India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism

India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism

India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism

India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism

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Overview

India and China, the ‘cultural cousins’ of the past were reduced to ‘colonial cousins’ during the 19th century by the British colonialists. If the colonial connections strengthened the bonds between the Indian and Chinese people during the 19th century, the same sowed the seeds of conflict during the 20th century. India wished to forge alliance with the nationalist as well as the communist China; however, the colonial legacy denied that alliance with both the parties. India’s hobnobbing with Taiwan in the wake of the 1962 hostilities did not go unnoticed in Beijing, however, after the relations were restored between India and China in mid 1970s, India became cautious and remains so developing more intimate relations with Taiwan, albeit there is a momentum as far as cultural and educational ties are concerned. India and Taiwan: From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism is a collection of eleven essays by eminent Indian and Taiwanese scholars, as well as research scholars who look at the multifaceted relationship between India and the Republic of China and contemporary Taiwan from strategic, trade, economics, educational and cultural perspectives. This has been a multilayered relationship where there are shades of support and sympathy, cooperation and conflict, attempts to befriend enemy’s enemy briefly, and now seeking more depth as regards security, trade, cultural and educational etc. arenas are concerned. However, China remains a factor, and both are not willing to cross the red line when we talk about relations between the two. Major areas covered in this volume pertain to India and the ROC prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, which includes perceptions on Tibet issue, quest for alliance, Chiang Kai-shek and the India-China-Burma theatre of war, the then ROC ambassador to India, Luo Jialun paying his last respect to Gandhi in 1948; India-Taiwan security and trade relations; experiences of developmental states in India and Taiwan; educational and cultural cooperation between India and Taiwan; Taiwan studies in India, the future direction of the India-China relations, and if Taiwan could play a bit of its role here. The collected essays are pertinent, as they help us to understand the past as well as present scenarios between India and the ROC on one hand and India and Taiwan on the other. These are also relevant to any researcher delving into the India-China relations.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9789384464912
Publisher: VIJ Books (India) Pty Ltd
Publication date: 01/01/2016
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 246
File size: 1 MB

About the Author

B R Deepak is Professor of Chinese and China Studies at the Centre for Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He specializes in Chinese civilization, contemporary China, India-China relations, China’s relations with its neighbors and major powers. He also has interest in Chinese classical literature and has translated the Analects of Confucius into Hindi recently.
D P Tripathi is the Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha). He is also the General Secretary and chief spokesman of the Nationalist Congress Party, and member the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India and the Standing Committee on External Affairs of the Parliament.

Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

The Republic of China: How the British were outmanoeuvred in diplomacy over the question of Tibet

B. R. Deepak

Tibet, from the very beginning of 20 century was a bone of contention between China and the British. In order to open Tibet for trade, and more so to check the Russian advance, Britain invaded Tibet in 1904, and forced Lhasa Convention on Tibet. Xinhai Revolution or the Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Manchus in an armed rebellion. The Chinese garrison at Lhasa had revolted and deposed the last Manchu Amban in Tibet. The killing of Zhao Erfeng, a Han Chinese bannerman Amban, and brain behind the Chinese expansion in eastern Tibet in December 1911 proved to be a signal for widespread revolt. According to Liu (1921: 540), the Tibetans under the influence of Kalon (the commander of the Tibetan forces in east) declared independence and in March, Tibetan forces at Kelunbu were first to raise the banner of revolt. Following this the entire Tibetan region was engulfed in revolt. The Chinese forces stationed in Outer and Inner Tibet were either subdued or forced to surrender their weapons and leave Tibet. Liu also goes on to say that in late June, Tibetan forces invaded Sichuan and occupied Batang, Litang and Daqianlu. In Chamdo, the Chinese garrison under Peng Rishidestroyed the Chamdo monastery.

After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, and subsequent expulsion of the Chinese military and other civil officials from Lhasa, the Tibetans under the Dalai Lama exercised de facto independence for the next 39 years. China under the Republicans however, declined to accept this status of Tibet and tried to exert its control on Tibet in one way or another from time to time. The British on their part worked closely with the Tibetan government but were outmanoeuvred by the Chinese in diplomacy.

