In this landmark book, award-winning historian Peter Edwards skillfully unravels the complexities of the global Cold War, decolonization in Southeast Asia, and Australian domestic politics. The Vietnam War was Australia's longest and most controversial military commitment of the 20th century, ending in humiliation for the United States and its allies with the downfall of South Vietnam. The war provoked deep divisions in Australian society and politics, particularly because for the first time young men were conscripted for overseas service in a highly contentious ballot system. The Vietnam era is still identified with diplomatic, military, and political failure. Was Vietnam a case of Australia fighting “other people's wars”? Were we really “all the way” with the United States? How valid was the “domino theory”? Did the Australian forces develop new tactical methods in earlier Southeast Asian conflicts, and just how successful were they against the unyielding enemy in Vietnam? This book provides new, often surprising, answers to these questions.
In this landmark book, award-winning historian Peter Edwards skillfully unravels the complexities of the global Cold War, decolonization in Southeast Asia, and Australian domestic politics. The Vietnam War was Australia's longest and most controversial military commitment of the 20th century, ending in humiliation for the United States and its allies with the downfall of South Vietnam. The war provoked deep divisions in Australian society and politics, particularly because for the first time young men were conscripted for overseas service in a highly contentious ballot system. The Vietnam era is still identified with diplomatic, military, and political failure. Was Vietnam a case of Australia fighting “other people's wars”? Were we really “all the way” with the United States? How valid was the “domino theory”? Did the Australian forces develop new tactical methods in earlier Southeast Asian conflicts, and just how successful were they against the unyielding enemy in Vietnam? This book provides new, often surprising, answers to these questions.
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In this landmark book, award-winning historian Peter Edwards skillfully unravels the complexities of the global Cold War, decolonization in Southeast Asia, and Australian domestic politics. The Vietnam War was Australia's longest and most controversial military commitment of the 20th century, ending in humiliation for the United States and its allies with the downfall of South Vietnam. The war provoked deep divisions in Australian society and politics, particularly because for the first time young men were conscripted for overseas service in a highly contentious ballot system. The Vietnam era is still identified with diplomatic, military, and political failure. Was Vietnam a case of Australia fighting “other people's wars”? Were we really “all the way” with the United States? How valid was the “domino theory”? Did the Australian forces develop new tactical methods in earlier Southeast Asian conflicts, and just how successful were they against the unyielding enemy in Vietnam? This book provides new, often surprising, answers to these questions.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781742241678 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | UNSW Press |
| Publication date: | 04/01/2014 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 304 |
| File size: | 11 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
About the Author
Peter Edwards was the Official Historian and general editor of the nine-volume Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975. He was also the author of the volumes dealing with politics, strategy, and diplomacy, Crises and Commitments and A Nation at War. His other books and monographs include Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins, Permanent Friends? Historical Reflections on the Australian-American Alliance, Prime Ministers and Diplomats, and Robert Marsden Hope and Australian Public Polic. He is currently an adjunct professor at the Alfred Deakin Research Institute of Deakin University, a Member of the Order of Australia, a Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and a former Trustee of the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne.
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Australia and the Vietnam War
By Peter Edwards
University of New South Wales Press Ltd
Copyright © 2014 Australian War MemorialAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-74224-669-7
CHAPTER 1
DECOLONISATION AND THE COLD WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 1945–50
The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 brought the Second World War to an end, but did not begin a period of peace and political stability. During the next ten years, many parts of the world were riven with tensions and conflicts, amid a widespread fear of a third global war, in which atomic bombs or even more devastating weapons might be used. Southeast Asia was one of the most bitterly contested regions, but well-informed observers and even participants found it difficult to understand the complex forces involved. With the advantages of historical perspective, we can see the cauldron of Southeast Asian politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a complex interaction between long-standing local rivalries and two of the great historical processes of the post-1945 world – the decolonisation of the European empires, and the Cold War between the communist 'East' and the non-communist 'West', led respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States, together with their respective friends, allies and satellites.
