Epistemic Luck

by Duncan Pritchard

Overview

One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know very much, or else that luck is compatible with knowledge after all. In this book, Duncan Pritchard argues that we do not need to choose between these two austere alternatives, since a closer examination of what is involved in the notion of epistemic luck reveals varieties of luck that are compatible with knowledge possession and varieties that aren't. Moreover, Pritchard shows that a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between luck and knowledge can cast light on many of the most central topics in contemporary epistemology. These topics include: the externalism/internalism distinction; virtue epistemology; the problem of scepticism; metaepistemological scepticism; modal epistemology; and the problem of moral luck. All epistemologists will need to come to terms with Pritchard's original and incisive contribution.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780191535666
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	03/10/2005
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	412 KB

About the Author

University of Stirling

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• I. Scepticism
• 1: Scepticism in contemporary debate
• 2: Closure and context
• 3: Neo-Mooreanism
• 4: The source of scepticism
• II. Epistemic luck
• 5: Luck
• 6: Two varieties of epistemic luck
• 7: Cognitive responsibility and the epistemic virtues
• 8: Scepticism and epistemic luck
• 9: Epistemic angst
• Postscript: Moral luck

Editorial Reviews

'This book is a tour de force.'
—Kevin Meeker, Mind

"Epistemologists commonly say that knowledge excludes luck. But few of us pause to explain what this common saying amounts to, or what truth it contains. Pritchard has paused to do just that, and the result is this fascinating and enjoyable book. In attempting to explain the sense in which knowledge excludes luck, Pritchard both offers a clear and comprehensive survey of much contemporary literature in the theory of knowledge, and also advances the dialectic considerably. If you work in the theory of knowledge, you cannot afford to ignore this book."
—Ram Neta, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

"In this beautifully written book, Duncan Pritchard provides a distinctive defense of a neo-Moorean safety response to skepticism. At the heart of the book is a sensitive and subtle discussion of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. He distinguishes two central kinds of luck which are epistemologically relevant and uses them to provide an insightful critique of contemporary virtue epistemology. He defends his own preferred safety-based view by arguing that it best accommodates the idea that knowledge excludes what he calls 'veritic luck'. However, he acknowledges that knowledge is ineliminably infected with a further kind of luck, 'reflective luck', which provides a perpetual source of skeptical doubt. Pritchard's admirably clear prose will provide students with an overview of debates at the heart of contemporary epistemology while also making substantial contribution to those debates."
—Jessica Brown, University of Bristol

"Epistemic Luck is a rich, engaging, and ground-breaking work. It is a fine example of the kind of original and exciting work being done at the frontier of epistemology today."
Jason Baehr, Metaphilosophy

From the Publisher