Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions / Edition 1

by Dominic D. P. Johnson Alistair Buchan Professor of International Relations, Department of Politics and Internation

Overview

Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win—and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in Overconfidence and War, states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias—called "positive illusions"—as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war.

Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries—and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions.

The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred—heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests—and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out—in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780674015760
Publisher:	Harvard University Press
Publication date:	10/29/2004
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	288
Product dimensions:	5.50(w) x 8.25(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

Dominic D. P. Johnson is Alistair Buchan Professor of International Relations at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford.

Table of Contents

1. War and Illusions

2. Looking for Illusions

3. World War I

4. The Munich Crisis

5. The Cuban Missile Crisis

6. The Vietnam War

7. Vanity Dies Hard

8. Iraq, 2003

Appendix

Notes

Acknowledgments

Index

What People are Saying About This

Dominic Johnson's attack on the war puzzle is novel, convincing, and appealing. Steeped in sound biology and a detailed account of key well-documented conflicts, Overconfidence and War marks an important advance in the long-anticipated integration of political science and evolutionary theory.

Richard Wrangham

Dominic Johnson's attack on the war puzzle is novel, convincing, and appealing. Steeped in sound biology and a detailed account of key well-documented conflicts, Overconfidence and War marks an important advance in the long-anticipated integration of political science and evolutionary theory.
— Richard Wrangham, co-author of Demonic Males

Robert Trivers

This is an important book, both timely and of enduring value. It traces in detail the dreadful connection between self-deception and human warfare and suggests the kinds of thinking we must guard against if we are to avoid war. Read this book in hopes of a better, more conscious day-a day when we will not blunder so easily and stupidly off the first cliff inviting us to war.

Steven Pinker

Overconfidence and War is a fascinating and insightful analysis. Its skillful blend of history, psychology, and evolutionary biology is a model for a new kind of social analysis, one that will have increasing prominence in the years to come.
— Steven Pinker, author of How the Mind Works and The Blank Slate

Rosabeth Moss Kanter

Dominic Johnson shows that international conflicts need not escalate into long, costly wars -- if decision-makers rely on well-vetted information and avoid wishful thinking. He provides a lucid, convincing analysis of the disastrous consequences when normal confidence gives way to arrogance, causing leaders to believe their own propaganda, assume superiority, and deny facts.
— Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Harvard Business School Professor and author of Confidence: How Winning Streaks and Losing Streaks Begin and End

Stephen Peter Rosen

The puzzle of why countries go to war is a puzzle only for those who assume that humans are calculating machines. Dominic Johnson provides a scientific foundation for understanding how humans really make decisions about the most important questions they face. We need more books like Overconfidence and War.
— Stephen Peter Rosen, Harvard University

Editorial Reviews

Johnson applies the logic of evolution to international relations. Following one of his mentors, the Harvard anthropologist Richard Wrangham, he suggests that overconfidence might once have been helpful in war and conflict. On the ancient African savannah, it was actually rational to misestimate your own capacities: a fearsome appearance and bold tactics could intimidate the enemy and help carry the day during lightning raids on enemy camps. But today, given modern weaponry, bureaucratic planning and mass armies, a cocky disposition is as likely to be suicidal as it is glorious. Military overconfidence, in other words, is a psychological holdover—a cognitive appendix—from an earlier period in human history. It is perhaps most dangerous when it prompts a decision for war in the first place. And it could be the X-factor explaining the otherwise inexplicable in recent military history: French faith in the Maginot line, Hitler's drive into Russia, the American failure to heed the lessons of French defeat in Vietnam. Most humans are prone to overestimating themselves, but leaders (who are inordinately ambitious and, by definition, have suffered few recent professional setbacks) are especially susceptible. Fittingly, the cover of Johnson's book features George W. Bush in the famous flight suit, flashing an exuberant thumbs-up.

New York Times Magazine - Christopher Shea

The puzzle of why countries go to war is a puzzle only for those who assume that humans are calculating machines. Dominic Johnson provides a scientific foundation for understanding how humans really make decisions about the most important questions they face. We need more books like Overconfidence and War.

Stephen Peter Rosen

This is an important book, both timely and of enduring value. It traces in detail the dreadful connection between self-deception and human warfare and suggests the kinds of thinking we must guard against if we are to avoid war. Read this book in hopes of a better, more conscious day-a day when we will not blunder so easily and stupidly off the first cliff inviting us to war.

Robert Trivers

Dominic Johnson shows that international conflicts need not escalate into long, costly wars — if decision-makers rely on well-vetted information and avoid wishful thinking. He provides a lucid, convincing analysis of the disastrous consequences when normal confidence gives way to arrogance, causing leaders to believe their own propaganda, assume superiority, and deny facts.

