Read an Excerpt

Greek Buddha

Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Pyrrho's Thought

BEYOND HUMANITY

A brief passage that derives ultimately from the lost dialogue Pytho 'Python' by Timon of Phlius is accepted to be the single most important testimony for the thought of his teacher, Pyrrho. Because it is preserved in a chapter of a history of philosophy by Aristocles of Messene (quoted verbatim in the Preparation for the Gospel by Eusebius), it is generally known as "the Aristocles passage". The text begins with Timon's short introduction, in which he says, "Whoever wants to be happy must consider these three [questions]: first, how are pragmata '(ethical) matters, affairs, topics' by nature? Secondly, what attitude should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for those who have this attitude?" Then Timon quotes Pyrrho's own revelation of the three negative characteristics of all pragmata 'matters, affairs, questions, topics'. The ethical meaning of the word pragmata is absolutely clear because other testimonies show that it meant for Pyrrho exclusively ethical 'matters, affairs, topics'. Accordingly, the word will be so translated below, or given in Greek as pragmata (singular pragma).

Following these prefatory remarks, Timon says, "Pyrrho himself declares that"

As for pragmata 'matters, questions, topics', they are all adiaphora 'undifferentiated by a logical differentia' and astathmeta 'unstable, unbalanced, not measurable' and anepikrita 'unjudged, unfixed, undecidable'. Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our 'views, theories, beliefs' (doxai) tell us the truth or lie [about pragmata]; so we certainly should not rely on them [to do it]. Rather, we should be adoxastous 'without views', aklineis 'uninclined [toward this side or that]', and akradantous 'unwavering [in our refusal to choose]', saying about every single one that it no more is than it is not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not.

To paraphrase, Pyrrho says that ethical matters or questions are not logically differentiated, they are unstable (or 'unassessed and unassessable by any measure'), and they are unjudged, not fixed (or, undecidable). Therefore, our inductive and deductive reasoning cannot tell us whether any ethical question is True or false, so we should not count on them to tell us. Instead, we should have no views on ethical matters, we should not incline toward any choice with respect to ethical questions, and we should not waver in our avoidance of attempts to decide such matters, reciting the tetralemma formula—"It no more is than it is not or it both is and is not or it neither is nor is not"—in response to every single one of such ethical questions.

The Aristocles passage is crucially important, highly condensed, and not easy to understand, as attested to by the fact that its basic meaning has been disputed by scholars of Classical philosophy for the past century. It thus requires additional explanation. To begin with, as the subject of Pyrrho's entire declaration, the meaning of pragmata is crucially important, so it needs a little further clarification.

The Greek word pragma (singular) ~ pragmata (plural) is largely abstract. In other words, it means 'something, things', but in the abstract logical sense of 'an object of our cogitation or disputation', so translating pragmata as 'things'—in the same general abstract logical sense—is not wrong, but things in English are by default largely physical or metaphysical objects. As a result, scholars have let themselves be misled by that default meaning into misinterpreting Pyrrho's entire message. When helpful below, pragmata will be translated as "ethical things, matters (etc.)".

Moreover, it must be emphasized that Pyrrho sees pragmata as disputed matters. If people agreed on pragmata or did not argue about them, they would not be characterizable as Pyrrho says. They would already be decided and no problem. Arguments about opposing or disputed "matters, topics" are ubiquitous in Greek philosophy, as for example in Plutarch, "They quarrel about whether the matter (pragma) is good or evil or white or not white."

Based evidently on the general scholarly unclarity about pragmata, some have argued that the Aristocles passage represents a "dogmatic" metaphysical position, on account of which they conclude that Pyrrho could not be the founder of Pyrrhonism. This idea has been much criticized, mainly because the ancient testimonies overwhelmingly say that the concern of Pyrrho is purely with ethics, and many modern scholars agree. The very first significant word in his declaration is adiaphora, a logical term, which is followed by inference after inference. Pyrrho's way of skewering ethical issues is to use logic. How would using metaphysics for ethical problems make sense? Pyrrho never, in this or any other testimony, talks about physical or metaphysical issues (though he is said to have criticized other philosophers who did talk about them), and in two testimonies—the Aristocles passage and the narrative about the dog—he explicitly mentions pragmata and makes it very clear that he uses the word to refer to conflicting ethical "matters, affairs". In short, for Pyrrho, pragmata are always and only ethical 'topics, questions, matters, affairs' which people dispute or try to interpret with antilogies—opposed choices such as Good : Bad, or True : false.

