Elementary Decision Theory

by Herman Chernoff, Lincoln E. Moses

Overview

"The text is very clearly written [with] many illustrative examples and exercises [and] should be considered by those instructors who would like to introduce a more modern (and a more logical) approach in a basic course in statistics." —Journal of the American Statistical Association
This volume is a well-known, well-respected introduction to a lively area of statistics. Professors Chernoff and Moses bring years of professional expertise as classroom teachers to this straightforward approach to statistical problems. And happily, for beginning students, they have by-passed involved computational reasonings which would only confuse the mathematical novice.
Developed from nine years of teaching statistics at Stanford, the book furnishes a simple and clear-cut method of exhibiting the fundamental aspects of a statistical problem. Beginners will find this book a motivating introduction to important mathematical notions such as set, function and convexity. Examples and exercises throughout introduce new topics and ideas.
The first seven chapters are recommended for beginning courses in the basic ideas of statistics and require only a knowledge of high school math. These sections include material on data processing, probability and random variables, utility and descriptive statistics, uncertainty due to ignorance of the state of nature, computing Bayes strategies and an introduction to classical statistics. The last three chapters review mathematical models and summarize terminology and methods of testing hypotheses. Tables and appendixes provide information on notation, shortcut computational formulas, axioms of probability, properties of expectations, likelihood ratio test, game theory, and utility functions.
Authoritative, yet elementary in its approach to statistics and statistical theory, this work is also concise, well-indexed and abundantly equipped with exercise material. Ideal for a beginning course, this modestly priced edition will be especially valuable to those interested in the principles of statistics and scientific method.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780486143774
Publisher:	Dover Publications
Publication date:	04/26/2012
Series:	Dover Books on Mathematics
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	384
Sales rank:	915,486
File size:	17 MB
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About the Author

Herman Chernoff is Professor Emeritus of Applied Mathematics at MIT and of Statistics at Harvard University. His research has focused on sample theory, optimal design of experiments, sequential analysis, and sequential design of experiments.Lincoln E. Moses (1921-2006), was Professor Emeritus of Health Research and Policy and of Statistics at Stanford University, where he spearheaded the development of biostatistics.

Read an Excerpt

Elementary Decision Theory

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By Herman Chernoff, Lincoln E. Moses

Dover Publications, Inc.

Copyright © 1959 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-486-14377-4

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1. INTRODUCTION

Beginning students are generally interested in what constitutes the subject matter of the theory of statistics. Years ago a statistician might have claimed that statistics deals with the processing of data. As a result of relatively recent formulations of statistical theory, today's statistician will be more likely to say that statistics is concerned with decision making in the face of uncertainty. Its applicability ranges from almost all inductive sciences to many situations that people face in everyday life when it is not perfectly obvious what they should do.

What constitutes uncertainty? There are two kinds of uncertainty. One is that due to randomness. When someone tosses an ordinary coin, the outcome is random and not at all certain. It is as likely to be heads as tails. This type of uncertainty is in principle relatively simple to treat. For example, if someone were offered two dollars if the coin falls heads, on the condition that he pay one dollar otherwise, he would be inclined to accept the offer since he "knows" that heads is as likely to fall as tails. His knowledge concerns the laws of randomness involved in this particular problem.

The other type of uncertainty arises when it is not known which laws of randomness apply. For example, suppose that the above offer were made in connection with a coin that was obviously bent. Then one could assume that heads and tails were not equally likely but that one face was probably favored. In statistical terminology we shall equate the laws of randomness which apply with the state of nature.

What can be done in the case where the state of nature is unknown? The statistician can perform relevant experiments and take observations. In the above problem, a statistician would (if he were permitted) toss the coin many times to estimate what is the state of nature. The decision on whether or not to accept the offer would be based on his estimate of the state of nature.

One may ask what constitutes enough observations. That is, how many times should one toss the coin before deciding? A precise answer would be difficult to give at this point. For the time being it suffices to say that the answer would depend on (1) the cost of tossing the coin, and (2) the cost of making the wrong decision. For example, if one were charged a nickel per toss, one would be inclined to take very few observations compared with the case when one were charged one cent per toss. On the other hand, if the wager were changed to $2000 against $1000, then it would pay to take many observations so that one could be quite sure that the estimate of the state of nature were good enough to make it almost certain that the right action is taken.

It is important to realize that no matter how many times the coin is tossed, one may never know for sure what the state of nature is. For example, it is possible, although very unlikely, that an ordinary coin will give 100 heads in a row. It is also possible that a coin which in the long run favors heads will give more tails than heads in 100 tosses. To evaluate the chances of being led astray by such phenomena, the statistician must apply the theory of probability.

Originally we stated that statistics is the theory of decision making in the face of uncertainty. One may argue that, in the above example, the statistician merely estimated the state of nature and made his decision accordingly, and hence, decision making is an overly pretentious name for merely estimating the state of nature. But even in this example, the statistician does more than estimate the state of nature and act accordingly. In the $2000 to $1000 bet he should decide, among other things, whether his estimate is good enough to warrant accepting or rejecting the wager or whether he should take more observations to get a better estimate. An estimate which would be satisfactory for the $2 to $1 bet may be unsatisfactory for deciding the $2000 to $1000 bet.