Rosabeth Moss Kanter

Overconfidence and War is a fascinating and insightful analysis. Its skillful blend of history, psychology, and evolutionary biology is a model for a new kind of social analysis, one that will have increasing prominence in the years to come.

Steven Pinker

Dominic Johnson's attack on the war puzzle is novel, convincing, and appealing. Steeped in sound biology and a detailed account of key well-documented conflicts, Overconfidence and War marks an important advance in the long-anticipated integration of political science and evolutionary theory.

Richard Wrangham

Johnson applies the logic of evolution to international relations. Following one of his mentors, the Harvard anthropologist Richard Wrangham, he suggests that overconfidence might once have been helpful in war and conflict. On the ancient African savannah, it was actually rational to misestimate your own capacities: a fearsome appearance and bold tactics could intimidate the enemy and help carry the day during lightning raids on enemy camps. But today, given modern weaponry, bureaucratic planning and mass armies, a cocky disposition is as likely to be suicidal as it is glorious. Military overconfidence, in other words, is a psychological holdover—a cognitive appendix—from an earlier period in human history. It is perhaps most dangerous when it prompts a decision for war in the first place. And it could be the X-factor explaining the otherwise inexplicable in recent military history: French faith in the Maginot line, Hitler's drive into Russia, the American failure to heed the lessons of French defeat in Vietnam. Most humans are prone to overestimating themselves, but leaders (who are inordinately ambitious and, by definition, have suffered few recent professional setbacks) are especially susceptible. Fittingly, the cover of Johnson's book features George W. Bush in the famous flight suit, flashing an exuberant thumbs-up.
— Christopher Shea

New York Times Magazine

"Does a human tendency toward overconfidence lead us into wars when a more realistic assessment might keep the peace?" Johnson, a fellow at Princeton's Society of Fellows, poses that question in this debut, and his answer, stretched out over eight densely written chapters, is (much more often than not): yes. Johnson hones in on different nations' decisions at what he posits as turning points in 20th-century history: WWI and the Vietnam War, which became shooting wars, and the Munich Crisis of 1938 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which did not. Johnson ties the trait of overconfidence to humankind's evolutionary past, maintaining that it is "an integral part of the human psyche." He finds the Iraq war, to which he devotes his last chapter, a consequence of that overconfidence. Johnson is meticulous in backing up his assertions, but (despite the trade-like subtitle) the book reads like an academic treatise; be prepared for arguments made solely for other experts, long stretches of quotation and dense charts. (Oct.) Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.

Publishers Weekly

If states could know the outcome of wars in advance, they would in many cases, even when they are likely to win, be inclined to find less harmful ways of pursuing their interests. Accordingly, Johnson argues, they must tend to harbor positive illusions about their prospects. He explores the various psychological and political sources of overconfidence, reflected in tendencies to overestimate one's own side and underestimate the enemy, and tests them in four case studies. In two, World War I and Vietnam, such illusions encouraged war, and in another two, Munich and the Cuban missile crisis, checks on illusions encouraged a settlement. He adds a postscript on Iraq, which certainly provides support for his underlying thesis, although there was no shortage of questioning of the Bush administration's optimism. The focus on overconfidence provides an interesting vantage point from which to view some familiar episodes in international history, although Johnson attempts to extract more in terms of international relations theory from the basic insight than it really warrants. What constitutes an illusion can be very hard to pin down, and, as Johnson notes, illusions can also cause bold or resolute behavior that leads to a convergence with reality.

Foreign Affairs

Drawing on scholarly articles, interviews, and testimony, and reports from the U.S. Army War College, Johnson (Princeton Univ. Soc. of Fellows) cogently examines the psychological, more than the political, reasons behind why nations go to war. By citing many examples from history, including World War I and Vietnam, he illustrates how overconfidence and false assumptions have led countries to military defeats. Conversely, Johnson explores two events that prevented (or delayed) the outbreak of war: the Munich crisis of 1938 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In a chapter titled "Looking for Illusions," he presents a theoretical look at the use of positive illusions in wartime and concludes that such illusions are "most likely to produce war in nondemocracies with a closed debate." The final chapter assesses the current war in Iraq, describing both Iraqi and American overconfidence, how the U. S. war plan undermined the later occupation of Iraq, and how prewar assumptions led to continuing postwar problems. This timely and important book should be required reading both before and after the presidential election.-Thomas A. Karel, Franklin & Marshall Coll. Lib., Lancaster, PA Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.

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