Pyrrho's declaration may now be examined section by section.

The Three Characteristics

Pyrrho famously declares that all ethical "matters, questions" have three characteristics which, oddly, are all negative, so his statement is actually a declaration of what matters are not. That is, the positive equivalent of each negative term is what Pyrrho negates, so we must base our understanding of the terms on their positive forms, which (unlike the negative ones) are all well attested in Classical Greek. His declaration is presented as the foundation of his teaching, and modern scholars' intensive analysis of the entire passage and the other ancient testimonies has confirmed that it is indeed the core of his thought: it is inseparable from his practical indirect path, via apatheia 'passionlessness', to ataraxia 'undisturbedness, calm'. Because of its conciseness, the text requires interpretation based on the remaining part of the Aristocles passage, other material in Aristocles' chapter on Pyrrhonism, and other testimonies, including in particular those containing statements attributed directly to Pyrrho himself.

1. Adiaphora 'Without a Self-Identity'

The first term, adiaphora, is the negative of diaphora 'differentiated by a logical differentia' and literally means 'undifferentiated by a logical differentia', that is, 'without a logical self-identity': pragmata 'matters, affairs' do not come supplied with their own self-identifying differentiae or other categorizing criteria. for example, someone's expression of anger is not automatically identified for us by a "thought balloon" spelling out its genus (or superordinate category) "an emotion" and further differentiating it as a "bad" emotion, thus distinguishing it from "good" emotions (among other choices). In several testimonies Pyrrho denies that pragmata are in fact differentiated from their contrasting opposites, for example "the just" versus "the unjust", or "the truth" versus "a lie". People dispute pragmata as to whether they are good or bad, just or unjust, and so on, but any specific pragma, in order to be a subject of philosophical discussion at all, must necessarily be discrete and differentiated from other pragmata by a logical differentia. Because pragmata themselves do not actually have differentiae (as Timon says, "by nature"), we ourselves necessarily supply the differentiae. But that makes the entire process strictly circular and therefore logically invalid.

A direct consequence of the teaching of adiaphora 'without a logical differentia, no self-identity' is the explicit denial of the validity of opposed categories, or "antilogies".

2. Astathmeta 'Unstable, Unbalanced, Not Measurable'

The second term, astathmeta, is an adjective from the stem sta -'stand' with the negative prefix a-, literally meaning 'not standing'. The word is based on the noun stathmos 'standing place, stable; a balance-beam, measuring scale'. for example, Aristophanes, in The Frogs, has Aeschylus say, "what I'd like to do is take him to the scales (stathmos); That's the only real test of our poetry; the weight of our utterances will be the decisive proof." So astathmeta means 'non-standing-place; no stathmos (a balance-beam, scale)', thus, 'unstable, unbalanced'. Since pragmata are unbalanced and unstable, they pull this way and that, and are unsettling. They make us feel uneasy and susceptible to passions and disturbedness.

3. Anepikrita 'Unjudged, Undecided, Unfixed'

The third term, anepikrita, is a negative made from epikrisis 'determination, judgement', from the well-attested derived verb epikrino 'to decide, determine; judge; select, pick out, choose'—as in Aristotle's usage "with what part of itself (the soul) judges that which distinguishes sweet from warm"—which is based in turn on the verb krino 'to separate, distinguish; choose; decide disputes or contests; judge; prefer'; krino is the source also of the important word kriterion 'criterion, means for judging or trying, standard'. Anepikrita thus means 'unjudged, undecided, unchosen, unfixed', so pragmata are not permanently decided or fixed.

The Three Characteristics—The Buddha

Pyrrho's tripartite statement is completely unprecedented and unparalleled in Greek thought. Yet it is not merely similar to Buddhism, it corresponds closely to a famous statement of the Buddha preserved in canonical texts. The statement is known as the Trilaksana, the 'Three Characteristics' of all dharmas 'ethical distinctions, factors, constituents, etc.' Greek pragmata '(ethical) things' corresponds closely to Indic dharma ~ dhamma '(ethical) things' and seems to be Pyrrho's equivalent of it.

The Buddha says, "All dharmas are anitya 'impermanent'.... All dharmas are duhkha 'unsatisfactory, imperfect, unstable'.... All dharmas are anatman 'without an innate self-identity'."

1. Anitya 'Impermanent, Variable, Unfixed'

The first term, anitya (Pali anicca) is the negative form of nitya 'eternal, invariant, fixed (etc.)' and means 'impermanent, variable, unfixed'.

