Read an Excerpt
The Civil War Diary of Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy
The Original Manuscript Edition
By William E. Gienapp, Erica L. Gienapp UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS
Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-252-09643-3
CHAPTER 1
1862
August 1862
On Sunday the 13th of July 1862, President Lincoln invited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr Stanton. Secretary Seward and his dauter-in-law Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr Stanton occupied at that time for a summer residence, the house of a naval officer, I think Hazzard—some two or three miles west, or north westerly of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this ride, that he first mentioned to Mr Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves by Proclamation in case the rebels did not cease to persist in their war on the govt' and the Union, of which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance and delicacy of the movement—said he had given it much thought and said he had about come to the conclusion that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued. &c. &c. This was, he said, the first occasion when he had mentioned the subject to any one, and wished us to frankly state how the proposition struck us. Mr Seward said the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to give it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer, but his present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two or three times on that ride the subject was adverted to, and before seperating the President desired us to give the question special attention for he was earnest in the conviction that something must be done.
It was a new departure for the President, for until this time in all our previous intercourse, whenever the question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the general government with the subject. This was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President considered it a domestic question apperta{in}ing to the states respectively who had never parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond, and the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection which extended through all the Slave States, and had combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the union impelled the administration to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the National existence. The slaves if not armed and disciplined were in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters & teamsters, and the fortifications and entrenchments were constructed by them.
Monday August 11th A busy day—reading and preparing despatches—State Department is sensitively apprehensive that our naval officers will not be sufficiently forbearing towards Englishmen. The old error, runing back to the commencement of difficulties, when the rebels were recognised as belligerents, and a blockade was ordered instead of closing the ports. We are not, it is true, in a condition for a war with Great Britain just at this time, but Britain is in scarcely a better condition for a war with us. At all events continued and degrading submission to aggressive insolence will not promote harmony and self-respect.
I am glad that our naval officers assert our rights and have no fears they will trespass on the rights of others.
Full despatches from Admiral Farragut who has got his large vessels down the river to New Orleans. Have been under apprehensions the Missippi was getting so low he would experience difficulty.
Tuesday Aug 12 I called early this morning on the Secretary of State touching a communication of his of the 8 th inst that I received yesterday, in which I am directed in the name of the President to give instructions of an extraordinary character to our naval officers—instructions which I do not approve—and which conflict with law and usage.
Mr Seward has a passion to be thought a master spirit in the administration, and to parade before others an exhibition of authority which is not always exercised wisely or intelligently. Englishmen have complained that their vessels were detained and searched, and that they have experienced great inconvenience by the delay in the transmission of their letters by blockade runners. These matters having been brought before the Secretary of State—he on the moment, without consultation with any one,—without investigation,—without being aware he was violating law and long-settled principles—volunteered to say he would mitigate the grivance,—would put the matter right,—and, under the impulse of the moment and with an ostentatious show of his power yielded all that was asked and more than they [the Englishmen] had anticipated, or than he had the power to give.
I saw at once that he had acted precipitately and inconsiderately, and was soon convinced that the President was uninformed on the subject. But Seward is committed and cannot humiliate himself to retrace his steps. I gave him to understand, however, I could send out no such instructions as he had sent me in the President's name—That we had, under the belligerent right of search, authority to stop any vessel, and if she had contraband on board to capture her—That blockade-runners never cleared for a rebel port, like Charleston, though that was their actual destination, but for Halifax, Nassau, or some neutral port. That the idea of surrendering mails and letters captured on blockade-runners to forign consuls, officers and legations, instead of delivering them as the law explicitly directs to the courts, could not be entertained for a moment.
Seward was much embarrassed and suggested that I could so modify the proposed instructions as to make them conform to the law, which he admitted he had not examined. Said it would relieve him and do much to conciliate the Englishmen who were troublesome, and willing to [get] into difficulty with us.
It will be useless to see the President who will be alarmed with the bug a boo of a forign war, which Seward well knows how to use. These absurd instructions do not originate with the President, yet, he will indorse them under the appeals which Seward will make.
Nothing of special interest to day in the cabinet. Some gentlemen, Roseleas, Cottman and Bullit of Louisiana were with the President when I called. He was reading some printed letters, as to the policy which the Union men of Louisiana, for whom they appeared, should pursue. He did not think it wise or expedient for them to shrink from an honest and open avowal of their principles & purpose,—assured them that rallying earnestly for the government and the service would be the surest way to restore tranquility.
Had a long private letter from Comodore Wilkes, who deplores recent orders in regard to the army under McClellan. Thinks it suicidal. I fear there is truth in his predictions.
Friday 15 Had a note from Chase that the President proposed to change two of the collectors for collectors under the new Tax law, in Connecticut. Called on the President, and stated to him I did it as a duty—that duty alone impelled me. He said he fully believed it, and was glad to do me the justice to say that in matters of appointments I had never given him any trouble whatever. # # # ____
Having an appointment this Friday morning at 9 with the President, I met there Babcock and Platt of Connecticut. They had called and stated their case which was extremely unjust to Mr Howard. # # #
The President said he had a slight acquaintance with Mr. H. himself—Had met him in Illinois and knew him as a friend of mine. Had received letters from him expressing regard for me, and one signed jointly by H. and Senator Dixon. But these gentlemen did not originate his action in relation to me. The truth is, said he, and I may as well state the facts to you, for others know them. On the day of the presidential election, the operator of the telegraph in Springfield placed his instruments at my disposal. I was there without leaving, after the returns began to come in, until we had enough to satisfy us how the election had gone. This was about two in the morning. I went home, but not to get much sleep, for I then felt as I never had before, the responsibility that was upon me. I began at once to feel that I needed support—others to share with me the burthen. This was on Wednesday morning, and before the sun went down, I had made up my cabinet. It was almost the same as I finally selected. One or two changes were made, and the particular position of one or two was unsettled. My mind was fixed on Mr Welles as the member from New England on that Wednesday. Some other names passed through my mind, and some persons were pressed upon me, but the man and the place were fixed in my mind then, as it now is. My choice was confirmed by Mr. H., by Senator Dixon, Preston King, Vice President Hamlin, Govr Morgan and others, but the selection was my own, and not theirs, and Mr H. is under a mistake in what he says. # # # ____
Saturday 16 With the President an hour or two this a.m. selecting candidates from a large number recommended for midshipmen at the naval school.
