"To Prepare for Sherman's Coming": The Battle of Wise's Forks, March 1865
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"To Prepare for Sherman's Coming": The Battle of Wise's Forks, March 1865
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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781611216790 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Savas Beatie |
| Publication date: | 03/23/2023 |
| Pages: | 288 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d) |
About the Author
Colonel (Ret) Wade Sokolosky is a graduate of East Carolina University and a 25-year veteran of the U.S. Army. Wade is the co-author (with Mark A. Smith) of “No Such Army Since the Days of Julius Caesar”: Sherman’s Carolinas Campaign from Fayetteville to Averasboro, and the author of Final Roll Call: Confederate Losses during the Carolinas Campaign.
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
"Prepare the way for my coming."
— Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman
Grant Plans a Campaign
Early on the morning of January 29, 1865, the side-wheel steamer USS Rhode Island entered Beaufort Inlet, cruising past watchful Union sentries at Fort Macon as the vessel sought sanctuary in Morehead City Harbor. John Hedrick, the harbor's U.S. Treasury Department agent, noted the day was "exceedingly cold." Excitement over a certain Rhode Island passenger, however, eclipsed any concern about the weather. On board was Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, general-in-chief of the Union army, who, for the last six months, had engaged the army of Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee in some of the bloodiest combat operations of the Civil War.
Grant's purpose in visiting the coast centered on a broadening military strategy for North Carolina, which in the coming weeks would transform the state into a major operational theater of the war. By March 1865, the U.S. Army's execution of Grant's strategy would employ more than 85,000 Union soldiers in the Tar Heel State as part of the effort to defeat the Confederacy.
Grant's rather sudden focus on North Carolina stemmed from the operational successes of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman. In December of 1864, Sherman had presented the city of Savannah, Georgia, to President Abraham Lincoln as a Christmas gift. The fall of Savannah, an important port city for the Confederacy, dealt a tremendous blow to Southern morale, but it was Sherman's March to the Sea that severely damaged the Confederacy's ability to wage war. Sherman's march had sliced through the Confederate heartland and disrupted the vital resources that Georgia had provided to the Southern cause.
Sherman's successful march to Savannah defined how he expected to conduct future operations in the Carolinas. As Sherman refitted his army in Savannah, he began a dialogue with Grant about what his army's next move should be. Grant initially considered transferring Sherman's army north by sea to Virginia to join Union forces confronting Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Grant wrote, "I had no idea originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North Carolina." The winter of 1864, one of the rainiest in memory, had turned roads into quagmires with no immediate prospect for improvement. Grant knew the torrential rains had rendered most roads impassable, and that terrible weather would cause Sherman's army much trouble on the march.
Sherman, however, had a plan. As historian Mark L. Bradley observed, "Sherman realized that by marching his army through the Carolinas, he would inevitably cut Lee's supply lines to the Deep South and induce hundreds — if not thousands — of Lee's troops from that region to desert." His march through Georgia to the sea aptly demonstrated the devastating effect an army could have on an enemy's transportation and supply networks. If Sherman marched his army through the Carolinas, he would eviscerate what remained of the Confederacy, which was already on the verge of collapse. In Virginia, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was desperately trying to prevent the capture of Richmond, the Confederate capital, and the vital rail junction at Petersburg. In the Western Theater, Gen. John B. Hood's Army of Tennessee had met with disaster at Nashville at the hands of Union Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas's Army of the Cumberland, leaving Hood's once-proud army a ghost of its former self.
Two factors convinced Grant to approve Sherman's suggestion for a march through the Carolinas. First, Grant was confident enough in Sherman's abilities as a commander to permit his subordinate to embark on such a daring and risky undertaking. This confidence stemmed from their close personal relationship forged during several successful campaigns earlier in the war. Second, Grant soon learned that due to a lack of transport ships, Sherman's army could march overland to Virginia more quickly than it could move by sea.
