Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility

by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Editor)

Overview

Leading philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists address issues of moral responsibility and free will, drawing on new findings from empirical science.

Traditional philosophers approached the issues of free will and moral responsibility through conceptual analysis that seldom incorporated findings from empirical science. In recent decades, however, striking developments in psychology and neuroscience have captured the attention of many moral philosophers. This volume of Moral Psychology offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate old and new problems regarding free will and moral responsibility.

The contributors—who include such prominent scholars as Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett, and Michael Gazzaniga—consider issues raised by determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism; epiphenomenalism, bypassing, and naturalism; naturalism; and rationality and situationism. These writings show that although science does not settle the issues of free will and moral responsibility, it has enlivened the field by asking novel, profound, and important questions.

Contributors
Roy F. Baumeister, Tim Bayne, Gunnar Björnsson, C. Daryl Cameron, Hanah A. Chapman, William A. Cunningham, Patricia S. Churchland, Christopher G. Coutlee, Daniel C. Dennett, Ellen E. Furlong, Michael S. Gazzaniga, Patrick Haggard, Brian Hare, Lasana T. Harris, John-Dylan Haynes, Richard Holton, Scott A. Huettel, Robert Kane, Victoria K. Lee, Neil Levy, Alfred R. Mele, Christian Miller, Erman Misirlisoy, P. Read Montague, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, William T. Newsome, B. Keith Payne, Derk Pereboom, Adina L. Roskies, Laurie R. Santos, Timothy Schroeder, Michael N. Shadlen, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Chandra Sripada, Christopher L. Suhler, Manuel Vargas, Gideon Yaffe

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780262321495
Publisher:	MIT Press
Publication date:	02/21/2014
Series:	A Bradford Book , #4
Sold by:	Penguin Random House Publisher Services
Format:	eBook
Pages:	496
File size:	2 MB
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Philosophy Department and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He edited the previous volumes in Moral Psychology.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments xi

Introduction Walter Sinnott-Armstrong xiii

1 Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the; Modern Mind Sciences Eddy Nahmias 1

1.1 Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing Gunnar Björnsson Derk Pereboom 27

1.2 A Neuroscientific Account of the Human Will Erman Misirlisoy Patrick Haggard 37

1.3 Response to Misirlisoy and Haggard and to Björnsson and Pereboom Eddy Nahmias 43

2 Mental Life and Responsibility in Real Time with a Determined Brain Michael S. Gazzaniga 59

2.1 Seduced by Tradition Daniel C. Dennett 75

2.2 Neuroscience, Explanation, and the Problem of Free Will William T. Newsome 81

2.3 Response Michael S. Gazzaniga 97

3 Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will? Adina L. Roskies 103

3.1 Free Will, Mechanism, and Determinism: Comments on Roskies, "Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?" Robert Kane 127

3.2 Comments on Adina Roskies, "Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?" Michael N. Shadlen 139

3.3 Response to Commentators Adina L. Roskies 151

4 The Neural Code for Intentions in the Human Brain: Implications for Neurotechnology and Free Will John-Dylan Haynes 157

4.1 Neural Decoding and Human Freedom Tim Bayne 177

4.2 Short-Term and Long-Term Intentions in Psychological Theory, Neurotechnology, and Free Will Timothy Schroeder 183

4.3 Reply to Schroeder and Bayne John-Dylan Haynes 191

5 Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will? Alfred R. Mele 195

5.1 Dualism, Libertarianism, and Scientific Skepticism about Free Will Thomas Nadelhoffer 209

5.2 Reconsidering Scientific Threats to Free Will Manuel Vargas 217

5.3 Reply to Nadelhoffer and Vargas Alfred R. Mele 227

6 Constructing a Scientific Theory of Free Will Roy F. Baumeister 235

6.1 Hold Off on the Definitions: Comments on Baumeister Richard Holton 257

6.2 Free Will Worth Having and the Intentional Control of Behavior B. Keith Payne C. Daryl Cameron 265

6.3 Grateful Responses to Thoughtful Comments by Holton, Payne, and Cameron Roy F. Baumeister 271

7 The Freedom to Choose and Drug Addiction P. Read Montague 279

7.1 Dopamine Dysfunction and Addict Responsibility: A Comment on Read Montague's "The Freedom to Choose and Drug Addiction" Gideon Yaffe 287

7.2 The Second Hit in Addiction Chandra Sripada 295

7.3 Responses to Yaffe and Sripada P. Read Montague 305

8 Agency and Control: The Subcortical Role in Good Decisions Patricia S. Churchland Christopher L. Suhler 309

8.1 Rules, Rewards, and Responsibility: A Reinforcement Learning Approach to Action Control Christopher G. Coutlee Scott A. Huettel 327