The Republican government under Yuan Shikai was reluctant to discontinue the Manchu policy of establishing Ambans in Tibet, albeit under a new name, the Administrator of Tibet. In September 1913, it sent orders to Zhong Ying to replace Lian Yu as Amban (Lamb 1966: 381). The presence of Zhong Ying, who was the commander of the Chinese expeditionary forces to Lhasa in 1910, infuriated the Tibetans and fighting broke out yet again. A truce agreement was signed in the presence of the Nepalese resident on December 14, 1913, and Zhong Ying finally retreated from Lhasa to the Indian borders. While still in Chumbi Valley, he received orders from China to stay back in Tibet. Finally, Lu Xingzhi, who the British considered a Chinese spy (Lamb 1966: 398400), was appointed as Administrator of Tibet but was never permitted to enter Lhasa. Meanwhile, Lian Yu had reached Peking and incited the rulers of Peking against Zhong Ying, blaming him for the Chinese disaster in Tibet. Zhong Ying was finally executed in 1915 by Yuan Shikai government for his crimes in Tibet.

1. The Simla Conference

After Tibet proclaimed independence, the British did not recognise it as an independent state but changed its policy of "Chinese suzerainty over Tibet" to one of "autonomous Tibet." The British were probably not in position to recognise Tibetan independence due to the existing treaties with China. Another reason could be the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 that had reinforced the Chinese suzerainty in Tibet, which is often cited by the British historians as a reason fortheir "nonintervention" in Tibet. However, other factors such as the collapse of the Chinese control in Tibet after the Revolution of 1911, the Dalai Lama's support for the British during his exile in Darjeeling (1910-13), the financial difficulties of Yuan's government, provincial disorder as well as international recognition for the nascent ROC, and the increased Japanese interest in Tibet might have forced the British policy makers to pressure China into accepting the status of Tibet.

It may be recalled at this moment that the main aim of the British was to create a buffer between China and the British dominions along Himalayan states at first instance, and subsequently establish a protectorate over Tibet. The British policy change was hastened by the Chinese pronouncements of forging the union of five races, the preparations of a military expedition from Sichuan to Lhasa, and the Chinese proposal to carve a province (Xikang) out of eastern Tibet (Richardson 1998: 541-2; Richardson 1962: 104-5; Lamb 1966: 427). Moreover, the British were apprehensive about Mongolia and Xinjiang falling into the hands of the Russians, hence their desire for at least establishing their control in Tibet. The Russo-Mongolian Treaty of 1912, which accepted Chinese suzerainty in Mongolia but agreed to preserve Mongolian autonomy, further encouraged the British to design and apply the same scheme of things in Tibet on one hand and make the Russians accept the British position in Tibet in exchange for the British accepting the Russian position in Mongolia on the other. Thus the British strategy in real terms was to redefine the status of Tibet to its own advantage and confirm this by a tripartite agreement between the Chinese, the Tibetans and themselves.

The Chinese on their part wanted to reassert their control on Tibet, which they had lost in the wake of 1911 revolution. The Tibetans obviously wanted to assert independence over the entire Tibetan population, including Kham and Amdo in eastern Tibet, and wanted the Chinese to evacuate these places. In order to realise the British ambitions in Tibet, Sir John Jordan, the British Minister in Beijing, made the first move on 17 August 1912. Jordan presented a five point memorandum to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, protesting against the Chinese military intervention in eastern Tibet and demanding that:

1. China should not intervene in the internal affairs of Tibet.

2. As a suzerain, China is free to station a resident in Tibet but not forces.

3. The policy of the Chinese government of incorporating Tibet as a province of China should be repudiated.

4. If the Chinese government does not give a written acceptance of points 1-3, Great Britain would not recognise the Republic of China.

5. Great Britain would close all its borders to Chinese until China made a declaration to the effect of abovementioned demands.

The Chinese government was baffled. They did not accept these proposals when they replied to Jordan's proposals on 23 December 1912. China declared that it would not convert Tibet into a province of China but reserved the right to dispatch troops to Lhasa for fulfilling the treaty obligations and maintaining peace; it further asserted that there was no need to conclude a fresh treaty as the old treaties were still in place (Wang 1998: 27; Li 1956: 133; Lamb 1966: 462). Citing article II of the Sino-Indian Convention of 1906 (The government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibetan territory or to interfere in the administration of Tibet) and the indemnity cleared by China on behalf of Tibet in 1908, it stated that China had exerted its control over Tibet (Liu 1921: 541; Li 1956: 131-2).