THE DECOLONISATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the only certainty about the future of Southeast Asia was that it would be very different from its past. At the outbreak of the Second World War the region was dominated by the European empires, which had extended their dominance over much of Africa and Asia starting in the 16th century, with a marked expansion in the 19th. By 1939 the Netherlands controlled most of the chain of islands from Sumatra in the west to the western half of New Guinea in the east; France governed the mainland territories collectively known as Indochina; Britain's vast empire included Burma and a number of colonies and protectorates on the Malayan peninsula and its offshore islands, and on the western and northern coasts of Borneo; the United States governed the Philippines, a territory it had acquired from its victory over Spain in 1898; and Portugal had a tiny colony on the eastern half of the island of Timor. Only Thailand remained independent but, bordered by British territories on one side and French on the other, it generally deferred to both European powers.
After their victory over Germany, Italy and Japan in 1945, the British, French and Dutch authorities expected to reassert their pre-war control over their respective territories. Their desire to return was driven by much the same motives as those that had been behind their original acquisition, sometimes summarised as 'gold, God and glory' – that is, to gain access to valuable resources, to spread Christianity, and to acquire the prestige that accompanied imperial status. In particular, the European governments, economically exhausted by years of depression and war, wanted to regain strategically valuable resources such as oil, rubber, tin and rice. The French and the Dutch especially sought reassurance that, after their humiliation at the hands of Nazi Germany and Japan, they could now return to the top table of world powers. They were shocked to discover the strength of the resistance that they encountered from nationalist movements seeking independence. The ease and speed with which the Japanese established control over Southeast Asia in 1941–42 had destroyed the aura of European invincibility. The fall of Singapore in February 1942 had had a huge symbolic effect in the Dutch and French territories as well as the British. When Japan in turn was defeated in 1945, the European powers encountered a great variety of political forces, all seeking to grasp the opportunity of the new post-war era to claim 'national liberation' or 'independence'.
During the 1920s and 1930s, when the European colonial powers had appeared to be firmly in control of their respective possessions, important developments had been taking place in the nationalist movements. The intelligentsia and political activists across the region recognised that their traditional structures had been defeated by the European powers. They now thought, discussed and wrote not only about their desire for independence but also about the nature of the post-colonial governments they hoped to form. In many and varied ways, they became familiar with European political concepts, such as democracy, self-determination, liberalism, socialism and communism. In a great historical irony, they determined to turn these European ideas against their European rulers and apply them to the independent national governments they intended to create.
While the desire to be rid of colonial rule was widespread in South-east Asia, the groups who asserted claims to independence and national liberation were many and diverse. The differing nature of colonial rule in British, French and Dutch territories, and within each of those empires, affected the nature of the anti-colonial movements. All colonies were governed primarily in the interests of the metropolitan powers, but the levels of political repression, economic exploitation and concern for the interests and welfare of the colonial subjects varied greatly. The use of 'direct' or 'indirect' rule – that is, whether the colonial powers exercised their control through their own colonial administrations or through compliant local authorities – differed in different territories. Some large and disparate areas, incorporating numerous traditional states or polities, were governed as one territory, while others with a sense of national identity were divided into smaller units. The size and influence of racial and ethnic groups, including both indigenous populations and immigrant communities, most notably the Chinese, varied greatly. Religious and philosophical identifications, including Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Confucianism, reinforced some ethnic or racial divisions and cut across others. Some groups worked with the colonial powers and hoped to achieve independence in an amicable transfer of power; others had fought their colonial masters with every weapon available to them. During the war some groups had collaborated with the Japanese, seeing this as a way to strengthen their claims to post-war independence; others, particularly those of Chinese ethnic origin, had taken up arms against the Japanese, who treated their Chinese subjects with particular brutality.
