Warrant and Proper Function

by Alvin Plantinga

Overview

In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780195078640
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	05/27/1993
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	256
Product dimensions:	6.08(w) x 9.19(h) x 0.78(d)

About the Author

University of Notre Dame

Table of Contents

1.	Warrant: A First Approximation	3
I.	Proper Function	4
II.	The Design Plan	11
III.	Reliability	17
2.	Warrant: Objections and Refinements	21
I.	The Design Plan	21
II.	Two Concluding Comments	42
3.	Exploring the Design Plan: Myself and My Past	48
I.	Knowledge of Myself	48
II.	Memory	57
4.	Other Persons and Testimony	65
I.	Other Persons	65
II.	Testimony	77
5.	Perception	89
I.	Perceptual Belief as Knowledge	89
II.	Perceptual Experience	91
III.	Perceptual Beliefs as Basic	93
IV.	Perceptual Beliefs Formed on the Basis of Experience	98
V.	Nature, Nurture, and Perceptual Judgments	99
6.	A Priori Knowledge	102
I.	A Priori Knowledge Initially Characterized	103
II.	A Priori Knowledge Is Knowledge	108
III.	Fallibilistic A Priorism	110
IV.	A Priori Knowledge and the Causal Requirements	113
V.	Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete	117
VI.	Back to the Causal Requirement	120
7.	Induction	122
I.	The Old Riddle of Induction	124
II.	The New Riddle of Induction	128
8.	Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views	137
I.	Epistemic Probability and Statistical Probability	139
II.	Theories of Epistemic Probability	142
9.	Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth	159
I.	The Two Faces of Epistemic Probability	159
II.	An Account of the Normative Component	165
III.	Replies and Comments	168
10.	Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence	176
I.	Coherence and Foundations	177
II.	Evidentialism	185
11.	Naturalism versus Proper Function?	194
I.	Naturalistic Analyses of Proper Function	199
II.	So What's a Poor Naturalist to Do?	211
12.	Is Naturalism Irrational?	216
I.	The Problem	216
II.	Darwin's Doubt	219
III.	A Preliminary Argument against Naturalism	228
IV.	The Main Argument Against Naturalism	229
	Index	239

Editorial Reviews

"A must for all epistemologists and philosophers of religion. Seldom is sustained philosophical argument such a joy to read."—Religious Studies Review

"...will undoubtedly generate extensive debate because of the breadth of scope, meticulous detail and resourceful argument that are so characteristic of Plantinga's work."—International Studies in Review

"The present volume and its two companions raise larger issues and promise to significantly broaden the scope and influence of this epistemological project....There is much that is provocative and of great interest in this new book from Plantinga....readers of the first two volumes will find much food for thought here, and will have their appetites whetted for the third, forthcoming volume of the trilogy."—Mind

From the Publisher