Since 1969, the Philippine government has been fighting Communist terrorists, yet it has not gained complete control of the security situation in 2005. Given the experience gained from years of fighting terrorism, the police and the armed forces should have defeated the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) and its Sparrow Unit and Alex Boncayao Brigade. They could have successfully established peace and order throughout the country, but the internal conditions at the time dictated otherwise.

Meanwhile, in Mindanao, the Philippine government is significantly challenged by the secessionist groups belonging to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the robust support given to them by Muslim countries, notably Libya, has prolonged the War on Terror in the archipelago.

The influx of foreign Islamists in Mindanao, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and their links with local terror groups like Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), have worsened an already volatile situation in the South. Their close cooperation has become a serious threat to national security. ASG's operational ties with JI and the Al-Qaeda (AQ) network have grown stronger over time, with bombings in Metro Manila and other parts of the country as their hallmark actions.

So, what prevented the Philippine government from winning its War on Terror, despite its counter-terrorism infrastructure, policies, programs, and experienced police and military forces? What obstacles hindered the War on Terror from achieving strategic success? How did the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches miss the opportunity to work together on the War on Terror, using concepts and theories from public administration and best practices in public governance?

The purpose of this case study is to analyze the Philippine government's anti-terrorism policies and programs from 1969 to 2005 and examine why the agencies responsible for enforcing them struggled to carry out their mission, which ultimately prevented them from achieving comprehensive victory.

This case study also looks at the challenges faced by the Intelligence Community in its counter-terrorism efforts against the CPP/NPA, MNLF, MILF, JI, ASG, and AQ. It shows how the system of governance hampers the Philippine government from reaching strategic success in the War on Terror. Additionally, this book examines how the prevailing culture in Philippine politics from 1969 to 2005 has influenced intelligence operations against both domestic and foreign terrorist groups.