Newton's Philosophy of Nature: Selections from His Writings

by Sir Isaac Newton, H. S. Thayer (Editor)

Overview

Aside from the Principia and occasional appearances of the Opticks, Newton's writings have remained largely inaccessible to students of philosophy, science, and literature as well as to other readers. This book provides a remedy with wide representation of the interests, problems, and diverse philosophic issues that preoccupied the greatest scientific mind of the seventeenth century.
Grouped in sections corresponding to methods, principles, and theological considerations, these selections feature cross-references to related essays. Starting with an examination of the methods of natural philosophy — including the rules of reasoning, the formulation of hypotheses, and the experimental method — the essays explore the laws of motion and the relationships between God and gravity, creation, and universal design. Discussions of questions related to natural philosophy include theories on light, colors, and perceptions. The volume concludes with absorbing selections from the Opticks and a helpful series of historical and explanatory notes.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780486170275
Publisher:	Dover Publications
Publication date:	07/24/2012
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	224
File size:	771 KB

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NEWTON'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS

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By H. S. THAYER

Dover Publications, Inc.

Copyright © 2005 Dover Publications, Inc.
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-486-17027-5

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CHAPTER 1

The Method of Natural Philosophy

1. RULES OF REASONING IN PHILOSOPHY

RULE I

We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.

To this purpose the philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.

RULE II

Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.

As to respiration in a man and in a beast, the descent of stones in Europe and in America, the light of our culinary fire and of the sun, the reflection of light in the earth and in the planets.

RULE III

The qualities of bodies, which admit neither intensification nor remission of degrees, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.

For since the qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiments, we are to hold for universal all such as universally agree with experiments, and such as are not liable to diminution can never be quite taken away. We are certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions of our own devising; nor are we to recede from the analogy of Nature, which is wont to be simple and always consonant to itself. We in no other way know the extension of bodies than by our senses, nor do these reach it in all bodies; but because we perceive extension in all that are sensible, therefore we ascribe it universally to all others also. That abundance of bodies are hard we learn by experience; and because the hardness of the whole arises from the hardness of the parts, we therefore justly infer the hardness of the undivided particles, not only of the bodies we feel, but of all others. That all bodies are impenetrable, we gather not from reason, but from sensation. The bodies which we handle we find impenetrable, and thence conclude impenetrability to be a universal property of all bodies whatsoever. That all bodies are movable and endowed with certain powers (which we call the inertia) of persevering in their motion, or in their rest, we only infer from the like properties observed in the bodies which we have seen. The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia of the whole result from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia of the parts; and hence we conclude the least particles of all bodies to be also all extended, and hard and impenetrable, and movable, and endowed with their proper inertia. And this is the foundation of all philosophy. Moreover, that the divided but contiguous particles of bodies may be separated from one another is a matter of observation; and, in the particles that remain undivided, our minds are able to distinguish yet lesser parts, as is mathematically demonstrated. But whether the parts so distinguished and not yet divided may, by the powers of Nature, be actually divided and separated from one another we cannot certainly determine. Yet had we the proof of but one experiment that any undivided particle, in breaking a hard and solid body, suffered a division, we might by virtue of this rule conclude that the undivided as well as the divided particles may be divided and actually separated to infinity.

Lastly, if it universally appears, by experiments and astronomical observations, that all bodies about the earth gravitate toward the earth, and that in proportion to the quantity of matter which they severally contain; that the moon likewise, according to the quantity of its matter, gravitates toward the earth; that, on the other hand, our sea gravitates toward the moon; and all the planets one toward another; and the comets in like manner toward the sun: we must, in consequence of this rule, universally allow that all bodies whatsoever are endowed with a principle of mutual gravitation. For the argument from the appearances concludes with more force for the universal gravitation of all bodies than for their impenetrability, of which, among those in the celestial regions, we have no experiments nor any manner of observation. Not that I affirm gravity to be essential to bodies; by their vis insita I mean nothing but their inertia. This is immutable. Their gravity is diminished as they recede from the earth.

RULE IV

In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more accurate or liable to exceptions.

This rule we must follow, that the argument of induction may not be evaded by hypotheses.

2. ON HYPOTHESES

From a Letter to Oldenburg

... For the best and safest method of philosophizing seems to be, first, to inquire diligently into the properties of things and to establish those properties by experiments, and to proceed later to hypotheses for the explanation of things themselves. For hypotheses ought to be applied only in the explanation of the properties of things, and not made use of in determining them; except in so far as they may furnish experiments. And if anyone offers conjectures about the truth of things from the mere possibility of hypotheses, I do not see by what stipulation anything certain can be determined in any science; since one or another set of hypotheses may always be devised which will appear to supply new difficulties. Hence I judged that one should abstain from contemplating hypotheses, as from improper argumentation ...