On December 27, 1864, Grant instructed his trusted lieutenant to "make your preparations to start on your expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as you can." Having received Grant's authorization to proceed, Sherman began preparing for his army's ambitious movement.
Grant initiated the first phase of his North Carolina strategy after approving Sherman's plan to march north from Savannah. On December 30, he ordered a combined army-navy operation to silence Fort Fisher, the Confederacy's largest bastion, thereby opening the door for the capture of Wilmington, North Carolina. Grant dispatched from Virginia Bvt. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry and more than 9,000 soldiers from the Army of the James to reinforce Rear Adm. David D. Porter's naval force off Fort Fisher. On January 15, 1865, after a desperate struggle, the combined force seized Fort Fisher and began preparations for the capture of Wilmington.
The fall of the seemingly impregnable Fort Fisher changed Grants opinion regarding the importance of eastern North Carolina, specifically the port city of Wilmington. Until that time, Grant had shown little interest in its capture, but thereafter sought to begin operations as soon as possible. Historian Chris Fonvielle Jr. noted, "Grant was so intent on capturing Wilmington he left the main theater of war in Virginia — a rare move for him — to travel to Cape Fear to confer with Admiral Porter and General Terry."
The news of Fort Fisher's capture pleased Sherman. "I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of its intrinsic importance," he wrote to Grant several days before launching his new campaign into South Carolina, "and because it gives me another point of security on the seaboard." The capture of Fort Fisher proved to be the first success in the execution of a much broader strategy.
With Fort Fisher eliminated, Wilmington was now vulnerable. Significant as the South's last major open seaport, Wilmington served as a key transportation hub for three railroads — above all, the Wilmington & Weldon, which served as the logistical lifeline for Lee's army in Virginia. The Union army now valued the railroad because of its access to the sea and its proximity to the town of Goldsboro, Sherman's ultimate destination in North Carolina.
To reinforce efforts in North Carolina and to prepare for other contingencies, Grant ordered the transfer of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield and his XXIII Corps from Tennessee to the Tar Heel coast. Concern that the Confederacy might attempt to halt Sherman's advance convinced Grant of the necessity for reinforcements. On January 21, Grant informed Sherman that the 20,000-man XXIII Corps was on its way to North Carolina.
After Fort Fisher's capture, the Union military directed its efforts to supporting Sherman's occupation of Goldsboro. To develop this final strategy, Grant traveled to the North Carolina coast accompanied by Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus V. Fox and General Schofield. Grant and his party arrived at Cape Fear, where they met with General Terry, commander of army forces, and Admiral Porter, commander of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. Terry and Porter, under Schofield's command, were assigned the task of capturing Wilmington.
Grant used this meeting to further define the final phases of his strategy to "open communication between the seacoast and Goldsboro by rail, so as to meet Sherman with supplies for his army and to put at his disposal an available force." During the meeting, the senior leaders decided upon Wilmington as the primary port of entry for supplies and personnel intended for Sherman's Goldsboro objective. Several factors drove the leaders to select Wilmington rather than the Union-occupied port cities of Beaufort, Morehead City, and New Bern. First, they assumed the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad was operational to Goldsboro based on its current use by the enemy. This was not case with the Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad, where the Confederates had removed a large section of the rail west of New Bern. Second, Wilmington's capture also provided a contingency in the event Sherman required a safe haven or resupply from the coast. In addition to the Wilmington & Weldon, two other railroads served Wilmington. The Wilmington, Charlotte & Rutherford, then under construction, would link the coast to Charlotte, North Carolina, and the Wilmington & Manchester provided access to Charleston, South Carolina, and other points south of the port city. Finally, the Cape Fear River provided a water route all the way to Fayetteville in the event Sherman required re-supply. However, Confederate forces still held Wilmington, so it was a risky choice. To mitigate the risk, Union troops would have to seize Wilmington quickly to save as much rolling stock as possible.
