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| ISBN-13: | 9780822397878 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Duke University Press |
| Publication date: | 06/01/2012 |
| Series: | Duke Press policy studies |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 378 |
| File size: | 2 MB |
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Resolving Disputes Between Nations
Coercion or Conciliation?
By Martin Patchen
Duke University Press
Copyright © 1988 Duke University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8223-0819-5
CHAPTER 1
Disputes Between Nations: An Analytic Framework
How can disputes between nations be resolved peacefully, without the use of force? Obviously this question is of crucial importance to us all. To help answer it, it is important to understand why national leaders act as they do in the course of a dispute. How does each side perceive the situation and its adversary? How does each choose among alternative actions? How do the actions of one nation affect those of its adversary? For example, when does a threat lead to compliance and when does it lead instead to counter-threat?
To answer these and related questions, it is very helpful to have a general theoretical framework for analyzing the interaction between leaders of nations. Such a framework can direct our attention to the important variables and processes at work. It can help us to describe the processes of interaction between nations in a systematic way. And it can help us to pose specific questions and hypotheses about the conditions related to peaceful or violent resolution of disputes.
In this chapter I will present such a theoretical framework. This framework is based on the view of conflict and cooperation as a process of strategic interaction between two parties who are interdependent. This viewpoint has been developed by game theorists and by some social psychologists, most notably by Harold Kelley and John Thibaut (1978). This same general perspective has been brought to bear on international relations by some political scientists. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing have made an especially important contribution in applying the approach to international crises in their book Conflict Among Nations (1977). The theoretical framework to be presented here is influenced heavily by these lines of work. At the same time, it is distinctive in some ways, as will become apparent.
In presenting this theoretical framework, I will illustrate the ideas by using the case of the Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 (Abel, 1966; Kennedy, 1969; Allison, 1971; Detzer, 1979). This case is not necessarily typical of international conflicts or crises, but it should serve to make the general points more concrete.
Actions and Statements of Intent
The actions of each party to a dispute may be categorized in terms of whether (or the extent to which) they provide rewards or penalties to the adversary. Rewarding behavior may involve concessions on the disputed issue (e.g., removing one's troops from a disputed area) or it may not be related directly to the dispute (e.g., granting the other nation a loan). Likewise, behavior that penalizes the other may be directly relevant to the dispute (e.g., blocking supplies to the other in a disputed territory) or not directly relevant (e.g., blocking an international loan to the other). Penalizing actions may or may not involve the use of violence against the other. (However, we will want to give special attention to violent actions.)
As the term is used here, actions may include statements. As with physical actions, statements may be rewarding or punishing. For example, statements by American leaders that acknowledge that the Soviet Union is a superpower on a par with the United States satisfy the long-felt need of Soviet leaders for recognition of their nation (and themselves as leaders) as equal to the United States. Conversely, statements that question the legitimacy of their regime or of their control over Eastern European countries are damaging to Soviet leaders not only symbolically but because they could potentially stimulate unrest. Of course, statements rarely are equal in reward or punishment value to physical actions—e.g., opening up markets for trade or dropping bombs.
Threats and Promises are not viewed here primarily as actions. While they may have some direct reward or punishment value (e.g., threats may be seen as insulting), their main importance is as expressed intentions to take actions in the future, usually under certain conditions. Likewise, offers by one side concerning terms on which they are willing to settle the dispute are treated here as promises to take certain rewarding actions (reflecting concessions) if the other side will agree to the terms.
To illustrate, when the United States discovered the construction of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, it considered several types of options at various times. One was to take (or promise to take) actions that represented concessions (or rewards) to the Soviets—specifically to remove our own missiles from Turkey and to refrain indefinitely from invading Cuba. A second option was to do nothing new—i.e., ignore the Soviet base on the grounds that it represented no significant change in the military balance. A third basic option was to impose some penalty on the Soviets or to threaten to do so. Those penalties considered by the president and his advisers included a blockade of Cuba and direct military action (bombing and/or invasion).
For the Soviets, too, the basic options can be viewed as ones that were either rewarding or penalizing to the other side. A basic option (once they were challenged) was to remove the missiles as the United States demanded, an important concession that would have been rewarding to the United States. A second basic option was to take some action that was further penalizing to the United States. The possibilities included completing and expanding new bases in Cuba, taking military action in the Caribbean (e.g., sinking a blockading U.S. ship) or taking counter-military action elsewhere in the world (e.g., cutting off Western access to Berlin). A third option was to do nothing after being challenged but rather to stall and hope that the United States would only bluster and would take no effective action to force removal of the missiles.
