The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security
212
The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security
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| ISBN-13: | 9780822377788 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Duke University Press |
| Publication date: | 10/01/2012 |
| Series: | Duke Press policy studies |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 212 |
| File size: | 1 MB |
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The Missing Link
West European Neutrals and Regional Security
By Richard E. Bissell, Curt Gasteyger
Duke University Press
Copyright © 1990 Duke University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8223-7778-8
CHAPTER 1
SWEDEN
Lars B. Wallin
"Sweden's security policy, like that of other countries, aims to preserve the country's independence. The goal of our security policy should therefore be, in all situations and by means of our own choice, to ensure national freedom of action in order that within our own borders we may preserve and develop our society in political, economical, social, cultural and all other respects, according to our own values, and in conjunction with this to promote international détente and peaceful development." Thus were the goals of Swedish security policy defined by the Swedish Parliament in 1968, and so they were reconfirmed in 1972, 1977, and 1982, and once again when the Parliament voted on the latest five-year defense plan in 1987. In other words, national independence and freedom are the supreme goals, the policy of neutrality one of the tools by which Sweden hopes to assure them.
The Swedish policy of neutrality is a self-chosen policy; it is not laid down in the constitution nor internationally guaranteed. The present concept of Swedish neutrality has, in fact, gradually evolved over the last century and half; and although it was not always a consistent policy, its roots can be traced to the early nineteenth century.
THE EVOLUTION OF SWEDEN'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY
Séparés du reste de l'Europe, notre politique, comme notre intérêt, nous portera toujours à ne jamais nous immiscer dans aucune discussion étrangère aux deux nations scandinaves; mais mon devoir et votre dignité serons toujours la règle de notre conduite, et Tun et l'autre nous prescrivent de ne jamais permettre qu'on intervienne dans nos affaires intérieures. (Karl XIV Johan 1818)
[Translated roughly: Separated from the rest of Europe, our politics, as well as our interest, leads us never to involve ourselves in any quarrels which do not concern the two Scandinavian nations; but my duty and your dignity will always be the rule of our conduct, and both the one and the other prescribes never to allow any interference in our internal affairs.]
When, in 1810, the French Marshal Jean Baptiste Bernadotte was elected crown prince of Sweden, this was done partly in the expectation that he would restore Finland, which had been lost to Russia the year before, to Sweden. Bernadotte, who already as crown prince rapidly seized control of Swedish foreign policy (he acceded to the throne only in 1818), instead joined Russia in battle against France and her allies, and in 1814, in the last war before a period of peace which has now lasted for more than 170 years, he succeeded to prize Norway away from Denmark. In 1834, when war was expected between England and Russia, Bernadotte, now as King Karl XIV Johan, in a secret note to these powers, declared his firm intention to stay neutral. In a speech to the secret committee of the Riksdag at the same time he expressed security policy views which in many ways resemble present Swedish policy.
While Karl Johan had conducted a policy that carefully balanced the interests of England and Russia and had emphasized improved relations with the traditional archenemy, Russia, based on "the absolute equality that is the foundation of all relations between independent Souverains and which must never be measured according to differences in their power," his son Oscar I and grandson Karl XV, supported by activist liberal opinions, entertained ambitions of restoring Swedish influence in the north of Europe. In 1848, for example, an army corps was deployed to Scania, the southernmost Swedish province, and some thousand men were moved to the Danish island of Fyen, in order to support Denmark in her war with Prussia over Schleswig and Holstein. Oscar I issued a declaration of neutrality on the eve of the Crimean War, but had the main theater of war been in the Baltic area and not in the Black Sea, he would have been prepared to join the Western powers against Russia. Dreams of reintegrating Finland were still entertained in some Swedish circles. In 1855 Oscar promised not to cede Swedish territory to Russia in exchange for English-French promises of support in case of a Russian attack (the November Treaty). When a new Dano-Prussian war approached, in 1863, Karl XV promised the Danish king a defense union, but his cabinet objected and the plan had to be canceled.
