The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea
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The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea
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Overview
The US seems to be heading directly toward a confrontation with North Korea as Koreans in the south, and nations around the world, anxiously witness mounting tension. Carpenter and Bandow take a look at the twin crises now afflicting US policy in East Asia: the reemergence of North Korea's nuclear weapons program and the growing anti-American sentiment in South Korea. They question whether Washington's East Asia security strategy makes sense with the looming prospect of US troops stationed in South Korea becoming nuclear hostages. Carpenter and Bandow put forth the most provocative solution yet to this gnarled and dangerous situation.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781466893023 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | St. Martin's Publishing Group |
| Publication date: | 03/31/2015 |
| Sold by: | Macmillan |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 224 |
| File size: | 453 KB |
About the Author
Ted Galen Carpenter is Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. He is the author of The Captive Press, among other titles.
Doug Bandow is senior fellow at the Cato Institute.
Ted Galen Carpenter is Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. He is the author of The Captive Press, among other titles.
Read an Excerpt
The Korean Conundrum
America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea
By Ted Galen Carpenter, Doug Bandow
Palgrave Macmillan
Copyright © 2004 Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug BandowAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4668-9302-3
CHAPTER 1
GROWING TENSIONS WITH BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
The United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have been allied for more than a half century. Like any relationship between great power and protectorate, the parties frequently have been irritated and angry with one another. Nevertheless, the tie, however strained, has survived. But tensions are growing and will almost certainly worsen in coming years.
Put simply, the alliance is suffering from the consequences of its own success. The end of the Cold War has isolated North Korea and diminished the threat to both the United States and the ROK. South Korea has grown economically, politically, and internationally, far outstripping its longtime communist rival. And virtually every other allied state in East Asia has similarly advanced. Military necessity no longer can bridge the deep differences between Seoul and Washington.
Both nations are beginning to look away. The Bush administration is preparing to eliminate America's celebrated troop "tripwire" along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. Although Washington has promised to maintain deterrence, it plans on reducing U.S. force levels and moving most soldiers southward, well away from the DMZ. South Korean officials, even some who once called for a U.S. withdrawal, have protested, to no avail.
Washington also continues to threaten to strike North Korea's nuclear facilities. There may be no more effective way to generate fear throughout South Korea than to suggest a course that might trigger a general war, but both the Clinton and Bush administrations have seemed airily unconcerned about winning Seoul's agreement before acting.
Perhaps no surprise, even more doubtful is South Korean support for the alliance. Despite Seoul's recent protestations of fidelity, real commitment seems to be lacking. For instance, before leaving office in early 2003, President Kim Dae-jung, chastened by Washington's dismissal of his "sunshine policy" toward the North and belligerent threats of military action, explicitly attempted to chart an independent course between the United States and Pyongyang. After his election Kim's successor, Roh Moo-hyun, suggested that the ROK "mediate" in any war between America and the North and called for "concessions from both sides." Indeed, he even stated that "we should proudly say we will not side with North Korea or the United States." The head of Roh's transition team, Lim Chae-jung, developed a proposal that sought "a concession" from both America and North Korea. For a time it did not sound as if there were much of an alliance, at least one of any value.
Although a degree of civility eventually returned to the relationship, the two nations' differences were merely set aside, not resolved. And tensions again will grow. The so-called Mutual Defense Treaty, ratified in 1954, was forged in a different era to deal with different threats. Circumstances have passed it by, and no amount of friendly rhetoric can rehabilitate it.
DIFFICULT HISTORY
To some degree, relations between the two countries never have been smooth. Early contacts between the isolated monarchy known as the Hermit Kingdom and the United States included loot-minded American sailors losing their vessel and lives, followed by Washington's demands, simply ignored by Seoul, for redress. Friendly relations eventually were opened, but then were abandoned after Japan swallowed the peninsula. Contact was reestablished after World War II when the United States and the Soviet Union jointly occupied what had been a Japanese colony. (Although some South Korean leftists have blamed Washington for Korea's division, the alternative would have been full control by communist leader Kim Il-sung. If that was the case, those leftists, along with any other defenders of democracy and human rights, would be dead or imprisoned, and their fellow citizens would be impoverished and oppressed. Division was bad, but it was not the worst alternative.)
Forging a new country, and especially one with a sufficiently compliant government, proved difficult for Washington. Indeed, perhaps never have the tensions been greater than after the United States settled on the cantankerous Rhee Syngman as its strongman for the southern sector of the Korean peninsula. Washington ended up backing Rhee because, according to historian Callum MacDonald, it considered his regime to be "an instrument of containment" and "the only reliable barrier against communism." Yet Rhee was constantly at odds with Washington: threatening war even before the North invaded in 1950, pressing for coercive unification even after the United States decided to limit its war aims, obstructing the peace negotiations, and refusing to sign the armistice. The Eisenhower administration considered forcibly removing him.
Even after Rhee's fall from power in 1960 in the face of popular demonstrations (with a push from Washington, tired of his authoritarian rule), relations were uneasy. The United States ultimately accepted military rule. Although initially displeased with Park Chung-hee's coup, the Kennedy administration came to back Park, who visited Washington shortly after taking power and was narrowly elected president in what appeared to be relatively free elections in 1963. Tensions increased when Nixon withdrew some U.S. troops and when the Carter administration emphasized human rights, a commodity often absent in the South. (North Korea was obviously worse, but Washington was subsidizing and defending Seoul, not Pyongyang.) Even the Reagan administration was forced to draw lines, demanding that President Chun Doo-hwan, who eventually succeeded Park, not murder Kim Daejung — longtime dissident, human rights activist, and opposition presidential candidate — after the regime kidnapped him from Japan.
Cooperative relations between the U.S. and the ROK governments stoked unhappiness among the Korean population. Although most Americans were blissfully ignorant of U.S. support for successive ROK dictatorships, Koreans were quite aware of that policy. And they were increasingly angered by it.
For instance, between 1985 and 1988 a number of radical student organizations targeted American citizens and institutions for protests, taking over offices of the Chamber of Commerce and the U.S. Information Service. As street demonstrations escalated during the summer of 1987, many protestors blamed America not only for the political intransigence of the Chun government, but for its very existence. At the same time, the Reagan administration became more interested in human rights and pressed the regime to forge a peaceful, democratic solution. Then the 1988 Olympics in South Korea showcased obnoxious behavior by some U.S. athletes — two swimmers stealing a hotel statue, for instance — and generated public disapproval. So did acrimonious trade disputes over automobiles, food, and other products. After the fall of the Berlin Wall led to Germany's reunification, polls found that many younger Koreans blamed the United States for impeding reunification of the peninsula. "It's not that we don't like Americans," explained one demonstrator in July 1987, "but for 37 years you've been supporting the wrong guy here."
One of the wrong guys was Rhee, of course. Barely a year after his fall the military seized power. As noted earlier, the United States accepted Park Chung-hee with few public qualms until the Carter administration. Although Park's assassination in 1979 eliminated this blight on America's record, another soon followed: Chun Doo-hwan. Alas, many Koreans suspected America of having been involved in Chun's 1980 coup. Although General John Wickham, then U.S. commander in the ROK, said that he had no opportunity to block the Korean troop movements, and it is doubtful that South Korean field officers would have refused to obey orders from their own commanders, he fanned suspicions by saying that Koreans were "lemming-like" and needed "a strong leader."
Perhaps an even worse blow to America's reputation was inflicted later the same year by the Chun regime's brutal suppression of the student demonstrations in the city of Kwangju. The official death toll is 191, but private observers estimated the actual number killed to be as high as 2,000. Many residents blamed Washington. Linda Lewis, an American anthropologist in Kwangju at the time, wrote of "the oft-repeated expectation that the American government would (and should) actively intervene."
It was almost certainly unfair for Koreans to accuse the United States of complicity in the Kwangju fight. Wickham did not have operational control of the special forces used to crush the demonstrations, and, again, it is unlikely that U.S. disapproval would have stopped Chun from employing the Korean military to bolster his control. But the fact that Wickham raised no objection to Chun's use of the troops and later publicly stated that the Koreans were not ready for democracy made it appear that Washington would blindly support any pro-American government regardless of its cruelty.
The Chun dictatorship ended in the midst of massive demonstrations in 1987, and the Reagan administration ultimately encouraged Chun to implement democratic reforms. Yet Koreans may be forgiven for their irritation with America's ambivalence. After all, observed Edward A. Olsen of the Naval Postgraduate School, "South Korea is joining the ranks of democratic nations," but more despite than because of the United States.
Important policy differences continued even with democratic rule; the Kim Young-sam administration worried about being ignored by President Bill Clinton when he approached the DPRK. But with the election of Kim Daejung, the third civilian president (after former General Roh Tae-woo, who won in 1987), fears of American interference in the ROK's internal political affairs diminished. Still, although the end of military rule eliminated the most serious sources of tension, anger persisted over support for past military regimes. Even a decade ago, wrote historian James Matray during a period of seeming quiet, "Burning the American flag, carrying banners denouncing the United States, and chanting anti-American slogans have become standard features at student demonstrations regardless of the issue."
Moreover, democracy magnified another problem inherent to Washington's military role: cultural conflicts. To place 37,000 military personnel — largely young and male — in a foreign nation guarantees social friction. It is impossible for Koreans to ignore the American presence. Many conservative businessmen as well as radical students long have been irritated by the presence of a U.S. base, Yongsan, near the center of the capital city of Seoul. (The base now is set to be moved.)
And many Koreans were angered by the special treatment accorded American soldiers accused of a crime. Issues of custody, trial, and punishment were easily handled by a military dictatorship, but became explosive for a democratic government. A 1992 case involving a serviceman who murdered a prostitute led to huge anti-American demonstrations. In the summer of 1995 the Kim Young-sam and Clinton administrations faced a bitter controversy arising out of a subway melee. South Koreans protested the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which outlines special treatment for U.S. soldiers by the Korean judicial system. (The United States negotiates similar agreements with other nations that host American bases, but the exact terms vary.) Washington blamed the ROK media and pointed to the fact that four Americans but no Koreans were indicted for the brawl as evidence that some protection for U.S. soldiers was required.
Defense Secretary William Perry later promised to consider changes in the SOFA, but that did not end the controversy. Whatever the merits of any particular case, the SOFA issue created serious discontent. Explained a student leader at Yonsei University: "The problem is not in the crime itself, but in the criminal process. This process reflects the imperialist characteristics of the U.S. government." His opinion might have been extreme, but he was not alone in his unhappiness about the U.S.–ROK relationship: a decade ago one activist collected 40,000 signatures demanding revision of the SOFA. Moreover, with the local media citing a supposed wave of 800 crimes in 1994 through 1995 (most being traffic violations), public opinion polls showed a 20-point plunge in public support for maintenance of American forces. Even U.S. ambassador James Laney acknowledged that "the Korean public is led to believe that these things are getting out of hand, and it's affecting our welcome here. It's cause for great concern."
In fact, the ROK's very success made its dependence on Washington more insufferable. Opined South Korean scholar Manwoo Lee, "anti-Americanism in Korea symbolizes a renaissance of Korean nationalism." His argument was supported by poll data. The United States long ranked at or near the top in terms of nations admired by Koreans. However, during the 1980s America slipped dramatically, falling to number nine in 1988, rebounding a little, and then sliding again to number eight in 1992. Ominously, the favorable rating for America fell among urban dwellers, professionals, and the young. Thus, while the North Korean threat forced South Koreans to accept an unnatural security dependency on the United States, an older, independent heritage was reasserting itself.
SURGING TENSIONS
The tensions are worse today. Nationalism, cultural conflicts, and policy differences have come together in a very powerful combination. Explained Kim Jin-wung of Kyungpook National University in 2003: with the U.S. presence seemingly less important in protecting the ROK's security, the American troops "have been increasingly perceived as a social irritant and a remnant of the almost forgotten Cold War."
Hostility toward America burst forth particularly strongly as the ROK began to improve its relationship with Pyongyang. President Kim Dae-jung had barely set foot back in Seoul after the 2000 summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il before thousands of students took to the streets demanding that the Americans go home. Protestors also used June 25 of that year, the fiftieth anniversary of the onset of the Korean War, as an opportunity to demand Washington's withdrawal. The U.S. military established a "civil disturbance hot line" and, in the aftermath of the murder of an army officer at a shopping mall, warned of anti-American "strike squads." Amid the summit euphoria a U.S. soldier was sentenced by a U.S. military court to eight years in prison for murdering a South Korean bar waitress who refused to have sex with him. The case rekindled public anger over the SOFA's limits on Seoul's jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers accused of crimes. Although the most hostile sentiments seemed to reflect only fringe opinions, they were a harbinger of future events.
Little more than two years later, these issues returned with even greater force. In late 2002, after an accident in which an American military vehicle killed two teenage girls, demonstrations swept the country. Anger spilled out of universities into the middle class and seemed to grow along with the nuclear crisis. Explained Kim Sung-han of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, "Anti-Americanism is getting intense. It used to be widespread and not so deep. Now it's getting widespread and deep."
Although polls showed that a majority of South Koreans still supported the U.S. troop presence, a majority also pronounced its dislike of America. Aidan Foster-Carter of Leeds University complained of the South's "swollen yet strangely selective spleen": "In this mood, the U.S. is resented as a bully, just as Japan is forever a war criminal. Conversely, China — despite repressing North Korean refugees — is seen as a benign protector, and North Korea indulged as a wayward sibling — let the family sort him out."
Although passions cooled in 2003, the ROK will never go back to the Korea of 1953. The world is too different. South Korea is too different. South Koreans no longer perceive their independence to be based solely on American support in the face of the threat of communist aggression from the North.
One significant trend is the change in the public's perceptions of North Korea. In Kim Jin-wung's view, this is "the most important factor to influence South Korean views of the United States." With the end of military rule, both the educational establishment and media, driven perhaps by a mixture of leftist ideology and fear of upsetting the status quo, have begun promoting more positive views of the North. One sign of the shift is the increasing willingness of ROK textbooks to acknowledge Kim Ilsung's role (much overstated in the North, of course) as an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader. Another is a string of movies romanticizing the DPRK and demonizing the United States.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Korean Conundrum by Ted Galen Carpenter, Doug Bandow. Copyright © 2004 Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow. Excerpted by permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
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Table of Contents
Growing Tensions with both North and South Korea * The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Then and Now * Options for Dealing with North Korea * South Korea as a Security Free Rider * Time for an Amicable Divorce * Forging a New U.S. Strategy in East Asia