This digital edition combines, for the first time, both volumes of The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, which is universally recognized as the standard English version.
The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in twelve volumes between 1912 and 1954. The revised edition contains the substance of the original translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English-speaking readers.
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
The Complete Works of Aristotle
The Revised Oxford Translation
By JONATHAN BARNES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESSCopyright © 1984 The Jowett Copyright Trustees
All rights reserved.
J. L. Ackrill
1. When things have only a name in common and the definition of being [1a1] which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different; for if one is to say what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct definitions. 
When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and an ox are animals. Each of these is called, by a common name, an animal, and the definition of being is also the same; for if one is to give the  definition of each — what being an animal is for each of them — one will give the same definition.
When things get their name from something, with a difference of ending, they are called paronymous. Thus, for example, the grammarian gets his name from grammar, the brave get theirs from bravery. 
2. Of things that are said, some involve combination while others are said without combination. Examples of those involving combination are: man runs, man wins; and of those without combination: man, ox, runs, wins.
Of things there are: (a) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject.  For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. (b) Some are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By 'in a subject' I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.)  For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), but is not said of any subject. (c) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also [1b1] said of a subject, knowledge-of-grammar. (d) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, the individual man or the individual horse — for nothing of  this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject. Things that are individual and numerically one are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent some of them from being in a subject — the individual knowledge-of-grammar is one of the things in a subject.
 3. Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. For example, man is predicated of the individual man, and animal of man; so animal will be predicated  of the individual man also — for the individual man is both a man and an animal.
The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate one to the other are themselves different in kind. For example, animal and knowledge: footed, winged, aquatic, two-footed, are differentiae of animal, but none of these is a  differentia of knowledge; one sort of knowledge does not differ from another by being two-footed. However, there is nothing to prevent genera subordinate one to the other from having the same differentiae. For the higher are predicated of the genera below them, so that all differentiae of the predicated genus will be differentiae of the subject also.
 4. Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected. To give a rough idea, examples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of qualification: white, grammatical; of [2a1] a relative: double, half, larger; of where: in the Lyceum, in the market-place; of when: yesterday, last-year; of being-in-a-position: is-lying, is-sitting; of having: has-shoes-on, has-armour-on; of doing: cutting, burning; of being-affected: being-cut, being-burned.
 None of the above is said just by itself in any affirmation, but by the combination of these with one another an affirmation is produced. For every affirmation, it seems, is either true or false; but of things said without any  combination none is either true or false (e.g. man, white, runs, wins).
5. A substance — that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all — is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the  individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these — both man and animal — are called secondary substances.
It is clear from what has been said that if something is said of a subject both its  name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject. For example, man is said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is of course predicated (since you will be predicating man of the individual man), and also the definition of man  will be predicated of the individual man (since the individual man is also a man). Thus both the name and the definition will be predicated of the subject. But as for things which are in a subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is  predicated of the subject. In some cases there is nothing to prevent the name from being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. For example, white, which is in a subject (the body), is predicated of the subject; for a body is called white. But the definition of white will never be predicated of the body.
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in  them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of cases. For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the individual man; for were it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be predicated of man at all. Again, colour is [2b1] in body and therefore also in an individual body; for were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. Thus all the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances  did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist.
Of the secondary substances the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary substance. For if one is to say of the primary substance what it is, it will be more informative and apt to give the species than the  genus. For example, it would be more informative to say of the individual man that he is a man than that he is an animal (since the one is more distinctive of the individual man while the other is more general); and more informative to say of the individual tree that it is a tree than that it is a plant. Further, it is because the  primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all. But as the primary substances stand to the other things, so the species stands to the genus: the species is a subject for the genus (for the genera are predicated of the species but  the species are not predicated reciprocally of the genera). Hence for this reason too the species is more a substance than the genus.
But of the species themselves — those which are not genera — one is no more a substance than another: it is no more apt to say of the individual man that he is a man than to say of the individual horse that it is a horse. And similarly of the  primary substances one is no more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox.
It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only other things called secondary substances. For only they, of things  predicated, reveal the primary substance. For if one is to say of the individual man what he is, it will be in place to give the species or the genus (though more informative to give man than animal); but to give any of the other things would be out of place — for example, to say white or runs or anything like that. So it is  reasonable that these should be the only other things called substances. Further, it is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances most strictly. But as the primary substances stand to everything else, so [3a1] the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are predicated of these. For if you will call the individual man grammatical, then you will call both a man and an animal grammatical; and similarly in other cases. 
It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither said of a subject nor in a subject. And as for secondary  substances, it is obvious at once that they are not in a subject. For man is said of the individual man as subject but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man. Similarly, animal also is said of the individual man as subject, but animal is not in  the individual man. Further, while there is nothing to prevent the name of what is in a subject from being sometimes predicated of the subject, it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. But the definition of the secondary substances, as well as the name, is predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of man of the  individual man, and also that of animal. No substance, therefore, is in a subject.
This is not, however, peculiar to substance, since the differentia also is not in a subject. For footed and two-footed are said of man as subject but are not in a  subject; neither two-footed nor footed is in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said. For example, if footed is said of man the definition of footed will also be predicated of man; for man is footed.
 We need not be disturbed by any fear that we may be forced to say that the parts of a substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances. For when we spoke of things in a subject we did not mean things belonging in something as parts.
