Warrant and Proper Function / Edition 1

Warrant and Proper Function / Edition 1

by Alvin Plantinga
ISBN-10:
0195078640
ISBN-13:
9780195078640
Pub. Date:
05/27/1993
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
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Overview

Warrant and Proper Function / Edition 1

In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Alvin Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment. Although this book is in some sense a sequel to its companion volume, the arguments do not presuppose those of the first book and it stands alone as a stimulating contribution to epistemology.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780195078640
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Publication date: 05/27/1993
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 256
Product dimensions: 9.25(w) x 6.13(h) x 0.76(d)

Table of Contents

1.Warrant: A First Approximation3
I.Proper Function4
II.The Design Plan11
III.Reliability17
2.Warrant: Objections and Refinements21
I.The Design Plan21
II.Two Concluding Comments42
3.Exploring the Design Plan: Myself and My Past48
I.Knowledge of Myself48
II.Memory57
4.Other Persons and Testimony65
I.Other Persons65
II.Testimony77
5.Perception89
I.Perceptual Belief as Knowledge89
II.Perceptual Experience91
III.Perceptual Beliefs as Basic93
IV.Perceptual Beliefs Formed on the Basis of Experience98
V.Nature, Nurture, and Perceptual Judgments99
6.A Priori Knowledge102
I.A Priori Knowledge Initially Characterized103
II.A Priori Knowledge Is Knowledge108
III.Fallibilistic A Priorism110
IV.A Priori Knowledge and the Causal Requirements113
V.Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete117
VI.Back to the Causal Requirement120
7.Induction122
I.The Old Riddle of Induction124
II.The New Riddle of Induction128
8.Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views137
I.Epistemic Probability and Statistical Probability139
II.Theories of Epistemic Probability142
9.Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth159
I.The Two Faces of Epistemic Probability159
II.An Account of the Normative Component165
III.Replies and Comments168
10.Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence176
I.Coherence and Foundations177
II.Evidentialism185
11.Naturalism versus Proper Function?194
I.Naturalistic Analyses of Proper Function199
II.So What's a Poor Naturalist to Do?211
12.Is Naturalism Irrational?216
I.The Problem216
II.Darwin's Doubt219
III.A Preliminary Argument against Naturalism228
IV.The Main Argument Against Naturalism229
Index239

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