The Set of Outcomes
At any time during the course of the interaction, the outcome for each side depends on the joint actions of the two sides at that time. The set of outcomes, and the preferences of each side among outcomes in the set, may be represented in the form of a payoff matrix, as shown in table 1.1.
The basic types of possible actions for nation B are listed down the left column of table 1.1 while the parallel actions of nation A are indicated across the top. The entry in each cell of the matrix indicates the outcome that results from a particular combination of actions. For example, if both sides take actions rewarding to the other (make concessions), the outcome will be a compromise, as indicated in the upper left cell.
The rank order preference of each side for each outcome also is indicated in each cell. (B's preference is shown at the bottom left while A's preference is shown at the top right of each cell.) The preferences of each side among the various outcomes will depend on its particular values—e.g., how vital to its welfare each believes winning its demands to be, how much each cares about the possible costs of a stalemate or a fight, how much each cares about the welfare of the other side. In the particular illustration shown in table 1.1, each side's first preference is exploitation of the other (the outcomes in cells C and G), compromise (cell A) is the fifth preference of each, a fight is just lower in preference (sixth) for both, and so on.
Table 1.1 represents the simplified essentials of the options available and the possible outcomes for the two sides in the dispute. But it may be expanded to indicate various types or degrees of rewarding or penalizing actions by each. For example, actions imposing physical damage on the other side may be distinguished in terms of the magnitude and extensive-ness of the damage. If a larger number of possible actions by each side are considered, then the number of possible outcomes that may result from the combined actions of the two sides also will increase. For example, the use of token military force by each side may result in small skirmishes while a full-scale attack by one or both would result in a major war.
An outcome shown in a cell of the matrix may be a temporary one, reflecting the current status of a struggle between the two sides. For example, the outcome in cell I—a fight—is likely to be temporary, pending settlement of the dispute. Other outcomes, such as possible settlements of the dispute by negotiation or by the tacit acceptance of each side, may be more permanent.
The terms of each possible settlement will reflect certain rewarding (or penalizing) actions that side A takes toward side B and that B takes toward A. For example, in cell A of table 1.1, a compromise agreement would entail the two sides trading certain rewards (presumably at some cost to each side). While only one compromise outcome (cell A) is shown in table 1.1, there are in fact a variety of possible compromise agreements in cell A, some of which would be more advantageous to side A (B rewards A more than vice versa) and some of which would be more advantageous to side B (A rewards B more than vice versa). Possible settlements of the dispute may be found as well in other cells of the matrix. Thus, for example, side A may be able to force side B to accept an agreement that falls in cell C. Such an agreement would entail rewards to A but penalties to B and could be said to reflect A's exploitation of B.
The nature of the strategic situation—in terms of the options available to each side, the outcomes of possible joint actions, and each side's preferences among possible outcomes—often will not be clear to the parties, especially at the start of the dispute. As the interaction between the sides progresses, new options may be considered and old ones discarded as impractical. The possibility may arise that the other side may take actions not previously considered. Conceptions of particular outcomes—e.g., how much cost a stalemate will entail—may be uncertain and may change. Most important, each side—especially at the outset—may be uncertain about the preferences of its adversary or even of its own preferences. For example, does the other side prefer war to giving in? Or will it, in a crunch, choose surrender to war? And how about one's own side? Is it better to give in if necessary than go to war?
In addition to possible uncertainty by each side about the basic situation, there also may be differences in the two sides' perceptions of the options available to each side, of the nature of outcomes (e.g., how extensive and lengthy a fight would be), and especially of the preferences of each side. Thus, each side may believe that the odier would prefer to give in on the issues in dispute rather than to fight. So long as both sides hold such different perceptions, no settlement of the dispute is likely.
As interaction between the parties continues, each side gains information that may clarify or change its view of the situation. Moreover, each side attempts to influence the preferences of the other side among possible outcomes and the expectations of the other side concerning its own actions. For example, side A may attempt to convince B that it will never make concessions and will fight if necessary to get its way. Thus, much of the series of events in a dispute can be understood as a process by which each side's perceptions of the basic interdependence situation are clarified and their perceptions may eventually converge.
In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the set of possible outcomes at the time U.S. officials were deciding on a course of action is shown in table 1.2. In each cell of the matrix, my own estimates of the rank order preference of each side for this outcome are given. The estimates of the preferences of central U.S. officials (ultimately, the president) are based on the accounts of their deliberations during the course of the crisis. The estimates of the preferences of central Soviet leaders (particularly Premier Khrushchev) are more speculative but are based on general information about their objectives at that time. My aim is not to provide a completely accurate and detailed picture of the preferences of the two sides but, rather, to illustrate how the general approach may be applied to this type of situation.