2. AN EXAMPLE

To illustrate statistical theory and the main factors that enter into decision making, we shall treat a simplified problem in some detail. It is characteristic of many statistical applications that, although real problems are too complex, they can be simplified without changing their essential characteristics. However, the applied statistician must try to keep in mind all assumptions which are not strictly realistic but are introduced for the sake of simplicity. He must do so to avoid assumptions that lead to unrealistic answers.

Example 1.1. The Contractor Example. Suppose that an electrical contractor for a house knows from previous experience in many communities that houses are occupied by only three types of families: those whose peak loads of current used are 15 amperes (amp) at one time in a circuit, those whose peak loads are 20 amp, and those whose peak loads are 30 amp. He can install 15-amp wire, or 20-amp wire, or 30-amp wire. He could save on the cost of his materials in wiring a house if he knew the actual needs of the occupants of that house. However, this is not known to him.

One very easy solution to the problem would be to install 30-amp wire in all houses, but in this case he would be spending more to wire a house than would actually be necessary if it were occupied by a family who used no more than 15 amp or by one that used no more than 20 amp. On the other hand, he could install 15-amp wire in every house. This solution also would not be very good because families who used 20 or 30 amp would frequently burn out the fuses, and not only would he have to replace the wire with more suitable wire but he might also suffer damage to his reputation as a wiring contractor.

Table 1.1 presents a tabulation of the losses which he sustains from taking various actions for the various types of users.

The thetas (θ) are the possible categories that the occupants of a particular house fall into; or they are the possible states of nature. These are: θ1—the family has peak loads of 15 amp; θ2—the family has peak loads of 20 amp; and θ3—the family has peak loads of 30 amp.

The α's across the top are the actions or the different types of installations he could make. The numbers appearing in the table are his own estimates of the loss that he would incur if he took a particular action in the presence of a particular state.

For example, the 1 in the first row represents the cost of the 15-amp wire. The 2 in the first row represents the cost of the 20-amp wire, which is more expensive since it is thicker.

In the second row we find a 5 opposite state θ2, under action α1. This reflects the loss to the contractor of installing 15-amp wire in a home with 20-amp peak loads; cost of reinstallation, and damage to his reputation, all enter into this number. It is the result of a subjective determination on his part; for one of his competitors this number might be, instead, a 6. Other entries in the table have similar interpretations.

Since he could cut down the losses incurred in wiring a house if he knew the value of θ for the house (i.e., what were the electricity requirements of the occupant), he tries to learn this by performing an experiment. His experiment consists of going to the future occupant and asking how many amperes he uses. The response is always one of four numbers: 10, 12, 15, or 20. From previous experience it is known that families of type θ1, (15-amp users) answer z1, (10 amp) half of the time and z2 (12 amp) half of the time; families of type θ2 (20-amp users) answer z2 (12 amp) half of the time and z3, (15 amp) half of the time; and families of type θ3 (30-amp users) answer z3, (15 amp) one-third of the time and z4 (20 amp) two-thirds of the time. These values are shown in Table 1.2. In fact, the entries represent the probabilities of observing the z values for the given states of nature.

The contractor now formulates a strategy (rule for decision making) which will tell him what action to take for each kind of observation. For instance, one possible rule would be to install 20-amp wire if he observes z1; 15-amp wire if he observes z2; 20-amp wire if he observes z3; and 30-amp wire if he observes z4. This we symbolize by s =(α2, α1 α2, α3), where the first α2 is the action taken if our survey yields z1; α1 is the action taken if z2 is observed; the second α2 corresponds to z3; and α3 corresponds to z4.

Table 1.3 shows five of the 81 possible strategies that might be employed, using the above notation.

Note that s2 is somewhat more conservative than s1. Both s3 and s4, completely ignore the data. The strategy s5 seems to be one which only a contractor hopelessly in love could select.

How shall we decide which of the various strategies to apply?

First, we compute the average loss that the contractor would incur for each of the three states and each strategy. For the five strategies, these losses are listed in Table 1.4.

They are computed in the following fashion:

First we compute the action probabilities for s1, = (α1, α1 α2, α3). If θ1 is the state of nature, we observe z1 half the time and z2 half the time (see Table 1.2). If s1 is applied, action α, is taken in either case, and actions α2and α3 are not taken. If θ2 is the state of nature, we observe z2, half the time and z3 half the time. Under strategy s1, this leads to action α1 with probability 1/2, action α2 with probability 1/2, and action α3 never. Similarly, under θ3, we shall take action α1, never, α2 with probability 1/3, and α3 with probability 2/3. These results are summarized in the action probabilities for s1 (Table 1.5) which are placed next to the losses (copied from Table 1.1).

If θ1 is the state of nature, action α1 is taken all of the time, giving a loss of 1 all of the time. If θ2 is the state of nature, action α1 yielding a loss of 5 is taken half the time and action α2 yielding a loss of 2 is taken half the time. This leads to an average loss of

5 × 1/2 + 2 × 1/2 = 3.5.

