Freedom of the Will: A Wesleyan Response to Jonathan Edwards

by Daniel Whedon, John D. Wagner (Editor)

Overview

Is the human will in bondage to sinful motives, to the point that people cannot make truly free decisions? Daniel D. Whedon, a prominent nineteenth-century Wesleyan theologian, takes aim at this central thesis of the famed theologian Jonathan Edwards. In this new edition of his widely admired 1864 work, Whedon offers a step-by-step examination of Edwards's positions and finds them lacking in Biblical and logical support. Within his position against Edwards, he argues that the difference between natural ability and moral ability is meaningless, that Edwards's deterministic "necessitarian" argument makes God the author of sin, and that people frequently act against their strongest motives. He concludes that, without a free will, "there can be no justice, no satisfying the moral sense, no moral Government of which the creature can be the rightful subject, and no God the righteous administrator."

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781498273039
Publisher:	Wipf & Stock Publishers
Publication date:	01/01/2009
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	364
File size:	2 MB

About the Author

Daniel D. Whedon (1808-1885) was a prominent university professor, theologian, and author. He served as Professor of Ancient Languages at Wesleyan University in Connecticut; as Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Michigan; and as editor of the Methodist Quarterly Review from 1856 to1884. He authored numerous books including Commentary on the New Testament (New York: Carlton&Porter, 1860); Commentary on the Old Testament (New York: Nelson&Phillips, 1873); What is Arminianism? (Toronto: W. Briggs, 1879); and Essays, Reviews, and Discourses (New York: Phillips&Hunt, 1887)

About the Editor:
John D. Wagner, a Biblical Studies student at Trinity Theological Seminary, is the editor of Redemption Redeemed: A Puritan Defense of Unlimited Atonement by John Goodwin. He has a master's degree in Journalism from University of Arizona and has studied and debated the Calvinism vs. Arminianism controversy for many years.
Daniel D. Whedon (1808-1885) was a prominent university professor, theologian, and author. He served as Professor of Ancient Languages at Wesleyan University in Connecticut; as Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Michigan; and as editor of the Methodist Quarterly Review from 1856 to1884. He authored numerous books including Commentary on the New Testament (New York: Carlton&Porter, 1860); Commentary on the Old Testament (New York: Nelson&Phillips, 1873); What is Arminianism? (Toronto: W. Briggs, 1879); and Essays, Reviews, and Discourses (New York: Phillips&Hunt, 1887)

About the Editor:
John D. Wagner, a Biblical Studies student at Trinity Theological Seminary, is the editor of Redemption Redeemed: A Puritan Defense of Unlimited Atonement by John Goodwin. He has a master's degree in Journalism from University of Arizona and has studied and debated the Calvinism vs. Arminianism controversy for many years.
John D. Wagner is a PhD student in Christian Apologetics and Theology and has an MA in Biblical Studies, both with Trinity Theological Seminary, Evansville, Ind. He is the editor of Redemption Redeemed: A Puritan Defense of Unlimited Atonement by John Goodwin, Freedom of the Will: A Wesleyan Response to Jonathan Edwards by Daniel D. Whedon, and Arminius Speaks: Essential Writings on Predestination, Free Will and the Nature of God by James Arminius.

Table of Contents

Preface ix

Part First The Issue Stated

Chapter I Will Isolated and Defined 3

Chapter II Freedom of the Will Defined 11

Chapter III Volition Not Always Preceded by Emotion 28

Chapter IV Freedom of Will Causationally Presented 32

Chapter V Edwards's Synthesis of Definitions Reviewed 42

Chapter VI Conditions and Limitations of Will's Free Action 49

Chapter VII Anterior Standard of Accordance 55

Chapter VIII Schematism of Conscious Free Will 60

Part Second The Necessitarian Argument Considered

Section I The Causational Argument

Chapter I The Necessitarian Paralogism 67

Chapter II Cause of Particular Volition 70

Chapter III Boundary Lines of the Unknown 83

Chapter IV Freedom Involves Not Atheism 86

Chapter V What Is the Use? 91

Chapter VI That Alternative Volition Is Chance 94

Section II The Psychological Argument

Chapter I Self-Determination, Infinite Series 101

Chapter II The Nature of Motive Influences 107

Chapter III Commensurability of Motives: Volition as Greatest Good 120

Chapter IV Motives No Necessitative Cause of Volition 128

Chapter V Uniformities of Volition 135

Chapter VI Double Volition 146

Chapter VII Activity No Passivity 148

Chapter VIII Determination from Indetermination 151

Chapter IX Choice between Equal Alternatives 157

Chapter X Equality of Divine Motives 161

Chapter XI Useless Modifications of Necessity 169

Chapter XII Invariable Sequences or Spontaneous Necessity 178

Chapter XIII Counter Choice a Prodigy 197

Chapter XIV Volitional Powerlessness or "Moral Inability" 198

Chapter XV "Moral Ability" as Treated by Edwards 202

Chapter XVI "Moral Ability" as Homiletically Treated 213

Chapter XVII "MoralInability" as Expressed in Ordinary Phrase 216

Section III The Theological Argument

Chapter I Foreknowledge and Predestination 223

Chapter II Reconciliation of Free Agency and Foreknowledge 227

Chapter III Edwards's Argument for Necessity from Foreknowledge 236

Chapter IV Calvinistic Predestination: An Unnecessary Hypothesis 244

Chapter V Christ Not Necessitated, but a Free Moral Agent 250

Chapter VI Non-Necessitation of the Divine Will 259

Chapter VII Freedom Limits Not Omnipotence 265

Chapter VIII Freedom Exalts Man and Dishonors God? 268

Chapter IX Responsibility of Impenitents and of Fallen Man 272

Chapter X The Free Appropriation of Our Depraved Nature 281

Part Third The Positive Argument Stated

Chapter I The Argument from Consciousness 289

Chapter II Argument from Possibility of Divine Command 295

Chapter III Distinction between Automatic Excellence and Moral Deserts 300

Chapter IV Created Moral Deserts Impossible 311

Chapter V The Maxim of Responsibility 317

Chapter VI Necessitarian Counter Maxim of Responsibility Considered 322

Chapter VII Edwards's Direct Intuitional Proof of Necessitated Responsibility 327

Chapter VIII Responsibilities of Belief Demonstrates Freedom of Will 333

Chapter IX Coaction and Necessitation 340

Chapter X Argument from God's Non-Authorship of Sin 343

Chapter XI Freedom the Condition of a Possible Theodicy 351

Index of Names 353