Athenian Ostracism and its Original Purpose: A Prisoner's Dilemma
Ostracism is by far the most emblematic institution of ancient Athenian democracy. This volume offers a reassessment of recently found ostraka (or potsherds, on which the names of the 'candidates' for exile were inscribed by citizens) from several Greek cities outside Athens, a thorough reconstruction of the history and of the procedure of ostracism in Athens, and a comprehensive account of the political circumstances of the introduction of the law on ostracism by Cleisthenes in 508/507 BCE. Marek Węcowski's original study focuses not only on the final stage, the day of the vote, but on the entire operation and procedure of ostracisation. Tracing the logic of the political play in Athens between the opening and final stages of ostracism, Węcowski argues that Athenian ostracism was a mechanism devised to impose compromise on the main players in Athenian political life, thereby avoiding the punishment of political elites by exile of leading politicians resulting from unpredictable votes by the citizenry. To support this hypothesis, Węcowski turns to the theory of the 'evolution of cooperation' as formulated by the American mathematician and political scientist Robert Axelrod based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma in game theory, applied as a probabilistic analogy to the dynamics of Athenian political life under democracy.
1141959310
Athenian Ostracism and its Original Purpose: A Prisoner's Dilemma
Ostracism is by far the most emblematic institution of ancient Athenian democracy. This volume offers a reassessment of recently found ostraka (or potsherds, on which the names of the 'candidates' for exile were inscribed by citizens) from several Greek cities outside Athens, a thorough reconstruction of the history and of the procedure of ostracism in Athens, and a comprehensive account of the political circumstances of the introduction of the law on ostracism by Cleisthenes in 508/507 BCE. Marek Węcowski's original study focuses not only on the final stage, the day of the vote, but on the entire operation and procedure of ostracisation. Tracing the logic of the political play in Athens between the opening and final stages of ostracism, Węcowski argues that Athenian ostracism was a mechanism devised to impose compromise on the main players in Athenian political life, thereby avoiding the punishment of political elites by exile of leading politicians resulting from unpredictable votes by the citizenry. To support this hypothesis, Węcowski turns to the theory of the 'evolution of cooperation' as formulated by the American mathematician and political scientist Robert Axelrod based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma in game theory, applied as a probabilistic analogy to the dynamics of Athenian political life under democracy.
76.29 In Stock
Athenian Ostracism and its Original Purpose: A Prisoner's Dilemma

Athenian Ostracism and its Original Purpose: A Prisoner's Dilemma

by Marek Wecowski
Athenian Ostracism and its Original Purpose: A Prisoner's Dilemma

Athenian Ostracism and its Original Purpose: A Prisoner's Dilemma

by Marek Wecowski

eBook

$76.29 

Available on Compatible NOOK devices, the free NOOK App and in My Digital Library.
WANT A NOOK?  Explore Now

Related collections and offers

LEND ME® See Details

Overview

Ostracism is by far the most emblematic institution of ancient Athenian democracy. This volume offers a reassessment of recently found ostraka (or potsherds, on which the names of the 'candidates' for exile were inscribed by citizens) from several Greek cities outside Athens, a thorough reconstruction of the history and of the procedure of ostracism in Athens, and a comprehensive account of the political circumstances of the introduction of the law on ostracism by Cleisthenes in 508/507 BCE. Marek Węcowski's original study focuses not only on the final stage, the day of the vote, but on the entire operation and procedure of ostracisation. Tracing the logic of the political play in Athens between the opening and final stages of ostracism, Węcowski argues that Athenian ostracism was a mechanism devised to impose compromise on the main players in Athenian political life, thereby avoiding the punishment of political elites by exile of leading politicians resulting from unpredictable votes by the citizenry. To support this hypothesis, Węcowski turns to the theory of the 'evolution of cooperation' as formulated by the American mathematician and political scientist Robert Axelrod based on the iterated prisoner's dilemma in game theory, applied as a probabilistic analogy to the dynamics of Athenian political life under democracy.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780192587565
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Publication date: 11/17/2022
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 304
File size: 1 MB

About the Author

Marek Węcowski is Associate Professor of Ancient History at the University of Warsaw and member of the Academic Board of the Polish Archaeological Institute at Athens. He studied in Warsaw and in Paris at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. He was a junior fellow at Harvard's Center for Hellenic Studies and a Fulbright Visiting Professor at Princeton University. His research interests include archaic Greek poetry, Greek historiography, archaic and classical Greek history, and Athenian democracy. He is the author of The Rise of the Greek Aristocratic Banquet (OUP, 2014).

Table of Contents

  • Introduction
  • Part I: Key Issues in the Study of Athenian Ostracism
  • 1: Ostracism before Ostracism?
  • 2: Towards a Reconstruction of Ostracism in Athens: The Facts
  • 3: Towards a Reconstruction of Ostracism in Athens: The Procedures
  • Part II: Towards an Interpretation of the Original Aims of Athenian Ostracism
  • 4: The Historical Context of the Cleisthenian Law about Ostracism
  • 5: The Prisoner's Dilemma: Ostracism and Competition among Athenian Political Élites
  • Epilogue and Conclusions: The Decline and Fall of Athenian Ostracism
From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews