Hitler's Fremde Heere Ost: German Military Intelligence on the Eastern Front 1942-45

by Magnus Pahl

Overview

The General Staff Division of Fremde Heere Ost (Military Intelligence Service, Eastern Section) which from 1942 was led by Reinhard Gehlen, was the nerve center of Hitler's military reconnaissance on the Eastern Front. This department worked professionally and was operationally and tactically reliable. However, at a strategic level there were clear deficits: the industrial capacity of the Soviet arms industry, the politico-military intentions and the details of the Red Army's plans for their offensive remained for the most part hidden from the department. When the Second World War ended, Gehlen put the documents and personnel of Fremde Heere Ost at the disposal of the Americans. With their support he was able to build a new foreign secret service which later evolved into the Federal Intelligence Service. In this book, military historian Magnus Pahl presents a complete overview of the structure, personnel and working methods of Fremde Heere Ost based on a tremendous array of archival sources. This work includes an extensive case study of the East Pomeranian Operation 1945. Pahl's study is a significant contribution to our understanding of German strategic, operational and tactical thinking on the Eastern Front 1941-45.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781910777084
Publisher:	Helion and Company
Publication date:	06/01/2016
Pages:	410
Product dimensions:	9.30(w) x 6.20(h) x 1.10(d)

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations, Maps viii

List of Abbreviations & Glossary xiii

Acknowledgements xxiii

1 Introduction 25

Scope of this Study 26

Questions 34

Definitions 36

Literature and Research 38

DDR Publications and Soviet Writing 39

Western Publications before 1990 42

Research Activity after 1990 (Post Reunification) 47

Sources and Archive Report 49

The Focus and Structure of this Study 56

2 Military Intelligence in the General Stab Des Heeres Until 1942 60

Main Lines of Development 60

The Separation of Intelligence Evaluation and Intelligence Acquisition 60

The Structure of Fremde Heere Ost and Fremde Heere West in 1938 62

Approaches to Strategic Analyses: Oberquartiermeister IV 63

The Abteilung under the Leadership of Eberhard Kinzel 1938-1942 65

The Underestimation of the Military Strength of the Soviet Union 67

The Intensification of the Reconnaissance Effort from July 1940 72

Deficits in Intelligence Evaluation and Procurement 78

Changes in the Situational Assessment of the Enemy during the Eastern Campaign 82

Crisis in the Ic-Dienst 86

3 Under New Leadership 89

Reinhard Gehlen: The Unwilling Intelligence Chief 89

The New Mission: Anticipation of Soviet Operational Intentions 95

The Professionalization of the Ic-Dienst 98

Structural Changes 98

The New Index Card System 105

The Structuring of Report Contents 107

The Demand for Higher Quality 110

The Interrogation of Prisoners of War 111

The Systematisation of Training 115

The Generalstabsabteilung on the Road to an Intelligence Service 120

The Attachment of the Front Line Abwehr Units to the Ic-Dienst 122

Frontaufklärung: The Struggle with the RSHA 128

Propaganda and the 'Landeseigene Verbände' 134

Coordination of Partisan Operations 137

Deception Attempts during the Final Phase of the War 141

4 Systemic Limitations and the Attempt to Overcome Them 148

Cooperation between the Luftwaffe Intelligence and the Nachrichtentruppe 150

Fremde Luftwaffen Ost 150

The Exploitation of Air Reconnaissance 166

The Control of Operational/Tactical Signals Intelligence Communications 170

The Decline of German Radio Intelligence 176

Posturing within the Military Elite 179

The Ambiguity in Gehlen's Forecasts 182

The Relationship with Hitler 187

Repercussions following the Attempted Assassination of Hitler 20 July 1944 191

Competition for the Führer's Favour 195

Gehlen Plans for the Post-Hitler Era 199

5 A Case Study: Intelligence of the Soviet Campaign in East Pomerania 1945 203

The Situation at the Turn of 1944/45 203

Gehlen's 'New Year Memorandum' 206

The Soviet Winter Offensive 210

Reaction to the Changing Military Situation 211

Hitler's Accusations against the Generalstab 213

The Formation of Heeresgruppe Weichsel 215

Berlin or the Baltic Sea? 220

Operations Sonnenwende and Frühlingserwachen 223

The Beginning of the East Pomeranian Operation 24 February 1945 235

The Overview of the Enemy before the Attack 238

Heeresgruppe Weichsel's Assessment 238

The Results of Front-line Reconnaissance 241

The Results from Air Reconnaissance 243

German Radio Reconnaissance 247

The Final Evaluation of Intelligence by the Generalstab 250

6 Transition to the Post-War Period 259

The Consequences of the East Pomeranian Operation 260

Explanations 260

Undermining the Reduction Order 264

Personal Consequences 269

Unity until the New Beginning 273

Disbandment of the Secret Agent Network 276

Final Precautions 279

7 Concluding Observations 284

Notes 289

Bibliography 371

Index 397

Editorial Reviews

… Pahl’s work definitively answers the questions of how and why the Germans had such difficulty building an in-depth appreciation of the Soviets and is well worth the time to read.

British Army Review