Consequently, the aims and methods of those fighting for independence were diverse, often conflicting, and extremely difficult for external observers to comprehend. Some groups wanted the borders of the new independent countries to reflect those drawn up by the European colonialists; others fought for separatist causes based on ethnic, regional or religious identities. Some were communist, at a time when communist movements around the world not only expected at least ideological and diplomatic, if not economic or military, support from like-minded governments and movements but also proclaimed their allegiance to the Soviet Union and its leader, Joseph Stalin, who had emerged with enhanced prestige and power from the world war. In Vietnam at least, some Trotskyites proclaimed their support for an ideology that was even more revolutionary than that of the Stalinists. Other nationalist groups were willing to ally themselves with communists in 'national fronts' to gain independence, in the hope of sharing power in the post-colonial regime, while others again were suspicious of, or openly hostile to, the communists, for a variety of religious, political, social and economic reasons. It was obvious to all that the future of the region would be greatly affected by the outcome of the titanic civil war in China between the Nationalists, led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the communists, led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), which would bring the communists to power in October 1949.
Two Southeast Asian countries became independent soon after the war's end. In 1946 the United States lived up to the promise it had given in the 1930s, to grant independence to the Philippines. Britain granted independence to Burma (Myanmar) in 1948, soon after India and Pakistan and just before Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Although Burma has generally been regarded as part of Southeast rather than South Asia, the story of its decolonisation has more in common with that of its western than of its eastern neighbours. Portugal's return to its tiny colony on Timor attracted little attention. The parts of Southeast Asia of most concern to the external world, especially Australia, in the years after 1945 were those parts of the former British, French and Dutch empires that are known today as Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, together with Thailand.
THE INDONESIAN REVOLUTION
From the late 16th to the early 20th century, the Dutch expanded their interests in the islands they called the East Indies, often in competition with the Portuguese and British. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Dutch East India Company dominated trade in spices and other cash crops. After 1800, when the company was dissolved, the Dutch territories became colonies. Despite strong resistance from several islands and regions, including Aceh, Bali and Lombok, the Dutch gradually expanded their possessions. In 1886 the Dutch, Germans and British determined their respective spheres of influence on the island of New Guinea, with the Dutch claiming the western half, the Germans taking the northeastern quarter and the British the southeastern quarter, but the Dutch did not establish a strong presence in West New Guinea until well into the 20th century. The predominant view in the independence movement was to seek a single Indonesia, incorporating all of the Netherlands East Indies, even though there had been no such polity before the arrival of the Dutch. Nevertheless, the territory of the future Indonesia and the nature of its government were contested, as many islands and regions retained a strong sense of local identity and some nationalists thought West New Guinea should be excluded.
On 17 August 1945, two days after Japan had announced its surrender and before the official documents were signed, the leader of the nationalist movement in the Netherlands East Indies, Sukarno, and his closest associate, Mohammad Hatta, proclaimed the independence of Indonesia. The Dutch entered negotiations with the nationalists, but they sought to establish a federation of semi-autonomous units in a 'United States of Indonesia', which the nationalists regarded as an attempt to preserve an indirect form of Dutch influence. Two agreements, in 1946 and 1948, broke down over fundamental issues and the Dutch twice used military force in what were euphemistically called 'police actions'. The Dutch attempted to use Sukarno's and Hatta's war-time collaboration with the Japanese to denigrate their nationalist credentials, without success. The Dutch also played on the resentment in the 'outer islands' towards domination by Java, but again without success. The nationalist army could not match the weapons of the Dutch, but their skilful use of guerrilla tactics gained widespread popular respect.
Sukarno, a complex and charismatic figure, brought together many groups in the nationalist coalition under a vaguely worded program of panca sila, or five principles, which could be translated as belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice and democracy. The leaders of the movement were predominantly secular, non-communist nationalists. In 1948 elements of the Indonesian communist party, the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI), based at Madiun in central Java, attempted to take over the revolutionary movement to direct it towards their own political ends. Troops of the nationalist army, led by Colonel AH Nasution, crushed this attempted coup. The army emerged from this internal conflict with great prestige and a deep antipathy towards the Indonesian communists.
