From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy toward West Germany, 1946-1955

At the end of World War II, the Allies were unanimous in their determination to disarm the former aggressor Germany. As the Cold War intensified, however, the decision whether to reverse that policy and to rearm West Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet threat led to disagreements both within the US government and among members of the nascent NATO alliance. The US military took the practical view that a substantial number of German troops would be required to deter any potential Soviet assault. The State Department, on the other hand, initially advocated an alternative strategy of strengthening European institutions but eventually came around to the military’s position that an armed West Germany was preferable to a weak state on the dividing line between the Western democracies and the Soviet satellite states.

Sheldon A. Goldberg traces the military, diplomatic, and political threads of postwar policy toward West Germany and provides insights into the inner workings of alliance building and the roles of bureaucrats and military officers as well as those of diplomats and statesmen. He draws on previously unexamined primary sources to construct a cogent account of the political and diplomatic negotiations that led to West Germany’s accession to NATO and the shaping of European order for the next forty years.

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From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy toward West Germany, 1946-1955

At the end of World War II, the Allies were unanimous in their determination to disarm the former aggressor Germany. As the Cold War intensified, however, the decision whether to reverse that policy and to rearm West Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet threat led to disagreements both within the US government and among members of the nascent NATO alliance. The US military took the practical view that a substantial number of German troops would be required to deter any potential Soviet assault. The State Department, on the other hand, initially advocated an alternative strategy of strengthening European institutions but eventually came around to the military’s position that an armed West Germany was preferable to a weak state on the dividing line between the Western democracies and the Soviet satellite states.

Sheldon A. Goldberg traces the military, diplomatic, and political threads of postwar policy toward West Germany and provides insights into the inner workings of alliance building and the roles of bureaucrats and military officers as well as those of diplomats and statesmen. He draws on previously unexamined primary sources to construct a cogent account of the political and diplomatic negotiations that led to West Germany’s accession to NATO and the shaping of European order for the next forty years.

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From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy toward West Germany, 1946-1955

From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy toward West Germany, 1946-1955

From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy toward West Germany, 1946-1955

From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy toward West Germany, 1946-1955

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Overview

At the end of World War II, the Allies were unanimous in their determination to disarm the former aggressor Germany. As the Cold War intensified, however, the decision whether to reverse that policy and to rearm West Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet threat led to disagreements both within the US government and among members of the nascent NATO alliance. The US military took the practical view that a substantial number of German troops would be required to deter any potential Soviet assault. The State Department, on the other hand, initially advocated an alternative strategy of strengthening European institutions but eventually came around to the military’s position that an armed West Germany was preferable to a weak state on the dividing line between the Western democracies and the Soviet satellite states.

Sheldon A. Goldberg traces the military, diplomatic, and political threads of postwar policy toward West Germany and provides insights into the inner workings of alliance building and the roles of bureaucrats and military officers as well as those of diplomats and statesmen. He draws on previously unexamined primary sources to construct a cogent account of the political and diplomatic negotiations that led to West Germany’s accession to NATO and the shaping of European order for the next forty years.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780821446225
Publisher: Ohio University Press
Publication date: 10/02/2017
Series: War and Society in North America
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
Pages: 304
File size: 940 KB

About the Author

Sheldon A. Goldberg, PhD, is a retired career U.S. Air Force officer, half of which was spent in West Europe. His many assignments included a combat tour in Southeast Asia in the F-4 Phantom, Air Force advisor to the Commandant, German General Staff College, and air policy staff officer in Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Region.

Table of Contents

Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgments

Acronyms

Introduction

1 Operation Eclipse

2 The Diplomatic Path to 12 September 1950

3 The Military Path to 12 September 1950

4 From EDF to EDC to NATO

5 1954–55: EDC Defeated, “German Problem” Solved

Epilogue: The Role of the Three US Military Services

Appendix A: The European Advisory Commission (EAC)

Appendix B: Operation Eclipse Memoranda

Appendix C: Eradication of Nazism and Militarism

Appendix D:US-Approved Draft Directives of the US Joint Advisors to the US Representative to the European Advisory Commission1

Appendix E: The Himmerod Conference and the Bonn Report

Appendix F: Acheson’s “Single Package”

Appendix G: The Great Debate

Notes

Bibliography

Index

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