Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits
A nuanced discussion of human enhancement that argues for enhancement that does not significantly exceed what is currently possible for human beings.

The transformative potential of genetic and cybernetic technologies to enhance human capabilities is most often either rejected on moral and prudential grounds or hailed as the future salvation of humanity. In this book, Nicholas Agar offers a more nuanced view, making a case for moderate human enhancement—improvements to attributes and abilities that do not significantly exceed what is currently possible for human beings. He argues against radical human enhancement, or improvements that greatly exceed current human capabilities.

Agar explores notions of transformative change and motives for human enhancement; distinguishes between the instrumental and intrinsic value of enhancements; argues that too much enhancement undermines human identity; considers the possibility of cognitively enhanced scientists; and argues against radical life extension. Making the case for moderate enhancement, Agar argues that many objections to enhancement are better understood as directed at the degree of enhancement rather than enhancement itself. Moderate human enhancement meets the requirement of truly human enhancement. By radically enhancing human cognitive capabilities, by contrast, we may inadvertently create beings (“post-persons”) with moral status higher than that of persons. If we create beings more entitled to benefits and protections against harms than persons, Agar writes, this will be bad news for the unenhanced. Moderate human enhancement offers a more appealing vision of the future and of our relationship to technology.

1117299894
Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits
A nuanced discussion of human enhancement that argues for enhancement that does not significantly exceed what is currently possible for human beings.

The transformative potential of genetic and cybernetic technologies to enhance human capabilities is most often either rejected on moral and prudential grounds or hailed as the future salvation of humanity. In this book, Nicholas Agar offers a more nuanced view, making a case for moderate human enhancement—improvements to attributes and abilities that do not significantly exceed what is currently possible for human beings. He argues against radical human enhancement, or improvements that greatly exceed current human capabilities.

Agar explores notions of transformative change and motives for human enhancement; distinguishes between the instrumental and intrinsic value of enhancements; argues that too much enhancement undermines human identity; considers the possibility of cognitively enhanced scientists; and argues against radical life extension. Making the case for moderate enhancement, Agar argues that many objections to enhancement are better understood as directed at the degree of enhancement rather than enhancement itself. Moderate human enhancement meets the requirement of truly human enhancement. By radically enhancing human cognitive capabilities, by contrast, we may inadvertently create beings (“post-persons”) with moral status higher than that of persons. If we create beings more entitled to benefits and protections against harms than persons, Agar writes, this will be bad news for the unenhanced. Moderate human enhancement offers a more appealing vision of the future and of our relationship to technology.

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Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits

Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits

by Nicholas Agar
Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits

Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits

by Nicholas Agar

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Overview

A nuanced discussion of human enhancement that argues for enhancement that does not significantly exceed what is currently possible for human beings.

The transformative potential of genetic and cybernetic technologies to enhance human capabilities is most often either rejected on moral and prudential grounds or hailed as the future salvation of humanity. In this book, Nicholas Agar offers a more nuanced view, making a case for moderate human enhancement—improvements to attributes and abilities that do not significantly exceed what is currently possible for human beings. He argues against radical human enhancement, or improvements that greatly exceed current human capabilities.

Agar explores notions of transformative change and motives for human enhancement; distinguishes between the instrumental and intrinsic value of enhancements; argues that too much enhancement undermines human identity; considers the possibility of cognitively enhanced scientists; and argues against radical life extension. Making the case for moderate enhancement, Agar argues that many objections to enhancement are better understood as directed at the degree of enhancement rather than enhancement itself. Moderate human enhancement meets the requirement of truly human enhancement. By radically enhancing human cognitive capabilities, by contrast, we may inadvertently create beings (“post-persons”) with moral status higher than that of persons. If we create beings more entitled to benefits and protections against harms than persons, Agar writes, this will be bad news for the unenhanced. Moderate human enhancement offers a more appealing vision of the future and of our relationship to technology.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780262318983
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 12/13/2013
Series: Basic Bioethics
Sold by: Penguin Random House Publisher Services
Format: eBook
Pages: 232
File size: 497 KB
Age Range: 18 Years

About the Author

Nicholas Agar is Professor of Ethics at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. He is the author of Humanity's End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement and Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits, both published by the MIT Press.

Table of Contents

Series Foreword ix

Preface xi

Acknowledgments xv

1 Radical Human Enhancement as a Transformative Change 1

Transformative Change and Invasion of the Body Snatchers 5

The Rational Irreversibility of Some Transformative Changes 10

Positive and Negative Transformative Changes 14

Radical Enhancement as a Negative Transformative Change 15

2 Two Ideals of Human Enhancement 17

Defining Human Enhancement 18

The Objective Ideal of Human Enhancement 20

The Instrumental and Intrinsic Value of Human Capacities 26

Anthropocentric Ways of Evaluating Enhancements 27

3 What Interest Do We Have in Superhuman Feats? 33

The Value of Enhanced Marathons 34

Simulation and Meaning 36

Is Human Enhancement the Right Way to Pursue External Goods? 44

Is the Distinction between Internalizing and Externalizing Enhancement Philosophically Principled? 50

