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CHAPTER 1
TAKE RESPONSIBILITY
I was serving onboard the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), the lead ship of her class of amphibious transport dock ships, when I received transfer orders from my new command:
Welcome Aboard and congratulations on your assignment to Assault Craft Unit FOUR, where the Navy's newest and most advanced amphibious assault craft are located. You are about to embark on one of the most challenging and rewarding tours in your naval career. Designed to operate from every well deck configured amphibious ship, the Landing Craft Air Cushion's (LCAC) main mission is to deliver a 60-ton payload to a designated beachhead at speeds in excess of 35 knots. Combining high speed, exceptional maneuverability, and long-range qualities with the ability to travel over land, the LCAC provides added versatility to our Amphibious Forces ... Welcome Aboard.
After researching the command's history on the Internet, I learned that the LCAC employs air-cushion vehicle technology, combined with state-of-the-art marine gas turbine propulsion. The craft flies on a cushion of air contained within a flexible skirt of synthetic rubberized nylon. This design allows the LCAC to conduct high-speed, over-the-horizon, ship-to-shore movement of Marine Corps assets from amphibious ships to over 70 percent of the world's beaches, compared to only 17 percent using conventional landing craft. In an overload condition, it is capable of carrying a Marine M1A1 Main Battle Tank. It can operate over marshes, reefs, and other areas inaccessible to conventional landing craft. I thought, WOW! I am going to be the maintenance department head and senior engineer of ACU 4's Fleet Maintenance Activity.
In my excitement, I reviewed the ACU 4 website to find its mission: "To provide combat ready craft that fully meets operational tasking worldwide, on time, every time." I knew then that I was about to be challenged like never before.
I had seen the LCAC while embarked in San Antonio's well deck. With two fully loaded LCAC, the ship was able to transport and land marines with their equipment and supplies from its well deck. The embarked LCAC supported amphibious assault, special operations, or expeditionary warfare missions and served as secondary aviation platforms for amphibious-ready groups. The ability of San Antonio to carry LCAC helped sea warriors execute expeditionary missions throughout the world; this was amazing to watch as I performed my duties as debark control officer and ballast control officer.
I had heard some wonderful things about ACU 4 and was eager to get started. I was highly honored and very proud of the prospect of leading the men and women of MD-FMA at ACU 4. When I arrived in July 2014, I checked in with the executive and commanding officers (XO, CO). I was informed of how, on a daily basis, the sailors demonstrated their commitment to excellence and willingness to go the extra mile to produce first-rate, quality repairs. They stated how the organization had done an extraordinary job of overcoming any and all obstacles by coming up with smart and efficient ways to maintain craft readiness. It was pleasing to hear how the fleet maintenance activity team promoted pride and professionalism at every turn and didn't let declining resources, under-funding, or manpower shortages get in their way. I felt very fortunate to have such a key role in complementing the successes of ACU 4 maintenance.
There was one thing that really stood out about ACU 4, of which I had not taken much notice before. It was their motto: "Above and Beyond." For me, this slightly redundant expression meant they were exceeding what a particular job required and were exceeding expectations. So, not only was I on the brink of the most challenging and rewarding tour in my naval career, but I had to do more and perform better than would usually be expected of a surface engineer, limited duty officer.
I met with the officer of the fleet maintenance activity and proceeded with the turnover. As the new leader and manager in engineering, maintenance, and repair, I had to own what had been handed to me. It was now on me to lead the only fleet maintenance activity for thirty-five East Coast-based LCAC — valued at twenty-three million dollars each — that provided organizational, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance and repair in support of amphibious striking force capability for Commander, US Fleet Forces Command; Commander, Naval Surface Force, Atlantic; Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group TWO; and Commander, Naval Beach Group TWO.
I had already started instituting a number of minor changes at the MD-FMA, including rebranding the nine shop and work-center areas, capturing and showcasing photographs of the sailors hard at work and getting rid of what I considered clutter in and around the organization. The clutter hampered functionality and threatened future expansion of the command's maintenance and administrative footprint. What appeared to be a major problem, but not a concern to most, was the fundamentals of quality maintenance and repair evidenced by the 37 percent average LCAC readiness (thirteen of thirty-five available for task).
Alarmed at the low LCAC readiness during the weekly status briefings to the commanding officer, I thought, How can we continue to meet our mission to continuously provide combat-ready craft that fully meet operational tasking worldwide if this number stays low?
