Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.

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Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.

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Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

by Lisa L. Martin
Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

by Lisa L. Martin

eBook

$87.00 

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Overview

This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780691227825
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 03/09/2021
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 324
File size: 3 MB

About the Author

Lisa L. Martin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Harvard University.

Table of Contents

Figures

Tables

Preface

1 Introduction

Pt. 1 Theory and Data

2 Model and Hypotheses

3 Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables

4 Estimating Models of Cooperation

Pt. 2 Case Studies

5 Human Rights in Latin America: Explaining Unilateral U.S. Sanctions

6 The Falkland Islands Conflict

7 Western Technology-Export Controls

8 The Polish Crisis and Gas-Pipeline Sanctions

9 Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index

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