4 The Threat to Human Identities from Too Much Enhancement 55

Two Psychological Accounts of Personal Identity 56

A Threat to Identity from Life Extension 57

Radical Enhancement and Autobiographical Memory 60

How Does Autobiographical Memory Work? 62

An Asymmetry in Our Attitudes toward Past and Future 66

The Tension between Enhancement and Survival 69

The Analogy with Childhood 70

Why Radical Enhancement Is More Psychologically Disruptive Than Growing Up 75

The Regress Problem: The Tragedy of Unending Enhancement 76

5 Should We Enhance Our Cognitive Powers to Better Understand the Universe and Our Place in It? 81

Understanding the Consequences of Cognitive Enhancement for Science 84

Two Ways in Which Human Science and Radically Enhanced Science Might Be Fundamentally Different 88

Differences in Idealization as Fundamental Differences between Human and Radically Enhanced Science 89

Idealizations That Enhance the Power of Scientific Explanations 93

Mathematics as a Bridge between Human and Radically Enhanced Science 95

Human Science, Radically Enhanced Science, and the Theory of Everything 97

Dawkins and Haldane versus Deutsch on the Limits of Human Science 98

How Different Idealizations Generate Different Theories of Everything 102

Valuing Human Science and Radically Enhanced Science 105

Radical Enhancement Reduces the Intrinsic Value of Our Cognitive Faculties 106

What of Scientific Enhancement's Instrumental Benefits? 109

6 The Moral Case against Radical Life Extension 113

Two Kinds of Anti-Aging Research 114

The SENS Response to the Seven Deadly Things 117

Is Aging Really a Disease? 120

The Testing Problem 122

Why WILT (and Other SENS Therapies) Will Require Dangerous Human Trials 126

Where to Find Human Guinea Pigs for SENS 129

Will Volunteer Risk Pioneers Help Out? 131

Ethical Anti-Aging Experiments Not Now, but Some Day? 135

7 A Defense of Truly Human Enhancement 137

The Ubiquity of Human Enhancement 139

Enhancement and Heredity 142

Defining Genetic Enhancement 143

The Interactionist View of Development 144

Six Ways in Which Genetic Enhancements Could Turn Out to Be More Morally Problematic Than Environmental Enhancements (but, in Fact, Do Not) 146

The Ideal of Truly Human Enhancement 154

8 Why Radical Cognitive Enhancement Will (Probably) Enhance Moral Status 157

Enhancing Moral Status versus Enhancing Moral Dispositions 158

Why It's So Difficult to Enhance the Moral Status of Persons 159

A Justification for (Talking about) Moral Statuses 160

Three Obstacles to Moral Enhancement 161

1 The Problem of the Logic of Thresholds 161

2 The Problem of How to Improve upon Inviolability 163

3 The Problem of Expressing Moral Statuses Higher Than Personhood 164

Three Attempts to Describe Higher Moral Statuses 165

DeGrazia's Dispositionally Superior Post-Persons 167

McMahan's Freer, More Conscious Post-Persons 169

Douglas's Enhanced Cooperators 173

Criteria for Higher Moral Statuses and the Expressibility Problem 174

Why Cognitively Enhanced Beings Are Probably Better Than Us at Judging Relative Moral Status 176

Why Sufficiently Cognitively Enhanced Beings Will (Probably) Find That Cognitive Differences between Them and Us Mark a Difference in Moral Status 177

Two Hypotheses about Higher Moral Statuses 178

9 Why Moral Status Enhancement Is a Morally Bad Thing 181

Some Assumptions 182

Why a Change in Relative Moral Status Is Likely to Lead to Significant Harms for Human Mere Persons 184

Why Post-Persons Will Probably Identify Many Supreme Opportunities Requiring the Sacrifice of Mere Persons 189

What Complaint Can Mere Persons Make about the Harms They Suffer in Mixed Societies? 190

Why a Loss of Relative Status Is Unlikely to Be Adequately Compensated 193

10 A Technological Yet Truly Human Future-as Depicted in Star Trek 195

Notes 201

Index 213

What People are Saying About This

Neil Levy

Debates over human enhancement too often pit equally simplistic enhancement enthusiasts and enhancement luddites against one another. In Truly Human Enhancement Nicholas Agar takes us beyond this kind of futile debate, into the difficult questions concerning which enhancements are worth pursuing and on what grounds. Agar's opposition to many kinds of radical enhancements—on the grounds that they have negative prudential value to the unenhanced—represents to my mind the most serious challenge to transhumanists. Enthusiasts and conservatives will disagree with his arguments, but they cannot ignore them.

Endorsement

Debates over human enhancement too often pit equally simplistic enhancement enthusiasts and enhancement luddites against one another. In Truly Human Enhancement Nicholas Agar takes us beyond this kind of futile debate, into the difficult questions concerning which enhancements are worth pursuing and on what grounds. Agar's opposition to many kinds of radical enhancements—on the grounds that they have negative prudential value to the unenhanced—represents to my mind the most serious challenge to transhumanists. Enthusiasts and conservatives will disagree with his arguments, but they cannot ignore them.

Neil Levy, Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, University of Melbourne

From the Publisher

Debates over human enhancement too often pit equally simplistic enhancement enthusiasts and enhancement luddites against one another. In Truly Human Enhancement Nicholas Agar takes us beyond this kind of futile debate, into the difficult questions concerning which enhancements are worth pursuing and on what grounds. Agar's opposition to many kinds of radical enhancements—on the grounds that they have negative prudential value to the unenhanced—represents to my mind the most serious challenge to transhumanists. Enthusiasts and conservatives will disagree with his arguments, but they cannot ignore them.

Neil Levy, Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, University of Melbourne

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