Social Dynamics

by Brian Skyrms

Overview

Brian Skyrms presents eighteen essays which apply adaptive dynamics (of cultural evolution and individual learning) to social theory. Altruism, spite, fairness, trust, division of labor, and signaling are treated from this perspective. Correlation is seen to be of fundamental importance. Interactions with neighbors in space, on static networks, and on co-evolving dynamics networks are investigated. Spontaneous emergence of social structure and of signaling systems are examined in the context of learning dynamics.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780191017964
Publisher:	OUP Oxford
Publication date:	05/22/2014
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	368
File size:	24 MB
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About the Author

Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His interests cover a range of topics, including the evolution of conventions, the social contract, inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation, the metaphysics of logical atomism, causality, and truth. He is the author of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (OUP, 2010) and From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity. Coherence, and Induction (OUP, 2012).

Table of Contents

IntroductionPart I: Correlation and the Social ContractIntroduction to part I1. Evolution and the Social ContractPart II: Importance of DynamicsIntroduction to part II2. Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract3. Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?, with Jason Alexander4. Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models5. Dynamics of Conformist Bias6. Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics7. Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas, with Jorge Pacheco, Francisco Santos and Max Souza8. Learning to Take Turns, with Peter Vanderschraaf9. Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms, with Kevin ZollmanPart III: Dynamic NetworksIntroduction to part III10. Learning to Network, with Robin Pemantle11. A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation, with Robin Pemantle12. Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run, with Robin Pemantle13. Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models, with Robin PemantlePart IV: Dynamics of SignalsIntroduction to part IV14. Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model, with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle and Stanislav Volkov15. Inventing New Signals, with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell16. Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information17. Co-Evolution of Pre-Play Signaling and Cooperation, with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco18. Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and ReceiversIndex

Editorial Reviews

"Social Dynamics offers a careful, informed exploration of the relevant ones, as well as discussions of their explanatory import. No one interested in the evolution of sociality should ignore it, if only to know what it takes to carry out a thorough evolutionary investigation."
—Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online

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