The secular, republican nationalists were also challenged by Darul Islam, a fundamentalist Islamic movement that sought to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state under sharia law. This group failed to take over the nationalist movement, but retained considerable strength in some areas, especially west Java, Aceh (in northern Sumatra) and southern Sulawesi, and took militant action against the nationalists for years after independence.
Despite these challenges, when the Dutch finally granted independence to Indonesia in 1949, after four years of revolutionary struggle, it was to a secular democratic republic. President Sukarno and his government would continue to face challenges from the communists, from Islamic fundamentalists, and from regional separatists in the outer islands, but their secular, non-communist nationalism was in effective control. Although the Dutch had transferred sovereignty to a federated Republic of the United States of Indonesia, by August 1950 Sukarno was able to proclaim a unitary state, the Republic of Indonesia. In one respect, the nationalists' victory was less than complete. The western half of the island of New Guinea (later known as Irian Jaya and today as the provinces of Papua and West Papua) remained in Dutch hands, the only part of the old Netherlands East Indies not to be incorporated into the independent Indonesia.
THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION
The state of Nam Viet, based on the Red River delta in what is now northern Vietnam, struggled for independence from the Chinese empire for about 1000 years before attaining that goal in 939CE. Its major city, Hanoi, was founded in 1010. Thereafter Vietnamese history was characterised by several enduring themes. Despite a political culture that was more deeply influenced by Chinese standards and concepts than any other in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese fiercely protected their independence against domination by China. The Vietnamese steadily expanded their control southwards from the Red River delta, obliterating the kingdom of Champa, which had controlled much of what is now central Vietnam, by the 16th century and reaching the Mekong delta by the mid-18th century. While the ideal of a united Vietnamese state persisted, so did regional tensions and loyalties. For most of the 18th century, Vietnam was divided between two rival families, the Trinh in the north and the Nguyen in the south. Not until 1802 did a southerner impose unity on the country, taking the throne as Emperor Gia Long and establishing the last Vietnamese dynasty, which survived (at least in name) until 1955. The imperial capital was established at Hue in central Vietnam.
The French moved forcibly into Indochina in the mid-19th century, completing their conquest by 1883. Thereafter the French governed Indochina as five entities. Cochinchina (now southern Vietnam) was ruled directly as a colony, while Annam (central Vietnam) and Tonkin (northern Vietnam) were designated as protectorates, with the emperor as the nominal ruler. The tiny and fragile kingdom of Laos and the larger kingdom of Cambodia, heir to the once powerful Khmer kingdom at Angkor, were also ruled as protectorates.
The French came for imperial prestige and to spread Catholic Christianity: they stayed principally for economic gain. Rice, coffee, rubber and coal became major sources of income. The French imposed harsh labourconditions, a rapacious tax system, and monopolies on essentials such as salt. The ruling elite was predominantly French, but a small Vietnamese class of large landowners was created, especially in the south, where cash crops for export displaced the subsistence farms of the peasants. Many rural Vietnamese were unemployed or were compelled to work in the harsh conditions of the mines, plantations and construction projects. The indigenous middle class was small and weak. Some Vietnamese received a French education, but this served principally to create an intelligentsia who wanted the much-vaunted political and cultural values of metropolitan France applied to the colonies: they saw little evidence of liberty, equality or fraternity in Indochina. Discontent and opposition to the colonial system were widespread at all levels of society, especially in the northern provinces, but the French vigorously repressed all nationalist or anti-colonial movements, whether moderate or radical in nature, even those willing to collaborate with the colonial authorities. This repression served only to deepen the discontent and to favour the dominance within the anti-colonial movement of those best equipped by organisation and doctrine to operate in secret: the communists. The Moscowline communists acted ruthlessly against the Trotskyites as well as less revolutionary nationalists to ensure their own leadership of the nationalist movement.
