Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency
Negative actions, like intentional omissions or refrainments, seem to be genuine actions. The standard metaphysical theories of action are event-based: they treat actions as events of a special kind. However, it seems that many (and perhaps all) negative actions are not events, but absences thereof. This is the first book-length treatment of the problem of negative action. It surveys the recent literature, and shows how the problem is rooted in interconnected issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of language. In particular, it connects competing views of the ontology of negative actions to competing views of the semantics of 'negative action sentences', and develops unique ontological and semantic theories to solve the problem. It provides a comprehensive picture of the nature of negative actions, our thought and talk about them, and their place in a theory of action.
1137675216
Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency
Negative actions, like intentional omissions or refrainments, seem to be genuine actions. The standard metaphysical theories of action are event-based: they treat actions as events of a special kind. However, it seems that many (and perhaps all) negative actions are not events, but absences thereof. This is the first book-length treatment of the problem of negative action. It surveys the recent literature, and shows how the problem is rooted in interconnected issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of language. In particular, it connects competing views of the ontology of negative actions to competing views of the semantics of 'negative action sentences', and develops unique ontological and semantic theories to solve the problem. It provides a comprehensive picture of the nature of negative actions, our thought and talk about them, and their place in a theory of action.
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Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency

Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency

by Jonathan D. Payton
Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency

Negative Actions: Events, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency

by Jonathan D. Payton

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Overview

Negative actions, like intentional omissions or refrainments, seem to be genuine actions. The standard metaphysical theories of action are event-based: they treat actions as events of a special kind. However, it seems that many (and perhaps all) negative actions are not events, but absences thereof. This is the first book-length treatment of the problem of negative action. It surveys the recent literature, and shows how the problem is rooted in interconnected issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of action, and the philosophy of language. In particular, it connects competing views of the ontology of negative actions to competing views of the semantics of 'negative action sentences', and develops unique ontological and semantic theories to solve the problem. It provides a comprehensive picture of the nature of negative actions, our thought and talk about them, and their place in a theory of action.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781108879569
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 02/25/2021
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
File size: 4 MB

About the Author

Jonathan D. Payton is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Bilkent University, Turkey. He has published numerous articles on metaphysics, the philosophy of action and the philosophy of language in journals including the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Erkenntnis and Synthese.

Table of Contents

Introduction; 1. Action and ontology; 2. The problem of negative action; 3. Mere manifestations of agency?; 4. The logical form of negative action sentences I: the case for deflationism; 5. The logical form of negative action sentences II: a Neo-Davidsonian approach; 6. The logical form of negative action sentences III: the approach defended; 7. Realizer-functionalism and the metaphysics of events; 8. Objections; Conclusions.
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