I have to admit, I was quite embarrassed to be briefing the commanding officer of such low LCAC readiness when it was within my scope of responsibility and expertise. I had to do something. First, I established an LCAC status for my MD-FMA team a day prior to briefing the CO. By doing so, I was able ensure the CO received the most accurate information being reported. I will elaborate more in chapter 6. Then, I conducted a ninety-day review of ACU 4's fleet maintenance activity with the LCAC community mid-level managers that revealed a floundering maintenance strategy. Honestly, what we found was a badly broken business model in need of change. In particular, six key areas required our immediate attention:
• Insufficient LCAC crew staffing
• Decreased experienced/skilled personnel
• Broken processes
• Lack of procedural compliance
• Duplication of efforts across the organization
• Challenging cultural habits
To validate our findings, we solicited the help of the aviation community, who conducted a top-down review of our operational and maintenance philosophy. This assessment would prove pivotal later in the development of an executable plan to reshape our maintenance infrastructure. A post-command aviator and maintenance officer conducted a comprehensive review over a two-week period and concluded that ACU 4's LCAC readiness, preventive/corrective maintenance strategy, and repair accomplishment required immediate corrective action. The written report was staggering and indicated our reduction in readiness was due to the issues listed above.
Sufficient LCAC crew members were not available to fully man all LCAC, and a rapid decrease occurred in the number of experienced/ skilled journeyman-level technicians. I was losing institutional knowledge as these technicians were being permanently transferred. This contributed to the decline in overall LCAC readiness.
In addition, managers and supervisors had not trained the sailors in the value of personal ownership and quality maintenance of work. Minimal effort was expended to resolve an issue. If even the most minor hurdles were encountered, sailors and managers were quick to elude a problem with no concern. These attitudes resulted in a replace rather than attempt repair culture.
To remedy this, all LCAC would be issued to crew members for specific missions, and all personnel, who had not already been assigned to a deploying detachment, would be assigned to shops. Additionally, we would use an aviation model, called Maintenance Control, to become our central location for planning all preventive and corrective maintenance.
The broken processes would be mended with small working groups, reviewing current processes and developing new and improved ones. We thought a two-shift concept, with both night and day shifts staffed as close to 50 percent as possible, including management, would increase LCAC readiness. Both shifts had to have the same fix, form, and function in order to operate effectively. The second shift could not be expected to accomplish their work efficiently without full support. If possible, all command functions had to occur during the overlap period between shifts or be altogether duplicated.
My role as the MD-FMA officer seemed to contradict the efforts of the operations maintenance officer. To streamline efforts, these positions needed to be brought together as maintenance officer and assistant maintenance officer. Our plan would nearly triple the size of the MD-FMA, from 125 up to 370 personnel. Also, I needed to improve the LCAC hourly package tracking through the WEB log database, without operating the LCAC over the required hours (100-, 200-, 300-, 400-, and 500-hour packages). We had to reduce the number of waivers on behalf of the LCAC crew not meeting their proficiency hours.
There was a major lack in procedural compliance. Some reverted to an ambiguous Safe Engineering and Operations Program (SEAOPS) manual standard as opposed to the more appropriate Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (JFMM). The lack of procedural compliance meant we were not demanding written procedures every time an evolution was performed, to ensure it was followed precisely, in order. No one was checking to ensure the equipment operated as designed.
It is never acceptable to deviate from a written procedure without approval from the commanding officer. However, when a procedure or a result was suspect, some technicians didn't stop to check it. If a procedure is found deficient, procedure dictates it must be formally corrected for future use. Following the prescribed method would reduce wasteful spending in replacing lost tools. We saw the need to rejuvenate two-standard compliance efforts: the fledgling centralized tool issue and accountability program; and direct oversight from supervisors and managers over written procedures. Written procedures included all equipment operating procedures, technical manuals, temporary standing orders, standing orders, standard operating procedures, check lists, emergency procedures, planned maintenance system (PMS) cards, and several others.
In order to prevent duplication of efforts across the organization, we needed effective communication regarding maintenance and repair status during the turnovers from day to night shift. The day shift would review the night shift's completions and plan priorities for the day accordingly. All personnel needed to communicate all information in a very specific way, every time, so that miscommunication would not jeopardize our maintenance efforts.
Therefore, we created pass-down logs to document communication. This confirmation of understanding is critical prior to any change in LCAC or system operation. Since leadership is about getting other people to do what you want them to do, it follows that communication — transmitting information so that it's clearly understood — is vital.
There were plausible existing standards, but the existing culture made them a challenge to enforce. The culture consisted of taking four-day weekends and finding any excuse not to be working (i.e., fun runs, volunteer opportunities, etc.), which produced the perception that outside activities were more important than LCAC readiness. This was the attitude at all levels of the chain of command. The sailors observed leadership taking advantage of the system as it existed and mimicked these behaviors. Additionally, when extended hours were required, sailors at all levels exhibited defiant behavior, and production slowed.
