- III: Critical Remarks.- III: Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of the Body-Proper.- I: Introduction.- II: The Theory of the Body.- III: Critical Remarks.- Epilogue.
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