Moreover, the reply asked why did not the British protest when China sent Zhao Erfeng with expeditionary forces into Tibet in 1910-11? According to the Chinese, the question of Tibet was settled between the British and Chinese by the Convention of 1906. Not only this, in 1907 the Anglo-Russian Convention on Tibet also recognised Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. However, due to disturbances in many Chinese provinces and other weaknesses, the Chinese government repudiated its initial policy of sending expeditionary forces to Lhasa and reluctantly agreed to participate in a conference in London. The British on their part insisted on Tibetan participation and the venue was fixed at Darjeeling (Liu 1921: 542). The Chinese chose Wen Zongyao as its plenipotentiary but Wen refused to go to India. Wen opined that the Chinese would be better off if the negotiations were held in London not in India. Yuan Shikai then named Zhang Yintang, but the British had not forgotten his participation in the negotiations for the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. Therefore, Zhang was not acceptable to the British. Yuan chose yet another person, Chen Yifan (Ivan Chen), who had been Counsellor at the Chinese Legation in London and was acceptable to the British (Lamb 1966: 470; Li 1956: 135). The British appointed Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, to be assisted by Charles Bell. The Tibetans selected Lonchen Shatra, a senior minister in the Dalai Lama government. The Chinese were reluctant to accept Shatra's status as a plenipotentiary and suggested he be "an adjoint to the Chinese representative" [as was the case during 1908 Trade Regulations negotiations], but the British insisted for equal status. With British insistence the venue was also shifted from Darjeeling to Simla.

Tripartite negotiations began on 13 October 1913 at Simla with Henry McMahon in the Chair. The Chinese scholars are of the view that Sir Charles Bell had already discussed with Lonchen Shatra the agenda of the conference, and had "actively conspired the disintegration of China and flared up Tibetan independence" (Wang 1998: 27-8; Li 1956: 135). They accuse the British of extending hospitality to the Tibetans and conducting many rounds of talks with them even before the arrival of Chen Yifan in Simla and beginning of the Simla Conference. The British on their part blamed China for procrastination and postponement, and uphold that since the Conference was planned to start on 1 July 1913, the Chinese plenipotentiary appeared very reluctant to leave China and asked for postponement (Lamb 1966: 474; Bell 1926: 152).

During the negotiations, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan plenipotentiary, submitted a proposal consisting of six demands. The proposal apart from declaring Tibet an independent state, questioned the validity of Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906; it also claimed territory in Kham (eastern Tibet) that was recently conquered by Zhao Erfeng and also demanded that Daqianlu and Kokonor [Qinghai] be returned to Tibet. The Chinese historians (Liu 1921: 571) point out yet another demand: that the British troops be stationed at Lhasa temporarily and Tibet put under British supervision, though Lamb and other British writers do not mention this point. Obviously, Tibetan territorial claims in eastern Tibet were not acceptable to the Chinese. In the words of Bell (1926: 152), "It should be stated that all these districts form part of Tibet, but some of them have been brought more or less under Chinese control during the last two hundred years". The Chinese counter proposal envisaged that Tibet be regarded as an integral part of China; China undertake not to convert Tibet into a province; China retain the right to appoint an Amban at Lhasa with 2,600 soldiers; Tibet should have no relation with foreign countries except through the Chinese; the Tibetan boundary should be fixed at Giamda, just 100 miles from Lhasa [the line was suggested by Fu Songmu after Zhao Erfeng's conquest in the eastern Tibet] (Liu 1921: 572-3; Lamb 1966: 479-80; Richardson 1962, 108). According to the British (Lamb 1966: 280; Richardson 1962: 108), the documentary evidence produced by the Tibetan delegate at Simla Conference far outweighed the Chinese claim for territory, "Chen had with him little more than a pamphlet by Fu Songmu on the campaigns of Zhao Erfeng and a few European works on Tibet." It can be discerned from the accounts of Sir Charles Bell (1926: 153) that the Tibetans were undoubtedly instructed by the British to be prepared for any documentary evidence.

The two proposals were so divergent that it was difficult to reach an agreement. On 17 February, McMahon proposed the Inner and Outer Tibet plan on the basis of Russo-Mongol Treaty of 1912. The draft included 11 articles summarised in the following points.

1. The Governments of Great Britain and China recognise that Tibet is under the suzerainty not sovereignty of China. Both governments recognise the autonomy of Outer Tibet and engage not to interfere in its internal administration.

2. The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province.

3. China may station an Amban in Tibet but his escorts should not exceed 300 men.

4. The Governments of Great Britain and China engage that they will not enter into negotiations regarding Tibet with any other power.

5. The trade regulations of 1893 and 1908 are cancelled.

6. New trade regulations are to be negotiated between Britain and Outer Tibet.

7. British Trade Agents residing at Gyantse may visit Lhasa if necessary to consult the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the 1904 Convention.

8. For the purpose of the present Convention, the borders of Tibet and the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet shall be shown in blue and red respectively.

