Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense

Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense

by G. A. Johnston

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Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense by G. A. Johnston, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, James Beattie

Containing a Selection of Works by
Thomas Reid
Adam Ferguson
James Beattie
Dugald Stewart

Edited , With an Introduction by
G. A. Johnston



Thomas Reid

I.— Introduction to the Philosophy of Common Sense
§ 1. The Importance of the Subject, and the Means of Prosecuting It
§ 2. The Impediments to Our Knowledge of the Mind

II.— Analysis of a Typical Sensation
§ 1. The Sensation Considered Abstractly
§ 2. Sensation and Remembrance, Natural Principles of Belief
§ 3. Judgment and Belief In Some Cases Precede Simple Apprehension
§ 4. Two Theories of the Nature of Belief Refuted—Conclusions From What Hath Been Said
§ 5. Apology For Metaphysical Absurdities—Sensation Without a Sentient, a Consequence of the Theory of Ideas—Consequences of This Strange Opinion
§ 6. The Conception and Belief of a Sentient Being Or Mind Is Suggested By Our Constitution—The Notion of Relations Not Always Got By Comparing the Related Ideas
§ 7. There Is a Quality Or Virtue In Bodies, Which We Call Their Smell—how This Is Connected In the Imagination With the Sensation
§ 8. That There Is a Principle In Human Nature, From Which the Notion of This, As Well As All Other Natural Virtues Or Causes, Is Derived
§ 9. Whether In Sensation the Mind Is Active Or Passive?

III.— Knowledge and Reality
§ 1. Of Hardness
§ 2. Of Natural Signs
§ 3. Of Extension
§ 4. Of the Visible Appearances of Objects
§ 5. Of Perception In General
§ 6. Of the Process of Nature In Perception
Appendix: of Cause and Power

IV.— The Operations of the Mind
§ 1. Principles Taken For Granted
§ 2. Of Hypotheses and Analogy
§ 3. Of Perception
§ 4. Of Sensation
§ 5. Of Primary and Secondary Qualities
§ 6. Of Conception
§ 7. Of Judgment
§ 8. Of Common Sense
§ 9. The First Principles of Contingent Truths
§ 10. First Principles of Necessary Truths

V.— Of Morals
§ 1. Of Benevolent Affection In General
§ 2. There Are Rational Principles of Action In Man
§ 3. Of Regard to Our Good On the Whole
§ 4. Of the Notion of Duty, Rectitude, Moral Obligation
§ 5. Observations Concerning Conscience
§ 6. That Moral Approbation Implies a Real Judgment

Adam Ferguson
Of Man’s Progressive Nature

James Beattie
Of the Perception of Truth In General

Dugald Stewart
I.— Of the Object of Philosophy, and the Method of Prosecuting Philosophical Inquiries
II.— Of the Association of Ideas
III.— Of the Power Which the Mind Has Over the Train of Its Thoughts
IV.— Of the Influence of Association On Our Active Principles, and On Our Moral Judgments
V.— Of Certain Laws of Belief, Inseparably Connected With the Exercise of Consciousness, Memory, Perception, and Reasoning


An excerpt from the beginning of the:


The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense originated as a protest against the philosophy of the greatest Scottish philosopher. Hume’s sceptical conclusions did not excite as much opposition as might have been expected. But in Scotland especially there was a good deal of spoken criticism which was never written; and some who would have liked to denounce Hume’s doctrines in print were restrained by the salutary reflection that if they were challenged to give reasons for their criticism they would find it uncommonly difficult to do so. Hume’s scepticism was disliked, but it was difficult to see how it could be adequately met.

At this point Reid stepped into the field. He was the only man of his time who really understood the genesis of Hume’s scepticism and succeeded in locating its sources. At first sight it would seem that this discovery required no peculiar perspicuity. It would seem that nobody could help seeing that Hume’s sceptical conclusions were based on Locke’s premises, and that Hume could never be successfully opposed by any critic who accepted Locke’s assumptions. But this is precisely one of those obvious things that is noticed by nobody. And in fact Reid was the first man to see it clearly. It thus became his duty to question the assumptions on which all his own early thought had been based. The result of this reflection was the conclusion that, since the “ideal theory” of Locke and Berkeley logically led to Hume’s scepticism, and since scepticism was intolerable, that theory would have to be amended, or, if necessary, abandon.

Product Details

BN ID: 2940015599770
Publisher: OGB
Publication date: 10/11/2012
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: NOOK Book
File size: 494 KB

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