Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright

by Annalisa Coliva (Editor)

Overview

This volume is a collective exploration of major themes in the work of Crispin Wright, one of today's leading philosophers. These newly commissioned papers are divided into four sections, preceded by a substantial Introduction, which places them in the context of the development of Wright's ideas. The distinguished contributors address issues such as the rule-following problem, knowledge of our meanings and minds, truth, realism, anti-realism and relativism, as well as the nature of perceptual justification, the cogency of arguments such as G. E. Moore's celebrated proof of an external world, and skepticism about the material world. Some papers explore the relationship of Wright's ideas with those of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose influence has always been a prominent aspect of Wright's philosophy. The essays collectively testify to the enormous interest and relevance of Wright's seminal contributions for present-day debates in areas as diverse as the philosophy of language and mind, metaphysics, and epistemology, and significantly advance research in these areas. The volume also contains Wright's substantial responses to his critics, which offer the most up-to-date versions of his ideas and a vigorous defense of his philosophy.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780199278053
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	11/25/2012
Pages:	504
Product dimensions:	6.50(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.40(d)

About the Author

Annalisa Coliva is Associate Professor at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia (Italy) and Associate Director of COGITO Research Centre in Philosophy (Bologna). A Fulbright and Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, Coliva's main publications include Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (Palgrave, 2010) and, as editor, The Self and Self-Knowledge (OUP, 2012). She has published widely in Italian and English in epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, and history of analytic philosophy and is now working, with Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, on a collected volume titled Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein.

Table of Contents

List of contributorsIntroductionBio-bibliographical noteRule-Following and the Normativity of Meaning1. Blind rule-following, Paul A. Boghossian2. Understanding and rule-following, Christopher Peacocke3. Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms, Paul Horwich4. Why meaning intentions are degenerate, Akeel BilgramiKnowledge of Our Own Minds and Meanings5. The publicity of meaning and the interiority of mind, Barry C. Smith6. Expression, truth, and reality: some variations on themes from Wright, Dorit Bar-OnTruth, Objectivity, and Relativism7. Some remarks about minimalism, Simon Blackburn8. Objectivity, explanation, and cognitive shortfall, Stewart Shapiro9. How to formulate relativism, Carol RovaneWarrant, Transmission Failure, and Scepticism10. When warrant transmits, Jim Pryor11. Wright on Moore, José L. Zalabardo12. Moore's iProof/i, liberals, and conservatives - is there a (Wittgensteinian) third way?, Annalisa Coliva13. Wright against the sceptics, Michael WilliamsReplies, Crispin WrightPart I: The Rule-Following Considerations and the Normativity of MeaningPart II: Knowledge of Our Own Minds and MeaningsPart III: Truth, Objectivity, Realism, and RelativismPart IV: Warrant Transmission and EntitlementIndex

Editorial Reviews

"This is a terrific volume, covering a huge range of central topics in epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophies of mind and language."—Aidan McGlynn, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

"This volume is a fitting tribute and testament to the value of Wright's work over nearly five decades." — Mind

From the Publisher