The Chinese disagreed to these proposals, primarily due to the territorial claims made by Tibet in Kham and Amdo. According to Liu (1921: 576), Chen was entitled to negotiate the problem of Tibetan autonomy but not to give away the territories that Tibet had claimed in Sichuan and Qinghai. Moreover, the example of Treaty of Livadia with Russia, whereby Chong Hou, the Chinese plenipotentiary, had ceded Ili in Xinjiang to Russia and was sentenced to death by Qing Court, was still fresh in his mind. Chen, not realising the repercussions of these articles, agreed to all except article 9 to which he did not express his full agreement (Liu 1921: 576). The Chinese insisted on a border between Inner and Outer Tibet first at Giamda [Jiangda] and later at Enta [Danda], a point on the upper Salween to the west of Chamdo. The main issue remained the Inner-Outer Tibet border and Chen refused to budge from the Chinese stated position at Enta. On April 13, Chen requested the modification of the Inner-Outer alignment, and on 17 April, McMahon proposed that territories northeast of Jagchuka Range in Qinghai, Jinchuan, Daqianlu and Atuntse would be put under direct Chinese control, while Nyarong and Derge should form part of Inner Tibet. These amendments were still not acceptable to Chen, as China was already exercising control in the British proposed concessions. Chen, made some further suggestions on 20 April (Liu 1921:577) as:

a) Qinghai's original boundary runs through the north of Dangla Range; other regions such as Daqianlu, Litang, Batang and Atuntse should be regarded as parts of China proper and governed by China.

b) The territory east of Salween River including Derge, Nyarong and Chamdo, and the territory of 39 tribes should form a special region called Kham.

The negotiations went on for six months; minor amendments were carried out on the 11-point draft proposal and a total seven notes were exchanged. On 27 April McMahon excluded Qinghai from Outer Tibet in the final amendment, and since the Tibetan plenipotentiary had already signed the Draft proposal, McMahon threatened Chen that if he still refused to sign, the British and Tibetans would go ahead and delete Articles II and IV that were primarily concerned with Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. The seven notes envisaged:

1. The signatories of this Convention recognise Tibet as a part of China.

2. The appointment of the Dalai Lama would be reported to the Chinese government, and the investiture of the Dalai Lama by Chinese government would be done through the Chinese Resident at Lhasa.

3. The officials of the Outer Tibet would be appointed and dispatched by the Tibetan Government.

4. Outer Tibet would not send its representatives to the Chinese National Assembly or other such organs.

5. The escorts of the British Trade Agent in Tibet should not exceed 75% of the escorts of the Chinese Resident at Lhasa.

6. China is exempted from the Article III of the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention, which had stipulated that Great Britain and China engage reciprocally to respect the boundary [between Sikkim and Tibet] and to prevent acts of aggression from their respective side of the frontier.

7. China has the right to appoint its Resident at Lhasa. (Liu 1921: 578-9; Richardson 1962: 114).

Chen after some thinking initialled the agreement with British and the Tibetan. He was obviously intimidated by the British. Moreover, he must have thought that since the exchange of notes still regarded Tibet as a part of China, there was no harm in initialling the draft. He also might have thought that initials would be rendered meaningless, should the Chinese government repudiate the draft. He immediately cabled the draft back to China, but the Chinese government repudiated his actions instantly and declined to accept the agreement. It cabled back to Chen instructing him not to sign the final agreement under any circumstances; meanwhile it notified Jordan, the British Minister at Peking, that other items in the draft convention could be accepted but the boundary alignment for Inner-Outer Tibet may be negotiated under following condition.

(Continues…)


Excerpted from "India And Taiwan"
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Excerpted by permission of Vij Books India Pvt Ltd.
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Table of Contents

List of Contributors, Acknowledgement, Introduction, 1. The Republic of China: How the British were outmanoeuvred in diplomacy over the question of Tibet by B R Deepak, The Republic of India and the Republic of China: 1947-1949 47 by B R Deepak, India’s National leaders and the Nationalist China by B R Deepak, Chiang Kai-shek and the China-Burma-India Theatre of War by Lin Hsiao-chen, Paying Last Respects to Mahatma Gandhi by Luo Jialun (Tr. Prashant Kaushik), Testing the Limits of Pragmatic Diplomacy:Taiwan’s Relations with India by Mumin Chen, From Benign Neglect to Pragmatism: The Political and Security Issues between Taiwan and India by Parris H. Chang, Experiences of Developmental State in India and Taiwan by Kalim Siddiqui, Exploring Education Cooperation between Taiwan and India: The Case of Mandarin Chinese Education by Yu-li TUNG, Taiwan Studies in India by Janardan Sahu, India and I by Victor Feng Da-Hsuan, Index

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