With Prussia's victory over France in 1871, those Swedes who were still dreaming of the resuscitation of Sweden as a great European power lost their last hopes. The Baltic region was now dominated by a Russia suspicious of Swedish intentions and a Germany whose feelings towards Sweden were less than warm. It became the task of Karl's brother, Oscar II, to improve relations with these powerful neighbors.
In the early years of the present century there were widespread fears in Sweden of a Russian attack through northern Scandinavia, either in isolation or in connection with a larger European war, for the purpose of accessing open waters. In 1910, with the permission of the government, a representative of the Swedish general staff conducted discussions in Berlin concerning the possibility of German assistance in case of such an attack. While Germany was quite prepared to exploit pro-German sentiments in Sweden to make Russia deploy larger forces to northern Europe, thereby providing Germany with more freedom of action on the Continent, she had no interest in giving Sweden any guarantees. However, these talks, as well as the general anti-Russian sentiment in Sweden and some rather ambiguous statements by the Swedish foreign minister when war broke out in 1914, may have contributed to Russian suspicions as to the reliability of Swedish neutrality. One famous incident from the first days of World War I may have been caused by such doubts and it is often used to demonstrate the importance of credibility to a policy of neutrality. On 9 August 1914 the Russian Baltic Fleet left its base in Helsinki and steamed towards the Swedish island of Gotland, with the intention of sinking parts of the Swedish navy near Fårösund. It is not known whether the Russian command doubted that Sweden was about to join the war on Germany's side, or if it was uncertain of the accuracy of reports that Swedish and German warships were joining up in the Baltic for attacks on Russian naval units and harbors, but fortunately von Essen and his Baltic fleet only got halfway before being countermanded by St. Petersburg.
As it turned out, the First World War caused no military problems for Swedish neutrality. Instead, it became to a large extent a question of defending a neutral's rights of unimpeded trade. What problems there were of a military nature had to do with Finland. In 1917, after the Russian Revolution, Finland had gained its independence from Russia, and in January 1918 civil war broke out in the newly formed republic. Finnish requests for help caused a number of difficulties for the Swedish government. Although neutrality was not properly at issue—Finland was not at war with any external power—there was still a definite risk of becoming entangled in the ongoing war—or so it was perceived in Stockholm. Furthermore, Swedish political opinion of the warring sides in Finland was very much divided. The Finnish requests were turned down, although permission was given for the transit of some war materials, German transports were escorted to harbors in the Gulf of Bothnia, and some Swedish officers were allowed to volunteer on the government side.
Another problem was caused by the eternal Åland question. Åland is an archipelago joining Sweden and Finland across the northern end of the Baltic. Belonging to Finland, these islands were for a long time a political and strategic sore spot for Sweden—politically because their population is entirely Swedish-speaking, and strategically because who controls Åland controls the access to the Gulf of Bothnia and, consequently, all shipping along the northernmost two-thirds of Sweden's east coast. In the hands of a hostile power they would also be regarded as a serious threat against the Swedish capital.
In the autumn of 1917 the islands' inhabitants made known their wish to detach themselves from Finland and join Sweden. Germany offered Sweden help to acquire the islands. Although theSwedish government did not take a definite stand at the time, following reports of Russian persecution of the population a detachment of six hundred men was landed on Åland to disarm the Russian forces still present there, and to supervise their repatriation. This intervention was not appreciated either by Finland or by Germany, and the Swedish unit, the first one to be dispatched outside Sweden since 1849, left Åland in May 1918. Following a ruling by the League of Nations, Åland was assigned to Finland, but home rule was guaranteed. Following an international treaty of 1921, Åland was demilitarized and neutralized. This settled the matter for a while, but only until a new war was in preparation.