Pleased with the meeting, Grant departed the Cape Fear River and sailed north up the coast to Morehead City, where he met with Brig. Gen. Innis N. Palmer, the commander of the District of North Carolina. Caught off guard by Grant's sudden arrival at Morehead, Palmer hastily traveled down the railroad from New Bern to meet with the general-in-chief. As planned during the Cape Fear strategy session, Palmer was to assume a supporting role from New Bern and Morehead. Grant used his short visit to ensure that Palmer fully understood the plan and his duties. Grant and his party walked the streets, and after a short boat ride across the harbor, visited Union forces occupying the port of Beaufort.
For Palmer, Grant's visit confirmed the reasoning behind Sherman's earlier correspondence. Prior to Grant's strategy session, Sherman had requested from Palmer specific details about his forces and how far his line extended toward Kinston. He had also ordered Palmer to secure "at once" the railroad crossing over the Neuse River near Kinston. Sherman's message surely awakened Palmer to the reality that his once-quiet command was now at the center of a major operation.
On January 21, Sherman provided Palmer with specific instructions on his supporting role in seizing Goldsboro. More importantly, Sherman countermanded his order of January 16 to secure the Neuse River crossing "at once." Sherman hoped to prevent the Confederates from guessing his intended destination. He instructed Palmer: "don't attract attention, but hold New Bern and Morehead City (Fort Macon) secure as points for me to depend on. As I approach you may aim for the railroad, near where it crosses the Neuse [River] near Kinston."
Sherman's January 21 correspondence with Palmer demonstrated his concern for preserving secrecy at all costs. Sherman was notorious for his distrust of the press, for he believed that it often leaked vital information that helped the Confederates. As events unfolded throughout February, Palmer displayed a sense of paralysis in setting his forces in motion to secure Kinston. Sherman may have inadvertently contributed to Palmer's lack of immediate action.
In his after-action campaign report, Sherman explained that he had initiated all of these efforts "to prepare the way for my coming." The officer that Grant and Sherman selected to carry out the task was General John Schofield, a veteran of both the Atlanta and Tennessee campaigns. On January 31, the capable Schofield assumed command of the newly established Department of North Carolina, which would be subject to General Sherman's orders.
Major Gen. John M. Schofield was born in Gerry, New York, and raised in Freeport, Illinois. He attended the U.S. Military Academy, graduating seventh in the class of 1846. He then served nine years in South Carolina and Florida before transferring to West Point as an instructor. In the summer of 1860, disillusioned by the peacetime army's slow promotion rate, Schofield resigned his commission and moved west with his wife and two sons to St. Louis, Missouri.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, Schofield's military experience proved invaluable in the recruitment and training of the 1st Missouri Infantry. The soldiers expressed their gratitude by electing him major. In June 1861, Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Lyon appointed Schofield as his adjutant general. He later served under Lyon in the battle of Wilson's Creek, Missouri. A promising officer in the Western Theater, Schofield rose to lead the Army of the Ohio under Sherman's command during the Atlanta campaign. Following Atlanta's capture, Schofield's XXIII Corps took part in the defeat of Hood's Army of Tennessee in the battles of Franklin and Nashville, Tennessee, in late 1864. A proven field commander, Schofield developed a reputation for moderation and restraint. He more than compensated for his shortcomings as a battlefield commander by demonstrating shrewdness in the politics of high command, which proved invaluable in his new role as department commander in North Carolina.
Shortly after returning to Virginia from his meetings with Generals Terry and Palmer, Grant instructed Schofield to assume overall command of operations in North Carolina — a move based on Sherman's recommendation, but one initiated by Schofield weeks earlier. Following the Union victories at Franklin and Nashville, Schofield sought to convince Grant and Sherman to transfer his XXIII Corps east. Schofield did so because he was keenly aware that the only substantial Confederate forces were in the Eastern Theater. His efforts soon paid off, for on January 15, 1865, Grant ordered the transfer of the XXIII Corps to the Atlantic Coast.
