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Overview
Bannockburn 1314 is the most celebrated battle between Scotland and England. A decisive victory for Robert Bruce, it secured for Scotland independence from England. It was the greatest defeat the English would suffer throughout the Middle Ages, and a huge personal humiliation for Edward II. Chris Brown's account recreates the campaign from the perspectives of both the Scots and English. If you want to know what happened and why read – Battle Story.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780752497860 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | The History Press |
| Publication date: | 10/01/2013 |
| Series: | Battle Story |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 128 |
| File size: | 2 MB |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
Bannockburn 1314
By Chris Brown
The History Press
Copyright © 2013 The History PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7524-9786-0
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At the time of Alexander III's death in 1286, Scotland and England had enjoyed a long tradition of, essentially, good relations. Intermittent attempts by English kings over the preceding two centuries and more to procure a degree of sovereignty over their Scottish counterparts had never really taken root; indeed, it is questionable whether any English king had ever seriously believed that they would. William the Lion (reigned 1165–1214) was obliged to give homage for his kingdom after he was captured in 1174 as part of his ransom arrangements, but fifteen years later he paid a large sum to ensure that he and his successors would be free of any feudal obligation to the English Crown in the future. A century later, when Edward I came to the throne in England, the Scottish king, Alexander III, made a trip south to give homage for his various properties in England. Edward made a rather half-hearted attempt to have Scotland included in the homage ceremony, but this was robustly rejected by Alexander, who told him that the Kingdom of Scotland was held 'from God alone'1, which Edward accepted and there the matter rested.
Relations between the two countries were largely based on social relationships – cross-border landholding was fairly commonplace, but almost all of the properties were relatively modest. Although a Scottish lord might own several properties in England (or in France or Ireland), or vice versa, nobody was a top-ranking noble (or magnate) in both kingdoms. Naturally, any level of landholding automatically meant a degree of obligation to the Crown and therefore anyone who held land in both countries had a range of responsibilities to both kings, but this was never really a very serious problem before the English invasion of 1296, and its significance thereafter has been rather exaggerated by historians. The number of individuals involved was not terribly large in either kingdom and the properties concerned were mostly quite modest. No individual held a property of greater significance than a barony in more than one kingdom. Contrary to the claims of many writers in the past, neither Robert Bruce, nor John Comyn or even Alexander III, was considered a magnate in the English political structure, though all three of them did hold valuable English properties.
There was surprisingly little economic activity between the two countries. England's trade lay mainly with France and Scotland's mainly with the Baltic and the Low Countries – the Netherlands and Belgium. Both countries depended on wool as the chief export crop and there was therefore little point in exporting wool from one to the other. There was, however, a considerable degree of cultural overlap. Both kingdoms had adopted the political and military ethos of France that we now call feudalism. In England this had come about through the Norman Conquest of 1066; in Scotland it had come about through a mixture of exposure to the practices of her southern neighbour, a considerable degree of intermarriage between the two royal families and the senior nobility, and the general adoption of 'feudal' practice across Northern and Western Europe. In short, that was how a 'modern' nation functioned in the later Middle Ages. Long before the outbreak of the wars of independence there was precious little practical cultural, military or political difference between most of Scotland and most of England. There were some very clear regional differences within both countries, but little or nothing to distinguish the social ethos of Brechin from that of Bedford, save that the average 'parish gentry' landholder in Bedford might be more likely to speak French – or at least be able to speak French – than his northern counterpart.
The generally cordial relationship between England and Scotland started to unravel with the death of Alexander III in March 1286. Alexander's two sons by his first marriage had already died, and his granddaughter Margaret (daughter of Erik II of Norway) had been recognised as his heir. There is a possibility that Alexander and Edward were planning a dynastic union of the two countries, which would be achieved by the marriage of Margaret to Edward's eldest son (the future Edward II), but Alexander, still only in his forties, married Yolande de Dreux in 1285 and clearly hoped to produce a direct heir. Alexander's death did not cause an immediate crisis. The Scottish political community was supportive, though the prospect of a female heir, especially one that was still a child, was certainly an unusual thing in medieval Europe. The political situation did, however, become a major issue when Margaret died en route to Scotland in 1290. There were now two serious claimants to the throne, John Balliol and Robert Bruce (grandfather of the man who would become Robert I), and a number of others who might make claims of more dubious validity. Since the death of Alexander, Scotland had been administered by a council of 'guardians' representing the major political groups in the community. This system had worked well for the intervening four years but the question of the succession was too momentous to be decided by a council of lords and clerics, and there was no prospect of reaching a unanimous agreement since the council contained supporters of both of the significant candidates. The council approached Edward I for advice, for which they have attracted a great deal of criticism from historians, but their actions were perfectly rational: Edward had had a good relationship with the late Alexander III; he was known to have a real interest in jurisprudence; he was powerful enough to impose the final decision if necessary; and he was acceptable to both of the main contenders. As the King of Scotland's only neighbour and a major player on the European political stage, he simply could not be ignored and if the process degenerated into a civil war – a real possibility – Edward might well allow the two sides to exhaust themselves and simply march into Scotland at the head of a great army and take over, as he had in Wales.