The period preceding the next war was a time of optimism, symbolized by the League of Nations. Although it was questionable whether membership was consistent with neutrality, in particular because of the clause on collective military sanctions, Sweden opted for membership without stating any formal reservations (in contrast to Switzerland, which was granted exemption from participation in collective military actions). In fact, for a while "neutrality" vanished from the Swedish foreign policy vocabulary. Instead, references to international law and solidarity between nations as safeguards for the rights of small states became salient in official pronouncements.
The League of Nations period was also a period of great hopes for disarmament, and Sweden was quite active in this work, with her first Social Democratic prime minister, Hjalmar Branting, and his party friend Rickard Sandler playing prominent roles. Soon, however, illusions were dispelled and preparations for a new war got under way.
In 1938 all four Nordic countries issued declarations of neutrality and they also explored, in a preliminary fashion, the possibilities of cooperation in the safeguarding of Nordic neutrality. However, their perceptions of potential threats were too different for these discussions to lead to any real results. A limited agreement of cooperation was concluded between Sweden and Finland concerning a joint defense of Åland—the Stockholm plan of July 1938. To some extent this was motivated by the Swedish interest in not allowing a hostile power on these islands, but it was mainly perceived as a way of anchoring Finland to a policy of neutrality. Detailed plans for the defense of Åland were ready in April 1939, but when the question of implementation was raised by the approaching Finnish Winter War it all came to naught.
When the Winter War broke out on 30 November 1939 Sweden took a nonbelligerent position. Finnish hopes for Swedish intervention did not come true: Swedish support was limited to deliveries (albeit substantial) of war materials, including aircraft, a volunteer corps of approximately eight thousand men, loans, and humanitarian aid. On 12 March 1940, one day before the end of the war, Norway and Sweden declared themselves willing to discuss a defense union with Finland. Negative Soviet reactions quickly aborted this initiative, however, and the German attack on Norway and Denmark on April 9 sealed its fate. In October, on the initiative of the Finnish government, discussions of Swedish-Finnish cooperation were initiated, even a formal union with its foreign policy conducted by Stockholm was among the alrernarives envisaged. Again, Soviet and German hostility put an end to the discussions.
The real test of Swedish policy was, of course, the Second World War. From very early on, and until the last days of the war, Sweden was surrounded by German troops. I will save a discussion of some incidents relating to Swedish neutrality in this war for later.
In 1946 Sweden joined the United Nations, again despite questions as to the compatibility of neutrality with membership in a collective security organization. Contrary to the situation in the old League of Nations, the UN Charter makes participation in collective military interventions mandatory, when decided upon by the Security Council. However, Sweden's main concern—to stay out of conflicts between the major powers—was felt to be satisfied by the veto powers of the permanent representatives of the Security Council.
In 1948 Denmark, Norway, and Sweden discussed a Nordic defense union. While Denmark showed a strong interest, Norway did not feel that a neutral block of the kind envisaged by Sweden would correspond to its security interests, and by the end of 1949 the present Nordic pattern had been established, with Denmark and Norway members of NATO but with well-known restrictions on foreign bases and nuclear weapons, a nonallied Sweden, and a likewise nonallied Finland. The latter country had, after the trauma of war, managed to achieve a situation of mutual trust and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, symbolized by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1948.
THE CHARACTER OF SWEDEN'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY
Although often used as a convenient shorthand, the term neutral is, strictly speaking, appropriate only for Austria and Switzerland, which are permanently neutral states. Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, both conduct policies of neutrality in peacetime aiming at neutrality in the event of war. Obviously, membership in a military-political alliance would not make such policies credible or viable, thus the commonly used description of the Swedish policy as one of "non-participation in alliances aiming at neutrality in the event of war." This is not a mere quibble about words; it is a way of expressing the intention not to allow any outside power to prescribe what is consistent or not with Sweden's policy of neutrality. Statements such as "we are the sole arbiters of our policy of neutrality" are sometimes ridiculed, and were they indicative of a belief that Sweden can do whatever it pleases and still maintain credibility of its intentions to stay neutral in the event of a war, they would be rightly ridiculed. On the contrary, Sweden is acutely aware of the crucial importance of conducting a credible policy of neutrality, but also of the necessity to safeguard freedom of action—to not allow any foreign power to use neutrality arguments as a means of influencing Swedish policy.