It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae that all things called from  them are so called synonymously. For all the predicates from them are predicated either of the individuals or of the species. (For from a primary substance there is no predicate, since it is said of no subject; and as for secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual. [3b1] Similarly, differentiae too are predicated both of the species and of the individuals.) And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated  will be said of the subject also. Similarly, both the species and the individuals admit the definition of the differentiae. But synonymous things were precisely those with both the name in common and the same definition. Hence all the things called from substances and differentiae are so called synonymously.
 Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this'. As regards the primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name — when one speaks of man  or animal — that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this', this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification — for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal are said of many things. However, it does not signify simply a certain qualification, as white does. White signifies  nothing but a qualification, whereas the species and the genus mark off the qualification of substance — they signify substance of a certain qualification. (One draws a wider boundary with the genus than with the species, for in speaking of animal one takes in more than in speaking of man.)
Another characteristic of substances is that there is nothing contrary to them. For what would be contrary to a primary substance? For example, there is nothing  contrary to an individual man, nor yet is there anything contrary to man or to animal. This, however, is not peculiar to substance but holds of many other things also, for example, of quantity. For there is nothing contrary to four-foot or to ten or to anything of this kind — unless someone were to say that many is contrary to few or  large to small; but still there is nothing contrary to any definite quantity.
Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more and a less. I do not mean that one substance is not more a substance than another (we have said that it is), but that  any given substance is not called more, or less, that which it is. For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more [4a1] pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another. Again, a thing is called more, or less, such-and-such than itself; for example, the body that is pale is called more pale now than before, and the one that is hot is called more, or less, hot. Substance, however, is not spoken of thus. For a man is not called more a  man now than before, nor is anything else that is a substance. Thus substance does not admit of a more and a less.
It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the  same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a colour which is numerically one and the same will not be black and white, nor will numerically one and the same action be bad and good; and similarly with everything  else that is not substance. A substance, however, numerically one and the same, is able to receive contraries. For example, an individual man — one and the same — becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and  good.
Nothing like this is to be seen in any other case, unless perhaps someone might object and say that statements and beliefs are like this. For the same statement seems to be both true and false. Suppose, for example, that the statement that somebody is sitting is true; after he has got up this same statement will be false.  Similarly with beliefs. Suppose you believe truly that somebody is sitting; after he has got up you will believe falsely if you hold the same belief about him. However, even if we were to grant this, there is still a difference in the way contraries are received. For in the case of substances it is by themselves changing that they are  able to receive contraries. For what has become cold instead of hot, or dark instead of pale, or good instead of bad, has changed (has altered); similarly in other cases too it is by itself undergoing change that each thing is able to receive contraries. Statements and beliefs, on the other hand, themselves remain completely  unchangeable in every way; it is because the actual thing changes that the contrary comes to belong to them. For the statement that somebody is sitting remains the same; it is because of a change in the actual thing that it comes to be true at one [4b1] time and false at another. Similarly with beliefs. Hence at least the way in which it is able to receive contraries — through a change in itself — would be distinctive of  substance, even if we were to grant that beliefs and statements are able to receive contraries. However, this is not true. For it is not because they themselves receive anything that statements and beliefs are said to be able to receive contraries, but because of what has happened to something else. For it is because the actual thing  exists or does not exist that the statement is said to be true or false, not because it is able itself to receive contraries. No statement, in fact, or belief is changed at all by anything. So, since nothing happens in them, they are not able to receive contraries. A substance, on the other hand, is said to be able to receive contraries because it  itself receives contraries. For it receives sickness and health, and paleness and darkness; and because it itself receives the various things of this kind it is said to be able to receive contraries. It is, therefore, distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. This brings to an end our discussion of substance.
Excerpted from The Complete Works of Aristotle by JONATHAN BARNES. Copyright © 1984 The Jowett Copyright Trustees. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Table of Contents
NOTE TO THE READER, xiii,
DE INTERPRETATIONE, 25,
PRIOR ANALYTICS, 39,
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, 114,
SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS, 278,
ON THE HEAVENS, 447,
ON GENERATION AND CORRUPTION, 512,
ON THE UNIVERSE **, 626,
ON THE SOUL, 641,
SENSE AND SENSIBILIA, 693,
ON MEMORY, 714,
ON SLEEP, 721,
ON DREAMS, 729,
ON DIVINATION IN SLEEP, 736,
ON LENGTH AND SHORTNESS OF LIFE, 740,
ON YOUTH, OLD AGE, LIFE AND DEATH, AND RESPIRATION, 745,
ON BREATH **, 764,
HISTORY OF ANIMALS, 774,
PARTS OF ANIMALS, 994,
MOVEMENT OF ANIMALS, 1087,
PROGRESSION OF ANIMALS, 1097,
GENERATION OF ANIMALS, 1111,
ON COLOURS **, 1219,
ON THINGS HEARD **, 1229,
PHYSIOGNOMONICS **, 1237,
ON PLANTS **, 1251,
ON MARVELLOUS THINGS HEARD **, 1272,
MECHANICS **, 1299,
PROBLEMS *, 1319,
ON INDIVISIBLE LINES **, 1528,
THE SITUATIONS AND NAMES OF WINDS **, 1537,
ON MELISSUS, XENOPHANES, AND GORGIAS **, 1539,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1729,
MAGNA MORALIA *, 1868,
EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 1922,
ON VIRTUES AND VICES **, 1982,
ECONOMICS *, 2130,
RHETORIC TO ALEXANDER **, 2270,
CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS, 2341,
INDEX OF NAMES, 2467,
GENERAL INDEX, 2470,
* and **: See the Note to the Reader,