Similarly the average loss under θ3 is

6 × 1/3 + 3 × 2/3 = 4.

Thus the column of average losses corresponding to s1 has been computed. The corresponding tables for strategy s2 are indicated in Table 1.5. The other strategies are evaluated similarly.

In relatively simple problems such as this one, it is possible to compute the average losses with less writing by juggling Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 simultaneously.

Is it clear now which of these strategies should be used? If we look at the chart of average losses (Table 1.4), we see that some of the strategies give greater losses than others. For example, if we compare s5 with s2, we see that in each of the three states the average loss associated with s5 is equal to or greater than that corresponding to s2. The contractor would therefore do better to use strategy s2 than strategy s5 since his average losses would be less for states θ1 and θ3 and no more for θ2. In this case, we say "s2 dominates s5." Likewise, if we compare s4 and s1, we see that except for state θ1 where they were equal, the average losses incurred by using s4 are larger than those incurred by using s1. Again we would say that s4 is dominated by strategy s1. It would be senseless to keep any strategy which is dominated by some other strategy. We can thus discard strategies s4 and s5. We can also discard s3 for we find that it is dominated by s2.

If we were to confine ourselves to selecting one of the five listed strategies, we would need now only choose between s1 and s2. How can we choose between them? The contractor could make this choice if he had a knowledge of the percentages of families in the community corresponding to states θ1, θ2, and θ3. For instance, if all three states are equally likely, i.e., in the community one-third of the families are in state θ1, one-third in state θ2, and one-third in state θ3, then he would use s2, because for s2 his average loss would on the average be

1.5 × 1/3 +2.5 × 1/3 + 3 × 1/3 = 2.33

whereas, for s, his average loss would on the average be

1 × 1/3 + 3.5 x 1/3 + 4 x 1/3 = 2.83.

However, if one knew that in this community 90% of the families were in state θ1 and 10% in θ2, one would have the average losses of

1 × 0.9 + 3.5 × 0.1 = 1.25 for s1

1.5 × 0.9 + 2.5 × 0.1 = 1.60 for s2

and s1 would be selected. Therefore, the strategy that should be picked depends on the relative frequencies of families in the three states. Thus, when the actual proportions of the families in the three classes are known, a good strategy is easily selected. In the absence of such knowledge, choice is inherently difficult. One principle which has been suggested for choosing a strategy is called the "minimax average loss rule." This says, "Pick that strategy for which the largest average loss is as small as possible, i.e., minimize the maximum average loss." Referring to Table 1.4, we see that, for s1, the maximum average loss is 4 and for s2 it is three. The minimax rule would select s2. This is clearly a pessimistic approach since the choice is based entirely on consideration of the worst that can happen.

In considering our average loss table, we discarded some strategies as being "dominated" by other procedures. Those we rejected are called inadmissible strategies. Strategies which are not dominated are called admissible.

In our example it might turn out that s1 or s2 would be dominated by one of the 76 strategies which have not been examined; on the other hand, other strategies not dominated by s1 or s2 might be found. An interesting problem in the theory of decision making is that of finding all the admissible strategies.

Certain questions suggest themselves. For example, one may ask why we put so much dependence on the "average losses." This question will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4 on utility. Another question that could be raised would be concerned with the reality of our assumptions. One would actually expect that peak loads of families could vary continuously from less than 15 amp to more than 30 amp. Does our simplification (which was presumably based on previous experience) lead to the adoption of strategies which are liable to have very poor consequences (large losses)? Do you believe that the assumption that the only possible observations are z1, z2,z3, and z4 is a serious one? Finally, suppose that several observations were available, i.e., the contracter could interview all the members of the family separately. What would be the effect of such data? First, it is clearly apparent that, with the resulting increase in the number of possible combinations of data, the number of strategies available would increase considerably. Second, in statistical problems, the intelligent use of more data generally tends to decrease the average losses.

In this example we ignored the possibility that the strategy could suggest (1) compiling more data before acting, or (2) the use of altogether different data such as examining the number of electric devices in the family's kitchen.

(Continues...)

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Excerpted from Elementary Decision Theory by Herman Chernoff, Lincoln E. Moses. Copyright © 1959 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. Excerpted by permission of Dover Publications, Inc..
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

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Table of Contents

1 INTRODUCTION2 DATA PROCESSING 3 INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND RANDOM VARIABLES 4 UTILITY AND DESCRIPITIVE STATISTICS 5 UNCERTAINTY DUE TO IGNORANCE OF THE STATE OF NATURE 6 THE COMPUTATION OF BAYES STRATEGIES 7 INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL STATISTICS 8 MODELS 9 TESTING HYPOTHESES 10 ESTIMATION AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALSAPPENDIX A NOTATION B MATHEMATICAL TABLES C TABLES OF RANDOM DEVIATES D TABLES OF PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS E DERIVATIONS F MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS ABOUT GAME THEORY AND UTILITY THEORY PARTIAL LIST OF ANSWERS TO EXERCISES INDEX