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GHOSTS of PASSION
Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War
By BRIAN D. BUNK Duke University Press
Copyright © 2007 Duke University Press
All right reserved. ISBN: 978-0-8223-3943-4
Chapter One
THE REVOLUTION OF OCTOBER 1934
On the morning of 4 October 1934 the veteran socialist leader Teodomiro Menéndez sat on the train from Madrid to Oviedo comfortably dressed in a gray jacket and hat. He was no stranger to trains, having long been the director of the Unión General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers, UGT) railroad syndicates in the north. Menéndez's labor experiences had also accustomed him to strikes and confrontation, and he had spent at least a quarter of his life in prison because of such conflicts. Nevertheless, by 1934 he represented one of the more conservative factions within the Spanish socialist movement, and he vehemently disagreed with the growing radicalism of his party and union. Although it is impossible to know what he thought as he made his way through the spectacular mountain valleys that mark the passage from the south to Asturias, hidden in the band of his hat was a set of instructions to begin the "revolutionary general strike." The journey of Teodomiro Menéndez helped put into place the events that culminated in civil war less than two years later. The uprising began shortly after word had been received, and it did not end until military units had forcibly occupied the province of Asturias and defeated lesser actions in other parts of the country. The repercussions of those two weeks created a fierce battle over the commemorations and meanings of the revolt, and it was these conflicting interpretations that polarized politics and society and triggered the broader conflict in July 1936.
The direct causes of the October revolt included both economic and political factors. The effects of economic depression, along with the inability of either liberal or conservative administrations to improve conditions, led to a belief among many that only radical solutions would alleviate the suffering. In addition, the leadership of major leftist groups, especially the socialist movement began to publicly endorse radical action to both improve living conditions and counter the perceived threat of an authoritarian seizure of government. The election of a conservative administration determined to liquidate the reforms of the Republic's first two years was combined with a growing unity movement among revolutionary groups to produce a series of confrontations that culminated in the revolution of October 1934. Ultimately it was a series of mutual pressures, actions, and demands that propelled a large part of the working class toward revolution.
THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS
The Spanish economy entered the decade of the 1930s facing three fundamental challenges: the effects of the Great Depression, a lack of investment capital, and an unproductive and inefficient agricultural sector. It was the inability of successive administrations to effectively deal with these issues that contributed first to the revolutionary insurrection of 1934 and ultimately to civil war. Although the worldwide depression of 1929 affected Spain comparatively less than it did other European nations, the economic slowdown still created significant problems. Important areas such as exports, emigration, and foreign investment proved especially hard hit. The closure of export markets meant industrial and manufacturing concerns had to rely on internal demand, an area that had never been well developed. Not only did Spanish goods fail to find a home in foreign lands, but the export of human capital also slowed. This lack of movement, along with the economic problems in general throughout the world, caused a reduction in the amount of remittances from immigrants previously established abroad, thereby creating financial hardship for many who depended on these moneys. Furthermore, the shutting off of the safety valve of emigration left depressed areas with larger numbers of unemployed laborers. Total unemployment throughout the country rose steadily during the Republic, rising from 446,263 in 1932 to 703,814 by April 1934.
In agriculture, the economic difficulties caused by the Great Depression only added to the twin problems of an undercultivation of land and an overabundance of landless laborers. The advent of the Republic in 1931 gave hope, especially to the peasants and laborers, that these problems would soon be definitively solved. Although the newly established Republican system was not responsible for the initial problem of the Depression, many continued to blame the government, and the lack of concrete solutions led to increasing social and political tensions. According to Edward Malefakis, "The miserable lot of the day laborers under the latifundia system ensured that they would protest; their powerlessness to improve their condition through normal channels ensured that this protest would assume violent forms." The desperate situation of the agricultural workers increased the radicalism of that sector and in turn influenced the direction of the labor organizations that organized them.