Edward was more than happy to take on the role, correctly identifying it as an opportunity to further his own interests in Scotland. The council did everything they reasonably could to ensure the future security of the realm, but Edward was an astute politician and would clearly have a strong negotiating position. He was not invited to arbitrate on the question of the succession. His role was to conduct a court of inquiry, ensure a fair and equitable process, and then oversee the installation of the successful candidate. In due course, a grand jury of 104 auditors was assembled. The auditors included forty chosen by John Balliol and forty chosen by Robert Bruce – a clear indication that none of the other candidates really had a serious case to present, but were simply making a demonstration of their interest in the event that both the Bruce and Balliol lines failed to produce heirs in the future. Edward was able to manipulate all of the candidates into accepting his overlordship as a condition of having their bids for the crown recognised at all. There was some resistance to this from various barons, but their position was undermined by the acceptance of Edward's demands by the different candidates. The case ran for over a year, but in November 1292 a decision was finally reached and John Balliol became King of Scotland, but was obliged to give homage for his realm to Edward.
Almost immediately, Edward's actions became increasingly overbearing. He asserted a right to hear appeals against John's court judgements and generally set about undermining John's authority at every opportunity. John was not in a position to challenge Edward's action and his political credibility suffered accordingly. Edward hoped to provoke John into open resistance and the opportunity arose when Edward issued writs demanding military service from John and various prominent members of the Scottish nobility for service against France.
At around this time, the majority of the Scottish political community had taken power out of John's hands. Initiatives of this nature were – to say the least – rare in medieval politics, but the process was eased by the fact that a committee of guardians had ruled effectively during the years between the death of Alexander III and the death of his granddaughter Margaret: a period of four years. The Scottish political community had acquired some experience of governing a kingdom without actually having a king; experience that would prove invaluable in the years between 1297 and 1304.
The new council made a treaty of mutual defence with the King of France. And from 1295 there was, in theory at least, a state of war between England and Scotland. In practice, very little happened. Edward was already busy with his war in France and was unable to pursue operations in Scotland until the spring of 1296. Both sides raised armies, but the Scots simply had no idea about how to conduct a war. There had not been war in Scotland for more than thirty years, and that had been a relatively short affair that had been dealt with by the county communities of the south-west. Edward, on the other hand, was an experienced commander who pursued his campaign with purpose. The Scots made some rather purposeless raids into northern England, but Edward approached the town of Berwick, stormed it and sacked the community with enormous loss of life. The town – in those days one of the most significant commercial centres in the British Isles – was largely destroyed, but Edward effectively sent a signal to every other town in Scotland: resistance was not only futile, since hardly any Scottish towns had defences of any kind, let alone serious fortification, but would also result in the utter destruction of the community. There was only one action in the rest of the 1296 campaign. A body of Scottish men-at-arms encountered a similar English force near Dunbar and were completely routed. Only one fatality is recorded, but in the fighting and the subsequent surrender of Dunbar castle more than 200 members of the Scottish nobility and gentry were taken prisoner. The main body of the Scottish army, now bereft of leadership and purpose, simply dissolved and made their way home without ever seeing action.
The Scottish government had not enjoyed the full support of the political community. One, Robert Bruce (grandson of the man who had sought to become king in 1291–92), had sided with Edward I in the hope that his father (his grandfather had died in the interim) would now be installed on the throne at the hands of Edward I. He was quickly disabused of this; Edward had no plans to make anybody King of Scotland, least of all Robert Bruce. Instead, Edward marched northwards demanding homage and the surrender of castles and towns, all of which was easily accomplished, given the events at Berwick. By July he had captured John, forced his abdication and packed him off to London as a prisoner. Assuming – perhaps understandably – that the war was won, Edward left the consolidation of an occupation administration to his lieutenants and returned to the more pressing affairs at home.
The Scots had certainly been defeated and Edward had obliged a great number of Scottish nobles and towns to give homage, but recovery was rapid. Within a matter of months, Edward's officers reported that the Scots were in the process of forming a government and were appointing officials in many areas, and that only two counties – Berwickshire and Roxburgh – were under occupation control and they 'only lately'2. Any hopes that Edward had of imposing his own rule quickly and securely disappeared in early 1297. One of the prisoners taken the previous year, Sir Andrew Murray, escaped from captivity, made his way back to the north-east of Scotland and raised a force which set siege to strongholds. Robert Bruce had decided to jump ship and was assembling a force in the west, while William Wallace, youngest son of an obscure Ayrshire knight, was conducting operations in central Scotland.