(Continues...)
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Table of Contents
Preface xi
Abbreviations xvii
Chronology xxi
1 Decolonisation and the Cold War in Southeast Asia 1945-50 1
The decolonisation of Southeast Asia 2
The Cold War 16
2 Australia and Southeast Asia 1945-53 20
The Chifley government's foreign and defence policies 22
The Chifley government, the Indonesian Revolution and the Malayan Emergency 26
The Menkes government and Australian conservatism 29
Menzies and Spender 31
The Menzies government and Indochina 32
The Menzics government and the Malayan Emergency 35
The RAAF in Malaya 37
Australia and the Korean War 38
Australia and the First Indochina War 41
3 Australia and Southeast Asia 1954-60 45
The 'united action' crisis 46
The Geneva Conference 48
The creation of SEATO 50
The Strategic Reserve and the commitment of troops to Malaya 1955 52
Australian troops and the Emergency 1955-60 55
Australia and Vietnam 1955-60 59
Australia, Indonesia and West New Guinea 63
4 The Crises of the Early 1960s 67
The Laos crises 1959-61 68
Commitments to Thailand and Vietnam 1962 73
Confrontation 1963 80
Defence review 1963 84
The commitment to the defence of Malaysia 87
The end of Diem, November 1963 91
Two conflicts, two allies 95
5 Commitments to Confrontation and Vietnam 1963 101
The two crises deepen 102
The commitment of a battalion to Confrontation 109
The commitment of a battalion to Vietnam 112
The announcement and parliamentary reaction 116
Reactions at home and abroad 121
Operations in Confrontation 125
IRAR at Bien Hoa 127
The Malaysia-Singapore split and the commitment of a battalion group 130
The Indonesian coup and its impact on Australian policy 131
6 The Task Force and the Election 1966 134
A new Prime Minister 134
Operations in Borneo 138
The long election campaign 140
The establishment of the task force in Phuoc Tuy 144
The battle of Long Tan 150
Relations with allies and enemies 152
'All the way with LBJ' 156
The commitment confirmed and increased 158
7 Escalation of the Commitment, Escalation of Controversy 1967 162
The escalation of dissent 162
The war of attrition 166
British withdrawal, American pressure 170
The new task force commander 171
The minefield 173
The third battalion 178
ANZAC in Vietnam 180
The task force and its third commander 181
The commitment of three services 182
Death of a Prime Minister 185
8 The Turning-Point 1968-69 187
The revolutions of 1968 187
The Tet offensive and its impact 189
A missed opportunity? 191
Another new Prime Minister 192
Gorton on foreign and defence policies 195
Australian protest 199
The task force 1968-69 202
RAN and RAAF commitments 1968-69 213
The 1969 election 214
9 Social Dissent, Political Division and Military Withdrawal 1969-72 218
The first Australian withdrawal 220
The first Moratorium 222
Task force operations 1969-70 225
The second withdrawal, the civic action crisis and a new Prime Minister 229
The Pentagon Papers 232
Operating under a withdrawal 1971-72 238
Increasing the advisory role 1971-72 240
The withdrawal of RAN and RAAF forces 242
The Easter offensive 242
10 The Whitlam Government and the End of the Vietnam War 1972-75 245
The suspension of conscription, the withdrawal of the AATTV 246
The 'Christmas bombing' and the neat rupture in Australia-US relations 248
Recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 252
From 'forward defence' to 'the self-reliant defence of Australia' 253
The fall of Saigon 1975 255
11 Lessons, Legacies and Legends 261
Defence and strategic policy 263
Dominoes 268
Operational methods 274
Conscription 275
The veterans' experience 277
Some final reflections 284
Appendices
1 Australian Army deployment in Vietnam 1962-73 289
2 Australian chain of command and battalion deployment in Vietnam 1962-73 290
3 Persons named 291
Notes 299
Further Reading 309
Index 322