Not surprisingly, the victors of Fort Fisher, Porter and Terry, did not welcome the news of Schofield's transfer to North Carolina. If Grant was aware of their disappointment, he chose to ignore it. Sherman had also requested Schofield for the position, and whenever possible, the Union general-in-chief granted the wishes of his most trusted subordinate.
As the Union strategy for the Carolinas unfolded in the beginning months of 1865, the harsh reality of the situation became all too apparent to the Confederate high command. The forces defending that region were hopelessly scattered and lacked a guiding hand to direct them. Historian Thomas L. Connelly observed, "for almost two critical months in 1865, the Confederacy confronted Sherman in the Carolinas with nothing but chaos." Gen. Braxton Bragg commanded the Department of North Carolina and reported directly to General Lee, the Confederate army's newly appointed commander-in-chief. General P. G. T. Beauregard, commander of the Military Division of the West, was responsible for organizing an effective Confederate response to Sherman's drive north. Beauregard oversaw the disparate forces of Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, commander of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, elements of the Army of Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's cavalry corps, and the Georgia state militia, commanded by Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith. Beauregard's motley force of about 16,000 of all arms faced the very daunting task of stopping Sherman's powerful and victorious army of more than 60,000 men.
The tangled lines of authority violated a proven principle of war: unity of command. In the Carolinas, the Confederate army lacked an overall commander who ensured that all subordinates worked together. In February 1865, the Confederates faced numerically superior Union forces under one commander — Sherman. Unlike the Confederates, Sherman's forces had one clear objective: to capture Goldsboro.
On February 1, 1865, with most of his grand army across the Savannah River, Sherman ordered his commanders to begin the campaign. As he had during the March to the Sea, Sherman divided his army into two wings, the movements of which deceived the Confederates as to his real objective. The pair of wings moved along a front about 40 miles wide, creating the illusion that Sherman was simultaneously threatening Augusta, Georgia, on the left, and Charleston, South Carolina, on the right — all while aiming more directly toward Columbia, the capital of the Palmetto State.
On February 2, General Beauregard convened a council of war near Augusta, Georgia, to evaluate his limited options. The council discussed the possibility of concentrating forces at Branchville, South Carolina, to improve the odds of stopping Sherman's approaching army. Beauregard, however, had high hopes for an upcoming peace conference in Virginia, and therefore believed it was in the South's interests to attempt to defend both Augusta and Charleston. His decision to divide his forces to do so, instead of concentrating them, observed historian Mark L. Bradley, "played directly into Sherman'shands, and the Federal advance through South Carolina was virtually unopposed."
As a result, Union foragers, or "bummers," enjoyed the fruits of the countryside, stripping away all resources in their path. As they rampaged across South Carolina, Sherman's men gleefully implemented his idea of taking the war to the demoralized Southern public. The bummers helped themselves to anything they wanted, partly as punishment for what they believed was South Carolina's status as "the cradle of secession."
(Continues…)
Excerpted from ""To Prepare for Sherman's Coming""
by .
Copyright © 2015 Wade Sokolosky and Mark A. Smith.
Excerpted by permission of Savas Beatie LLC.
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Table of Contents
List of Maps,
List of Illustrations,
Preface,
Acknowledgments,
Chapter One: Grant Plans a Campaign,
Chapter Two: The Union Buildup,
Chapter Three: Johnston Forges an Army,
Chapter Four: Cox Advances,
Chapter Five: Hoke's Surprise,
Chapter Six: The Tide of Battle Turns,
Chapter Seven: Bragg's Final Strike,
Chapter Eight: So We Meet Again,
Chapter Nine: For Want of a Railroad,
Chapter 10: Final Analysis,
Appendix A: The Opposing Forces in the Battle of Wise's Forks, North Carolina,
Appendix B: Confederate Strength at the Battle of Wise's Forks,
Appendix C: Documented Confederate Battle Losses,
Appendix D: The Return of Capt. Julius Bassett's Sword,
Appendix E: Journey to Point Lookout, Maryland,
Bibliography,