As table 1.2 indicates, American officials preferred to accept the prospect of a local armed conflict with the Soviet Union (i.e., to be in cells M, N, R, or S) rather than to give in to the Soviets on this issue (i.e., to be in cells B, C, D, G, H, or I). This was because of the great political cost they believed the United States and their administration would suffer if the United States did not react forcefully to what they saw as a brazen Soviet challenge to longstanding American predominance in its own "backyard." President Kennedy was quoted as saying he believed he would be impeached by the Congress if he did not act forcefully in this situation (Allison, 1971:195).
The preference order shown for the Soviet leaders, on the other hand, reflects the estimates of most observers that they preferred to give up their prospective Cuban missile bases rather than accept a dangerous armed confrontation with the United States if such a withdrawal was not carried out under humiliating circumstances (i.e., the Soviets preferred the outcomes in cells F and K to those in cells M, N, R, and S). While the missile bases would have improved the strategic and political position of the Soviets, they had no long-standing stake in such bases and had not even admitted to building them. In other words, they would be giving up something that they had not had anyway. In addition, the Soviets knew that they would lose an armed confrontation in the Caribbean (though not necessarily elsewhere).
This difference in the preference order of the two sides gave the United States an advantage in the bargaining that followed. It meant that the United States was able to credibly threaten actions that would provoke an armed confrontation while the Soviets were less willing to do so. It should be noted also that each side—if it could not have its own way in the dispute—preferred a compromise (cell A) to an armed fight. Though this did not guarantee a peaceful settlement (there was always the possibility of miscalculation about the chances of the other backing down completely), it provided the opportunity for an eventual peaceful settlement.
Table 1.2 shows the situation—i.e., the options and outcomes seen by each side and the approximate preferences of each—after several days of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. But both sides' views of the situation they faced were not completely formed at the start of the crisis. American leaders at first did not consider the option of a blockade, the action they eventually chose. The desirability of various outcomes were debated; for example, Secretary of Defense McNamara argued early in the U.S. discussions that Soviet missiles in Cuba would have little effect on the overall military balance while other American officials maintained that the Soviet bases would have great military and political significance. American leaders were uncertain about general Soviet intentions and about how they would react to a firm stand by the United States. On the Soviet side, Khrushchev and his colleagues were unsure about whether the ultimatum of the United States that the missiles had to be removed really reflected an American preference for war rather than concession on this issue or whether it was merely a bluff.
Initially, there were differences in the perceptions of leaders on the two sides about their mutual preferences among outcomes. In particular, there was a key difference in perceptions about American preferences. Khrushchev's decision to put missiles into Cuba reflected his judgment that, while Kennedy would be upset about such a development, he would prefer to accept it as a fait accompli rather than to provoke an armed fight with the Soviet Union. The actual preferences of Kennedy and his key advisers were different: they preferred to risk war with the Soviets rather than accept the sudden fact of Soviet missiles ninety miles off American shores.
During the crisis, each side took actions and made statements that were intended to influence the preferences and expectations of the other. For example, Kennedy's tough address to the American people, the blockade of Cuba, the mobilization of American troops and planes in the southeastern United States, and Robert Kennedy's warning to the Soviet ambassador all were intended to convince Khrushchev that the United States was going to invade Cuba if he did not agree quickly to remove the missiles.
Additional possible outcomes—not initially among the outcomes considered—also were suggested by each side. The Soviets suggested a possible settlement in which they would remove the missiles while the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba and (in a later proposal) also remove U.S. missiles from Turkey. The United States proposed the deal of "missiles out for a pledge of no United States invasion" supplemented by a tacit pledge to remove the U.S. missiles from Turkey soon. As the perceptions of the two sides about the actual situation became more similar, and as new outcomes emerged as possible solutions, chances for resolution of the dispute increased.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Resolving Disputes Between Nations by Martin Patchen. Copyright © 1988 Duke University Press. Excerpted by permission of Duke University Press.
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Table of Contents
List of Tables and Figures ixPreface xi
I. Overall Perspective
1. Disputes Between Nations: An Analytic Framework 1
II. The Situation and Making Choices
2. The Situation 28
3. Perceptions 60
4. Making Decisions 95
5. When Are Coercive Versus Conciliatory Tactics Used? 123
III. Alternative Strategies and Their Effectiveness
6. Threat and Deterrence 169
7. Arms Buildup: Deterrent or Provocation? 195
8. The Use of Coercion 230
9. The Use of Positive Incentives 261
10. Strategies That Mix Conciliation and Coercion 275
11. Settling Disputes 294
IV. Conclusion
12. Summary and Conclusions 319
Notes 343
References 349
Index 363