I saw the changes required. I needed to eliminate official half days. If managers thought necessary, we needed to delegate a shop supervisor to handle and stagger assignments throughout the week. I had entered a culture where several managers didn't respect the orders of the department head or division officers without being told the order came from the executive officer. They would not take ownership or accept the assignment. I would give an order, and some would ask me where it came from — this was a red flag. Such skepticism and disrespect had to stop immediately.
As a top-level manager, I give orders that have originated at a higher level of command. Many times, I am simply passing the orders along. One of my managers used the following manner to give his sailors such orders: "LCDR Richardson says we have to be at work on time every morning — no more half-day Fridays." This method of giving orders is common but wrong. When he gave this order, he should have stated it as his order. What do I mean by this? Here is an example: "Beginning tomorrow, everyone must be at work on time every morning." In this manner, he builds his own authority with subordinates.
But why does it matter? One day the need may arise for him to take charge in an emergency or in absence of superiors. Passing orders in the proper manner preconditions his workers to respond to his commands. The following story, "Damn Exec," by then-Lieutenant Commander Stuart D. Landersman, former executive officer, USS STICKELL (DD 888), should clarify this point:
The Norfolk wind was streaking the water of Hampton Roads as Commander Martin K. Speaks, U.S. Navy, Commanding Officer of the USS BOWENS (DD 891), stepped from his car, slammed the door, and straightened his cap. As he approached the pier head a sentry stepped from the sentry hut and saluted.
"Good morning, Captain."
"Good morning, Kowalski," answered Commander Speaks. He took pleasure in the fact that he knew the sailor's name. Kowalski was a good sailor. He had served his entire first cruise in the BOWENS and did his work well.
The Captain noticed that over his blues Kowalski wore a deck force foul weather jacket, faded, frayed, dirty, and spotted with red lead. "Little chilly this morning," said the Captain as he walked by. "Yes sir, sure is," replied the sailor with his usual grin.
As the Captain approached his quarterdeck there was the usual scurrying of people and four gongs sounded. "BOWENS arriving," spoke the loudspeaker system, and Lieutenant (j.g.) Henry Graven, U.S. Naval Reserve, gunnery officer and the day's command duty officer, came running to the quarterdeck. Salutes and cheerful "good mornings" were exchanged, and the Captain continued to his cabin.
Lieutenant Graven looked over the quarterdeck and frowned. "Let's get this brightwork polished chief."
"It's already been done once this morning, sir," replied the OOD.
"Well, better do it again. The Exec will have a fit if he sees it this way," said Graven, again on the quarterdeck."
Later that morning Captain Speaks was going over some charts with the ship's Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Steven A. Lassiter, U.S. Navy. The Captain had just finished his coffee and lighted a cigarette. "Steve, I noticed our pier sentry in an odd outfit this morning. He had a foul weather jacket on over his blues; it looked pretty bad."
"Yes sir. Well, it gets cold out there, and these deck force boys have mighty bad looking jackets," the Exec said.
The Captain felt the Exec had missed his point and said, "Oh, I realize they have to wear a jacket, but for a military watch like that, I'd like to see them wear pea coats when it's cold."
Lieutenant Graven was talking with a third class boatswain's mate on the fantail when the quarterdeck messenger found him. When told that the Executive Officer wanted to see him, Graven ended his discussion with, "There, hear that? He probably wants to see me about that brightwork. I don't care how many men it takes to do it, the Exec told me to be sure to get that brightwork polished every morning."
The Executive Officer indicated a chair to Graven and they both lighted up cigarettes. "How's it going these days?" asked the Exec.
Lassiter had always liked Graven, but in the past few months, since he had taken over as senior watch officer, Graven seemed to have more problems than usual.
"Okay, I guess," Graven replied with a forced grin. He knew things were not as they used to be. It seemed strange, too, because everyone on the ship had been so glad to be rid of the previous senior watch officer, that "damn" Lieutenant Dumphy. The junior officers even had a special little beer bust at the club to celebrate Dumphy's leaving and Craven's "fleeting up" to senior watch officer. Now the Exec was always after him. The junior officers didn't help much either, always complaining about the Exec. Maybe the Exec was taking over as "the heel" now that Dumphy was gone.
"That's good," said the Exec, "here's a little thing that you might look into. These men that stand pier watches have to wear a jacket, but the foul weather jacket doesn't look good for a military watch. I'd like to see them wear their pea coats when it's cold." Graven had expected something like this, more of the Exec's picking on him. He responded properly, got up, and left.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Above and Beyond"
by .
Copyright © 2017 Dennis L. Richardson.
Excerpted by permission of AuthorHouse.
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