Finished a set of instructions for our naval officers in matters relating to prize captures and enforcing the blockade. Mr Seward sent me some days since in the name of the President some restraining points on which he wished the officers to be instructed that I was convinced would work injury. Have toned down and modified his paper, relieved it of its illegal features, added one or two precautionary points and sent the document to the State Department for criticism and suggestions.
Mem. It may be well if I can find time to get up a complete set of instructions, defining the points of inter national and statute law which are disputed.
Have a long telegram from Wilkes who informs me that McClellan has left, and asking for instructions now that McClellan has gone. I have not been advised of army movements by either the Secretary of War or Genl Hallock who are ready at all times to call for naval aid, but are wholly neglectful of the navy and of their own duties in regard to it as in this instance.
Sunday 17 Called this morning on Genl Hallock who had forgotten there was a naval force in James river co-operating with the army. He said the army was withdrawn and there was no necessity for the naval force to remain. I remarked that I took a different view of the question, and had I been consulted I should have advised that the naval force should remain and menace Richmond, in order to compel the rebels to retain a military force there while our army was getting in position. He at once adopted this view and wished the vessels to remain. Telegraphed Wilkes to that effect.
A difficulty has existed from the begining with the Military and I may say general management of the War. At a very early day, before even the firing upon Sumter and the capture of Norfolk I made repeated applications to Genl Scott for one or two regiments to be stationed at Norfolk. Anticipating the trouble that subsequently took place, and confident that with one regiment and a good military officer with the co-operation of the Cumberland and such small additional naval force as we could collect, that the place could be held at least until the public property and ships could be removed. I urged the importance of such aid. The reply on each occasion was, that he not only had no troops to spare from Washington or Fortress Monroe, both of which places he considered in great danger, but that if he had, he would not send a detachment into what he considered enemy's country, especially as there were no entrenchments. I deferred to his military position, but remonstrated against this view of the case, for I was assured, and I believed truly that a majority of the people in that vicinity were loyal—friends of the Union, and opposed to secession. He said that might be the political, but was not the military aspect, and he must be governed by military considerations in disposing of his troops.
There was but one way of overcoming these objections and that was by peremptory orders which I could not, and the President would not give in opposition to the opinions of Genl Scott. The consequence was the loss of the navy yard and of Norfolk, and the extinguishment of the union sentiment in that quarter. Our friends became at first cool and soon alienated by our abandonment. While I received no assistance from the military in that emergency, I was thwarted and embarrassed by the secret interference of the Secretary of State in my operations.
The same causes which influenced Genl Scott in that matter, and the line of policy which he marked out, have governed the educated military officers of the army and shaped the war measures of the government. We must erect our batteries on the eminences in the vicinity of Washington said Genl Mansfield to me, and establish our military lines.—Frontiers between the belligerents, as between the countries of Continental Europe, are requisite in order to adopt and reconcile the theory and instruction of West Point to the War that is being prosecuted. We become rapidly by the process two nations. All beyond the frontiers are considered and treated as be enemies, although large sections, and in some instances whole states have a union majority—occasionally approximating unanimity.
Instead of halting on the borders, building entrenchments and repelling indiscriminately all, union as well as disunion men in the insurrectionary region—we should penetrate their territory—[have] nourished and protected the union sentiment and created and strengthened a feeling counter to secession, and we might have done in North Carolina, Western Virginia—northern Alabama and Georgia—Arkansaw, Texas, and in fact in large sections of nearly every seceding State.
Our generals act on the defensive. It is not the policy of the country to be aggressive, therefore defensive rather than offensive is taught, and the effect upon our educated commanders is perceptible. The best materials for commanders may have never seen West Point. There is something in the remark that a good general is "born to command." We have experienced that some of our best educated officers have no faculty to govern, control, and direct an army. We have many talented and capable engineers—good officers in some respects, but utterly deficient as commanders. Courage and learning are essential, but something more is wanted, which West Point cannot give. The best Generals and the best and highest qualities to command may not be so fortunate as to have been selected by a member of Congress to be a cadet. Jackson & Taylor were excellent generals, but they were not engineers, nor what would be considered in these days educated military men. They availed themselves of these qualities in others.
We were unused to War when these difficulties commenced, and permitted men of the army to decide, often, questions that were more political than military. There is still the same misfortune, for I deem it such.
From the begining there was a persistent determination to treat the rebels as alien belligerents—as a hostile and distinct people—to blockade, instead of closing, their ports, and then the men "duly accredited by the government of the Confederate States of America" held back-door inter course with the Secretary of State and lived, in ostentatious stile in Washington for some weeks. Thus commencing, other governments had reason to claim that we had initiated them into the belief that the federal government and its opponents were of two nations, and the Union people of the South were, by this policy of our government and that of the army, driven, compelled to be our antagonists. No man in the South could avow himself a friend of the Union without forfeiting his liberty and perhaps his life. The federal govrt' not only afforded him no protection, but under the military system he was treated as a public enemy because he resided in his own home at the South.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Civil War Diary of Gideon Welles, Lincoln's Secretary of the Navy by William E. Gienapp, Erica L. Gienapp. Copyright © 2014 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Excerpted by permission of UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