The purpose of the Swedish policy of neutrality is to make it possible for Sweden to stay out of a war: nothing more, nothing less. This implies that the policy be conducted so as to convince everyone that Sweden firmly intends to avoid becoming involved in a war between other countries. It must give rise neither to fears nor to expectations on the part of either of the major powers. It does not imply that Sweden is politically equidistant from the powers, nor that its opinion is neutral. Politically, socially, and economically Sweden is firmly entrenched among the Western democracies. This does not rule out occasional criticism of both East and West in cases of perceived infringements of international law. The Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and the American in Vietnam and Central America are cases in point. Sweden takes a very strong interest in the defense and the strengthening of international law, not least as regards noninterference in the affairs of and the right of self-determination of all states.
SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY: THE SECURITY ONION
If the policy of neutrality is a means to an end—the safeguarding of freedom and national independence against the most serious threat of all, war—it is not the only means. Looking at Swedish security policy as a whole, one can discern several levels or layers, each of which employ different tools and have goals that lie in different time frames. The goal on the first level is to improve Swedish security by the reduction of the risk of war overall. Measures to promote a just global society are part of policy on this level. Although I agree with the late Swedish economist and social scientist Gunnar Myrdal that the Swedish development aid target of 1 percent of the GNP is founded on a strong sense of solidarity with the Third World by the Swedish people, foreign aid is also regarded as part of Sweden's security policy. It is hoped that, by relieving social and economic tensions due to unequal development, foreign aid can decrease the risk of conflict in the Third World with possible superpower involvement and a consequent risk of conflict spreading to Europe. The active Swedish interest in a New Economic Order as well as in the activities of the United Nations and its agencies can also be seen as expressions of this belief.
As a more direct way of preventing the spreading of crises, Sweden has a long tradition of participating in different UN and other peacekeeping activities: mediating efforts (Count Bernadotte in the Middle East in 1948 and Ambassador Jarring in the 1970s; the late prime minister Olof Palme in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s); supervisory commissions (UNTSO [Middle East, 1948–present], UNMOGIP [India-Pakistan, 1949-present], NNSC [Korea, 1953-present}, UNOGIL [Lebanon, 1958], UNYOM [Yemen, 1963-64], New Guinea [1962], UNIPOM [Kashmir, 1965-66], UNMOGAP [Afghanistan, 1988-present], UNIIMOG [Iraq-Iran, 1988-present]); UN peacekeeping forces (battalion size units in UNEF [Gaza, 1956– 67], UNOC [the Congo, 196064], UNICYP [Cyprus, 1964-present], and in Sinai [1973-80]). Since 1980 Sweden has contributed a medical company to UNIFIL in Lebanon. A special emergency force for UN peacekeeping operations was organized in 1964, concurrent with similar forces in Denmark, Finland, and Norway. Consisting of two infantry battalions and special units of maximum battalion strength, and equipped with light arms and vehicles, this force, if requested by the UN and after a decision by the Swedish government, can be dispatched on short notice to wherever need may be.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Missing Link by Richard E. Bissell, Curt Gasteyger. Copyright © 1990 Duke University Press. Excerpted by permission of Duke University Press.
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Table of Contents
Contents
Preface,Introduction,
Part One The Neutrals,
Chapter One Sweden,
Chapter Two Finland,
Chapter Three Austria,
Chapter Four Switzerland,
Chapter Five Yugoslavia,
Part Two The Neutrals and East-West Relations,
Chapter Six NATO Strategy and the Neutrals,
Chapter Seven The Neutrals, the Soviet Union, and the West,
Chapter Eight European Neutrals in Soviet Military Strategy,
Part Three Perspectives,
Chapter Nine Options for Neutral States,
Notes,
Index,