Bruce was now fighting for King John, though he had been conspicuous by his absence the previous year. In practice, if he ever wanted to be king himself, Bruce had to be seen as espousing the cause of independence. For Wallace and Murray the matter was more clear-cut: they were simply fighting to get John restored to the throne. Due to his commitments elsewhere, Edward was unable to take to the field himself and entrusted operations in Scotland to his lieutenants. The 'noble revolt' of Bruce and others was resolved through negotiations at Irvine, though there was a strong suspicion that he dragged the discussions out as long as he could to allow Wallace and Murray more time to gather and train their troops. True or not, by the time Sir Hugh Cressingham – Edward's treasurer for Scotland – was able to get to Stirling, he found that Murray and Wallace had combined their forces on the north bank of the river. Confident that his force was more than a match for anything the Scots might have to offer, Cressingham tried to cross the river and was soundly defeated.
Wallace and Murray were now effectively masters of Scotland north of the River Forth and throughout much of the south. They acted as guardians in the name of King John, but Murray died a few weeks after the battle – possibly of wounds incurred in the action – leaving Wallace in sole charge. It was rare indeed for someone of such lowly political status to acquire so much power, but there was something of a political vacuum. Some of the more prominent lords had already been neutralised at Irvine; some simply wanted a quiet life and were prepared to accept Edward's lordship; some – particularly in the south-east, where they were most vulnerable to English military power – were hesitant to resist; but, most significantly, a large number were still prisoners of war following the debacle of the 1296 campaign.
At about this time, Edward freed a number of senior figures – notably Sir John Comyn, Lord of Badenoch – to serve in his army in Flanders in exchange for their liberty, only to have them defect and escape to France at the earliest opportunity and then return to Scotland to continue the fight.
Clearly Edward had to act if he was to achieve his goals in Scotland, but he was unable to bring an army to the field until the late summer of 1298. By this time most of Scotland was under Wallace's control and initially Edward struggled to come to grips with his opponent. Just as he was on the verge of running out of money and supplies to keep his army in existence, Edward was able to steal a march on Wallace and inflicted a major defeat on him at Falkirk. Since Wallace's political authority had depended entirely on his military credibility, he was swiftly ousted from the position of guardian and his place was taken by Bruce and Comyn. This was not a happy arrangement. The Comyns had an excellent track record as servants of the Crown and were closely associated with King John, but Bruce had been on the English side in 1296 and clearly had royal ambitions of his own. Despite their differences, Comyn and Bruce managed their campaign reasonably effectively. In the aftermath of Falkirk, Edward had been obliged to leave Scotland once again to tend to concerns elsewhere and may even have believed that the Scottish situation was now largely settled and could be left to his subordinates.
This was clearly not the case. In 1299 – at the behest of the pope and as part of negotiations with France – Edward had released John Balliol, and by 1300 there seemed to be a real possibility that he might be restored to the throne. This was not an attractive proposition to Robert Bruce, who now made his peace with Edward, abandoning the Balliol cause. Despite his defection, the Scots continued to make headway, but Edward could not make an opportunity to take matters into his own hands until he had reached a satisfactory conclusion in France. Eventually he was able to force a peace treaty which specifically excluded the Scots and secured a statement in which King John rejected any further involvement in Scottish affairs.
The loss of France as an ally was a body blow to the Scots, and since John was no longer interested in his own restoration, it was now difficult for his supporters to be clear about what they were fighting for. Additionally, Edward now brought a large army to Scotland, but also made it clear that he was prepared to negotiate terms. In February 1304, an agreement was reached at Strathord and the war came to an end. For Edward this was a very important achievement. Aware that he was nearing the end of his life, he was eager to finish his Scottish business, but it is not at all clear that he really believed he had secured his authority. At least a proportion of the Scots seem to have seen the Strathord Agreement as more of an armistice than a final settlement, and a few prominent figures – notably William Wallace – were specifically excluded from the terms and were thus still active in the field. In August 1305, Wallace was captured, subjected to a travesty of a trial and executed.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Bannockburn 1314 by Chris Brown. Copyright © 2013 The History Press. Excerpted by permission of The History Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Title,Acknowledgements,
List of Illustrations,
Introduction,
Timeline,
Historical Background,
The Armies,
The Commanders,
The Soldiers,
The Tactics,
Before the Battle,
Edward II's Forces,
Robert I's Forces,
The Battlefield,
After the Battle,
The Legacy,
Orders of Battle,
Further Reading,
Copyright,