2. Duhkha 'Uneasy; Unsatisfactory; Unsteady'

The meaning of the second term, duhkha (Pali duhkha), is contested by scholars and actually has no universally accepted basic meaning or etymology. The standard Sanskrit dictionary and recent scholars' interpretations of duhkha include 'unsatisfactory, imperfect', and 'uneasy, uncomfortable, unpleasant', and so on, but the term is perhaps the most misunderstood—and definitely the most mistranslated—in Buddhism. However, at the very beginning of his definition, MonierWilliams says, "(according to grammarians properly written dush-kha and said to be from dus and kha [cf. su-khá] ...)". The opposite of duhkha is widely thought to be sukha 'running swiftly or easily (only applied to cars or chariots)'—a usage that occurs in the Rig veda. The usual meaning of sukha is now simply 'good', so its apparent opposite, duhkha, should mean 'bad', but such an idea is explicitly refuted by the third characteristic, anatman, as well as by complete agreement in attested Early Buddhism that antilogies such as "good" versus "bad" are misconceived. Accordingly, although the sense of duhkha in Normative Buddhism is traditionally given as 'suffering', that and similar interpretations are highly unlikely for Early Buddhism. Significantly, Monier-Williams himself doubts the usual explanation of duhkha and presents an alternative one immediately after it, namely: duh-stha "'standing badly,' unsteady, disquieted (lit. and fig.); uneasy," and so on. This form is also attested, and makes much better sense as the opposite of the Rig Veda sense of sukha, which Monier-Williams gives in full as "(said to be fr. 5. su + 3. kha, and to mean originally 'having a good axle-hole'; possibly a Prakrit form of su-stha q.v.; cf. duhkha) running swiftly or easily (only applied to cars or chariots, superl[ative] sukhátama), easy". It would seem that there were two forms of each word; Prakrit and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit chose the -kha forms instead of the -stha forms, which survived nevertheless in a much smaller way. The most important point here is that duh + stha literally means 'dis-/ bad-+ stand-', that is, 'badly standing, unsteady' and is therefore virtually identical to the literal meaning of Greek astathmeta, from a- + sta 'not- + stand', both evidently meaning 'unstable'. This strongly suggests that Pyrrho's middle term is in origin a simple calque.

3. Anatman 'No (Innate) Self (-Identity)'

The third term, anatman (Pali anatta), means 'no (innate) self (-identity)'. As with the other characteristics, it is applied to all dharmas, including humans, so it of course includes the idea of the human "self-identity", and much discussion in Buddhist texts and the scholarly literature on them focuses on that idea. Nevertheless, Buddha explicitly says that "all dharmas are anatman." As Hamilton rightly points out, "In a great many, one might almost say most, secondary sources on Buddhism" anatman "has regularly been singled out as being the heart or core of what Buddhism is all about." Like all major Early Buddhist teachings, this one is presented negatively. It rejects the idea of inherent absolutes such as good and bad, true and false, and so on. The rejection is explicit also in Buddhist-influenced Early Taoist texts as well as in early Normative Buddhist texts such as the Pratyutpanna Samadhi Sutra, first translated into Chinese between AD 178 and 189 by the Kushan monk Lokaksema, and the Sukhavativyuha Sutra (translated in the early third century AD), both of which belong to the Pure Land school of Buddhism, traditionally classed as a branch of Mahayana.

The "three characteristics" are said to apply to "all dharmas", that is, everything, and are central in Buddhism. But for Buddha, as for Pyrrho, their reference is exclusively to ethical or moral matters, including emotions and other conflicts. Like Pyrrho, the Buddha did not even mention metaphysics. He is presented in early Normative Buddhist texts as considering metaphysics to be distracting sophism, and refuses to teach it, but that story has patently been concocted to explain why a topic of concern in later times was not discussed by the Buddha.

Pyrrho's version of the Trilaksana is so close to the Indian Buddhist one that it is virtually a translation of it: both the Buddha and Pyrrho make a declaration in which they list three logical characteristics of all discrete "(ethical) things, affairs, questions", but they give them exclusively negatively, that is, "All matters are non-x, non-y, and non-z." The peculiar way in which the characteristics are presented is thus the same, the main difference being the order of the first and third characteristics. This passage about the three characteristics is thus the absolutely earliest known bit of Buddhist doctrinal text. It is firmly dated three centuries earlier than the Gandhari texts.

---

Excerpted from Greek Buddha by Christopher I. Beckwith. Copyright © 2015 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

---