From Letters to Cotes

I

I had yours of Feb. 18th, and the difficulty you mention which lies in these words, "since every attraction is mutual," is removed by considering that, as in geometry, the word 'hypothesis' is not taken in so large a sense as to include the axioms and postulates; so, in experimental philosophy, it is not to be taken in so large a sense as to include the first principles or axioms, which I call the laws of motion. These principles are deduced from phenomena and made general by induction, which is the highest evidence that a proposition can have in this philosophy. And the word 'hypothesis' is here used by me to signify only such a proposition as is not a phenomenon nor deduced from any phenomena, but assumed or supposed—without any experimental proof. Now the mutual and mutually equal attraction of bodies is a branch of the third law of motion, and how this branch is deduced from phenomena you may see at the end of the corollaries of the laws of motion.... If a body attracts another contiguous to it and is not mutually attracted by the other, the attracted body will drive the other before it, and both will go away together with an accelerated motion in infinitum, as it were, by a self-moving principle, contrary to the first law of motion, whereas there is no such phenomenon in all nature.

... And for preventing exceptions against the use of the word 'hypothesis,' I desire you to conclude the next paragraph in this manner: "For anything which is not deduced from phenomena ought to be called a hypothesis, and hypotheses of this kind, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy, propositions are deduced from phenomena, and afterward made general by induction." ...

II

On Saturday last I wrote to you, representing that experimental philosophy proceeds only upon phenomena and deduces general propositions from them only by induction. And such is the proof of mutual attraction. And the arguments for the impenetrability, mobility, and force of all bodies and for the laws of motion are no better. And he that in experimental philosophy would except against any of these must draw his objection from some experiment or phenomenon and not from a mere hypothesis, if the induction be of any force ...

3. THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD

From a letter to Oldenburg

... I cannot think it effectual for determining truth to examine the several ways by which phenomena may be explained, unless where there can be a perfect enumeration of all those ways. You know, the proper method for inquiring after the properties of things is to deduce them from experiments. And I told you that the theory which I propounded was evinced to me, not by inferring 'tis thus because not otherwise, that is, not by deducing it only from a confutation of contrary suppositions, but by deriving it from experiments concluding positively and directly. The way therefore to examine it is by considering whether the experiments which I propound do prove those parts of the theory to which they are applied, or by prosecuting other experiments which the theory may suggest for its examination.

To determine by these and such like queries seems the most proper and direct way to a conclusion. And therefore I could wish all objections were suspended from hypotheses or any other heads than these two: of showing the insufficiency of experiments to determine these queries, or prove any other parts of my theory, by assigning the flaws and defects in my conclusions drawn from them; or of producing other experiments which directly contradict me, if any such may seem to occur. For if the experiments which I urge be defective, it cannot be difficult to show the defects; but if valid, then by proving the theory, they must render all objections invalid.