The coal and iron industries, both of which entered into a serious decline during the 1930s following a wartime boom in production during the years 1914 to 1919, dominated the industrial economy in Asturias. As Adrian Shubert notes, "The period 1919-34 saw the most sweeping changes in the history of coal mining in Asturias, all of which were detrimental to the worker, forcing him to work longer and produce more while earning less." These changes in the industrial economy of the region largely resulted from rising costs, declining production, and a significant reduction in product demand. In the coal business, these problems were not new, as factors such as low internal demand and high transport costs had plagued the industry almost from its inception. The new social benefits passed during the first two years of the Republic, such as the seven-hour workday and paid vacations, increased the cost of coal production, although mine owners had previously been able to compensate for these increases by raising prices. The equation began to change because, despite the fact that the industry was largely shielded from external economic factors, its fundamental structural flaws left it vulnerable to economic depression. The rising price of labor was not the only contributor to higher production rates, for increased material costs and rail tariffs pushed up the cost per ton at least seven pesetas between 1929 and 1933, while the price per ton rose by just over four pesetas during the same period. Changes in governmental investment lowered internal demand for Asturian coal. In contrast to the grand public-works projects of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship of the 1920s, which had inflated demand for coal, the Republican government funneled money toward education, social legislation, and the agricultural sector. The artificially high demand for coal and steel previously fueled by government spending thus ended abruptly during the 1930s. The largest industrial consumers of coal, including railroads, merchant marine operations, and metalworking all reduced demand significantly between 1931 and 1932. In 1931, for example, the firm Altos Hornos de Vizcaya consumed nearly all of the coal produced by the Sociedad Hullera del Turón, but the next year it purchased only half of total production. Both workers and owners responded to these changes with demands for a protected internal market: Spanish coal for Spanish industry. In addition, management hoped to lower the costs of production by reducing labor expenses, which led them into conflict with an increasingly desperate and dispirited workforce. The electoral victory of the conservative forces in November 1933 ensured that these owners would now have the upper hand, and in the eyes of many workers this change signaled the ultimate failure of the Republican system.
THE ROLE OF THE PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL
The actions of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers Party, PSOE), its national trade union (the UGT), and its youth organization, Federación de Juventudes Socialistas (Federation of Socialist Youth, FJS) during 1934 can be traced to a change in policy resulting from the electoral defeat of November 1933. Owing to a deterioration of relations at the local and national levels, the socialists withdrew from the coalition government they had shared with moderate Republicans since the advent of the Republic in 1931. The leadership of the PSOE decided to contest the upcoming elections without electoral partners, despite the recently passed legislation that favored such coalitions. The result was a disaster for the PSOE, as the conservative bloc led by the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist Groups, CEDA) emerged victorious and thus denied the socialists a share of political power for the first time since the beginning of the Republic. The electoral defeat signaled a fundamental change in Socialist Party policy, and the leadership soon began publicly calling for revolution. From a meeting of the PSOE-UGT executives on 25 November 1933 came the first call to "rise up" in order to defend the Republic from what the party called "the forces of reaction." The declaration was not meant to signal a mass rising but rather was issued as a warning to conservatives that the socialist organizations would mobilize at the first provocation. The exact definition, however, of what actions constituted a rightist provocation, or what the party's call to "rise up" entailed, remained unclear. The vagueness of these conceptions had been a continuous problem within the socialist movement since at least the 1920s, and the coming of the Republic had only exacerbated them. At its heart the issue was the fundamental conflict between the PSOE'S wish to support the Republic and its desire to implement a purely socialist form of government. The historian Santos Juliá has argued that the PSOE had two separate conceptions of revolution. The first included a belief that the declaration of the Republic and the ouster of the monarchy constituted a revolution in government, and through the democratic processes of this Republic the PSOE could gradually introduce a socialist society. The second form of revolution allowed for a seizure of power, but only when it became clear that the proper functioning of the Republic had been compromised by conservatives. In contrast to the organization's leadership, the working-class rank and file often made little distinction between parliamentary and revolutionary actions since they favored results above theory. After the disastrous electoral loss in November 1933, only the revolutionary track seemed a viable option for the socialist movement.