8.2 Consciousness Matters Neil Levy 335

8.3 Responses Patricia S. Churchland Christopher L. Suhler 341

9 Evolutionary Insights into the Nature of Choice: Evidence from Nonhuman Primates Ellen E. Furlong Laurie R. Santos 347

9.1 Is Human Free Will Prisoner to Primate, Ape, and Hominin Preferences and Biases? Brian Hare 361

9.2 Furlong and Santos on Desire and Choice Christian B. Miller 367

9.3 Response to Miller and Hare Ellen E. Furlong Laurie R. Santos 375

10 A Social Perspective on Debates about Free Will Victoria K. Lee Lasana T. Harris 381

10.1 Social Groups: Both Our Destruction and Our Salvation? Hanah A. Chapman William A. Cunningham 397

10.2 Social Explanations and the Free Will Problem Manuel Vargas 403

10.3 Extreme Group Membership Frames the Debate Victoria K. Lee Lasana T. Harris 413

References 419

Contributors 459

Index 461

What People are Saying About This

Kathleen Vohs

Clear, logical, and cogent are not often words associated with discussions of free will or morality—yet the chapters in this book are just that. Experts who have done a lot of thinking about these issues raise points that I would guess not many readers will have thought of, and the diverse array of perspectives is explained so well that readers who are not immersed in the science, philosophy, and debates about free will and moral responsibility will learn a lot and keep reading. I certainly did—and then immediately started telling colleagues to read this book.

Scott Grafton

With this volume, Sinnott-Armstrong has created a much-needed point of entry into the free will debate. Drawing heavily on the neuroscience of choice, he deftly balances a dizzying array of perspectives built in large part on empirical facts. You experience free will emerging as an exciting yet profoundly complicated scientific challenge.

John Martin Fischer

This is an outstanding collection of work at the intersection between science and traditional approaches to moral responsibility (and free will). The contributors are among the very best people working in these areas. The book is strong evidence for the contention that progress in understanding freedom of the will and moral responsibility is often enhanced when philosophers and scientists work collaboratively. Highly recommended.

From the Publisher

This is an outstanding collection of work at the intersection between science and traditional approaches to moral responsibility (and free will). The contributors are among the very best people working in these areas. The book is strong evidence for the contention that progress in understanding freedom of the will and moral responsibility is often enhanced when philosophers and scientists work collaboratively. Highly recommended.

—John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside

Clear, logical, and cogent are not often words associated with discussions of free will or morality—yet the chapters in this book are just that. Experts who have done a lot of thinking about these issues raise points that I would guess not many readers will have thought of, and the diverse array of perspectives is explained so well that readers who are not immersed in the science, philosophy, and debates about free will and moral responsibility will learn a lot and keep reading. I certainly did—and then immediately started telling colleagues to read this book.

—Kathleen Vohs, Co-editor of Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work?

With this volume, Sinnott-Armstrong has created a much-needed point of entry into the free will debate. Drawing heavily on the neuroscience of choice, he deftly balances a dizzying array of perspectives built in large part on empirical facts. You experience free will emerging as an exciting yet profoundly complicated scientific challenge.

—Scott Grafton, University of California, Santa Barbara

Endorsement

With this volume, Sinnott-Armstrong has created a much-needed point of entry into the free will debate. Drawing heavily on the neuroscience of choice, he deftly balances a dizzying array of perspectives built in large part on empirical facts. You experience free will emerging as an exciting yet profoundly complicated scientific challenge.

—Scott Grafton, University of California, Santa Barbara

Editorial Reviews

There is much to like about this volume. Sinnott-Armstong has again done an excellent job orchestrating: topics are well-chosen, contributors include many leaders in both philosophy and cognitive science, and response authors are well-matched with target article authors. Much of the volume is pitched at a level accessible to both specialists and interested non-specialists alike.—Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews—

From the Publisher

There is much to like about this volume. Sinnott-Armstong has again done an excellent job orchestrating: topics are well-chosen, contributors include many leaders in both philosophy and cognitive science, and response authors are well-matched with target article authors. Much of the volume is pitched at a level accessible to both specialists and interested non-specialists alike.

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

There is much to like about this volume. Sinnott-Armstong has again done an excellent job orchestrating: topics are well-chosen, contributors include many leaders in both philosophy and cognitive science, and response authors are well-matched with target article authors. Much of the volume is pitched at a level accessible to both specialists and interested non-specialists alike.

—Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Reviews