CHAPTER 2

Fundamental Principles of Natural Philosophy

1. NEWTON'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE PRINCIPIA

Since the ancients (as we are told by Pappus) esteemed the science of mechanics of greatest importance in the investigation of natural things, and the moderns, rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities, have endeavored to subject the phenomena of nature to the laws of mathematics, I have in this treatise cultivated mathematics as far as it relates to philosophy. The ancients considered mechanics in a twofold respect: as rational, which proceeds accurately by demonstration, and practical. To practical mechanics all the manual arts belong, from which mechanics took its name. But as artificers do not work with perfect accuracy, it comes to pass that mechanics is so distinguished from geometry that what is perfectly accurate is called geometrical; what is less so is called mechanical. However, the errors are not in the art, but in the artificers. He that works with less accuracy is an imperfect mechanic; and if any could work with perfect accuracy, he would be the most perfect mechanic of all; for the description of right lines and circles, upon which geometry is founded, belongs to mechanics. Geometry does not teach us to draw these lines, but requires them to be drawn; for it requires that the learner should first be taught to describe these accurately before he enters upon geometry, then it shows how by these operations problems may be solved. To describe right lines and circles are problems, but not 9 geometrical problems. The solution of these problems is required from mechanics, and by geometry the use of them, when so solved, is shown; and it is the glory of geometry that from those few principles, brought from without, it is able to produce so many things. Therefore geometry is founded in mechanical practice and is nothing but that part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes and demonstrates the art of measuring. But since the manual arts are chiefly employed in the moving of bodies, it happens that geometry is commonly referred to their magnitude, and mechanics to their motion. In this sense rational mechanics will be the science of motions resulting from any forces whatsoever and of the forces required to produce any motions, accurately proposed and demonstrated. This part of mechanics, as far as it extended to the five powers which relate to manual arts, was cultivated by the ancients, who considered gravity (it not being a manual power) not otherwise than in moving weights by those powers. But I consider philosophy rather than arts, and write not concerning manual but natural powers, and consider chiefly those things which relate to gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance of fluids, and the like forces, whether attractive or impulsive; and therefore I offer this work as the mathematical principles of philosophy, for the whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in this: from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena; and to this end the general propositions in the First and Second Books are directed. In the Third Book I give an example of this in the explication of the System of the World; for by the propositions mathematically demonstrated in the former books, in the third I derive from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravity with which bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then from these forces, by other propositions which are also mathematical, I deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea. I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled toward one another and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from one another. These forces being unknown, philosophers have hitherto attempted the search of Nature in vain; but I hope the principles here laid down will afford some light either to this or some truer method of philosophy.

In the publication of this work the most acute and universally learned Mr. Edmund Halley not only assisted me in correcting the errors of the press and preparing the geometrical figures, but it was through his solicitations that it came to be published; for when he had obtained of me my demonstrations of the figure of the celestial orbits, he continually pressed me to communicate the same to the Royal Society, who afterward, by their kind encouragement and entreaties, engaged me to think of publishing them. But after I had begun to consider the inequalities of the lunar motions, and had entered upon some other things relating to the laws and measures of gravity and other forces; and the figures that would be described by bodies attracted according to given laws; and the motion of several bodies moving among themselves; the motion of bodies in resisting mediums; the forces, densities, and motions of mediums; the orbits of the comets, and suchlike, I deferred that publication till I had made a search into those matters and could put forth the whole together. What relates to the lunar motions (being imperfect), I have put all together in the corollaries of Proposition LXVI, to avoid being obliged to propose and distinctly demonstrate the several things there contained in a method more prolix than the subject deserved and interrupt the series of the other propositions. Some things, found out after the rest, I chose to insert in places less suitable, rather than change the number of the propositions and the citations. I heartily beg that what I have here done may be read with forbearance and that my labors in a subject so difficult may be examined, not so much with the view to censure, as to remedy their defects.

IS. NEWTON

Cambridge, Trinity College, May 8, 1686

2. DEFINITIONS AND SCHOLIUM

DEFINITION I

The quantity of matter is the measure of the same, arising from its density and bulk conjointly.

Thus air of a double density, in a double space, is quadruple in quantity; in a triple space, sextuple in quantity. The same thing is to be understood of snow and fine dust or powders that are condensed by compression or liquefaction, and of all bodies that are by any causes whatever differently condensed. I have no regard in this place to a medium, if any such there is, that freely pervades the interstices between the parts of bodies. It is this quantity that I mean hereafter everywhere under the name of 'body' or 'mass.' And the same is known by the weight of each body, for it is proportional to the weight, as I have found by experiments on pendulums, very accurately made, which shall be shown hereafter.

DEFINITION II

The quantity of motion is the measure of the same, arising from the velocity and quantity of matter conjointly.

The motion of the whole is the sum of the motions of all the parts; and therefore in a body double in quantity, with equal velocity, the motion is double; with twice the velocity, it is quadruple.

(Continues...)

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Table of Contents

Editor's Preface
Introduction: What Isaac Newton Started
Selections from Newton
I. The Method of Natural Philosophy
1. Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy
2. On Hypotheses
3. The Experimental Method
II. Fundamental Principles of Natural Philosophy
1. Newton's Preface to the First Edition of the Principia
2. Definitions and Scholium
3. Axioms, or Laws of Motion
4. The Motion of Bodies
III. God and Natural Philosophy
1. General Scholium
2. God and Gravity
3. On Creation
4. On Universal Design
IV. Questions on Natural Philosophy
1. The New Theory about Light and Colors
2. On the Science of Colors
3. Hypothesis Touching on the Theory of Light and Colors
4. Perception
5. On Gravity
6. Cotes' Preface to the Second Edition of the Principia
V. Questions from the "Optics"
Notes
Selected Bibliography