Despite these conclusions, not all socialists agreed that the time had come to disavow parliamentary cooperation in favor of a revolutionary uprising. These interparty conflicts also grew out of the intense personal rivalries between reformers and revolutionaries within the PSOE. The resignation and removal of many reformers from key leadership positions at the end of January 1934 temporarily resolved the strife but did not end it. The most significant change was the substitution of Francisco Largo Caballero for the reformist Julián Besteiro as head of the UGT. Largo Caballero, by this time also head of the PSOE, consolidated his control over the entire movement, and his followers, known as caballeristas, took over key posts within the union's largest affiliate, the Federación Nacional de los Trabajadores de la Tierra (National Federation of Agricultural Workers, FNTT), as well as in the important Madrid section of the PSOE. These substitutions meant that from this point on the maximalists dedicated, at least on paper, to a revolutionary seizure of power controlled virtually the entirety of the socialist movement. In accordance with the radical outlook of the leadership, the socialists constituted in February 1934 a revolutionary committee charged with organizing the insurrection. Largo Caballero presided over a group that included many of the most hardcore revolutionaries within the movement, such as the FJS leaders Santiago Carrillo and Carlos Hernández Zancajo.
By February 1934 the socialist movement within Spain had become increasingly dedicated to effecting political change through armed revolution. However, neither this new radical orientation nor the level of actual commitment to revolt was unanimous within the organization, and important questions and debates still raged regarding the timing and purpose of the revolution. In addition, a growing rift was developing between the intentions of the leadership and the growing radicalization of the rank and file, particularly in the FJS and UGT. Many leaders hoped to use the threat of insurrection to gain concessions from the conservative government, and these largely vocal revolutionaries remained less than fully committed to an actual revolt. The distance between membership expectations and leadership intentions proved especially significant in revealing Largo Caballero's fundamental lack of resolution, who despite his inflammatory language never fully committed to a genuine revolt. The difference between his idea of revolutionary brinkmanship and the goals of the workers and youth widened over time, and during the next seven months these tensions continually resurfaced in response to political and economic factors and ultimately helped to cause the failure of the October revolution. Internally, the PSOE spent most of 1934 responding to political and social crises rather than actively plotting revolution. The real and perceived provocations of the conservative government along with the growing radicalization of the rank and file propelled the PSOE, and the workers movement in general, toward the events of October 1934. Despite public threats of revolution and the existence of a planning committee, half-heartedness and conflicting priorities characterized the revolutionary plotting of the Socialist Party. Even as the organization of the rebellion stalled, the leadership of the PSOE remained publicly committed to revolution. The language of revolt emanating from the national committee led many rank-and-file members, as well as conservative observers, to believe that the Socialist Party was unanimously committed to organizing an insurrection. Rather than taking effective measures to prepare the party for revolution, however, the executives simply encouraged the growing radicalization of the membership, and together they stumbled down the road to revolution.
THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION
Following the election of 1933 the CEDA emerged as the largest single party in parliament, but until October 1934 they had chosen not to enter into the government and instead supported an administration led by the Radical Republican Party. Nonetheless, owing to their predominance in the Cortes it was the CEDA who generally took the lead on legislative matters. The actions of the conservative government that helped trigger the October revolution can be grouped into two categories: lack of enforcement of previous reforms, and perceived threats of a dictatorial takeover followed by a fundamental modification of the Republic. Almost since the right's electoral victory, and perhaps even before, large landowners had easily found ways to ignore or subvert the agricultural reform legislation passed by the Republican-socialist regime. In the countryside, the situation of rural laborers grew increasingly desperate as unemployment in some provinces skyrocketed to nearly 50 percent. The grave situation could not be easily mitigated, as few social programs such as unemployment compensation existed to relieve conditions. Soon laborers became disillusioned with the slow pace of reforms and the remarkable intransigence and callousness of landowners. The workers' pleas for relief were answered with cries of "eat the Republic!" and their desperate attempts to feed themselves were met with violence and prosecution.
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Excerpted from GHOSTS of PASSION by BRIAN D. BUNK Copyright © 2007 by Duke University Press. Excerpted by permission.
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