The Structure of Objects
Kathrin Koslicki offers an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. She focuses particularly on the question of how the parts of such objects are related to the wholes which they compose.
1101402108
The Structure of Objects
Kathrin Koslicki offers an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. She focuses particularly on the question of how the parts of such objects are related to the wholes which they compose.
44.99 In Stock
The Structure of Objects

The Structure of Objects

by Kathrin Koslicki
The Structure of Objects

The Structure of Objects

by Kathrin Koslicki

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$44.99 

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Overview

Kathrin Koslicki offers an analysis of ordinary material objects, those material objects to which we take ourselves to be committed in ordinary, scientifically informed discourse. She focuses particularly on the question of how the parts of such objects are related to the wholes which they compose.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780191609138
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Publication date: 04/17/2008
Sold by: Barnes & Noble
Format: eBook
File size: 18 MB
Note: This product may take a few minutes to download.

About the Author

Kathrin Koslicki is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Her interests are metaphysics, philosophy of language, and ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotle.

Table of Contents

I Standard Mereology

Introduction 3

I The Standard Conception of Composition 9

I.1 Introductory Remarks 9

I.2 Standard Mereology 10

I.2.1 The Basic Concepts of Standard Mereology 11

I.2.2 The Basic Principles of Standard Mereology 15

I.2.3 A Gradual Statement of the Theory 17

I.3 The Application of Standard Mereology to Ordinary Material Objects 20

II Ordinary objects as Mereological Sums 23

II.1 Introductory Remarks 23

II.2 Thomson's Three-Dimensionalist Approach 23

II.3 Lewis' Four-Dimensionalist Approach 29

II.3.1 Support for Unrestricted Composition 29

II.3.1.1 The Lewis/Sider Argument from Vagueness 30

II.3.1.2 The Controversial Premise (P3) 34

II.3.1.3 The Matter of Vague Existence 37

II.3.2 The Composition-as-Identity Thesis 40

II.4 Concluding Remarks 43

III Composition as Non-Identity 45

III.1 Introductory Remarks 45

III.2 The Suspect Strategy 47

III.2.1 The Suspect Strategy and Leibniz's Law 47

III.2.1.1 Contingent Identity 47

III.2.1.2 Temporary Identity 48

III.2.1.3 Indeterminate Identity 51

III.2.2 The Suspect Strategy and Existence Principles: Non-Existent Objects 52

III.2.3 The Suspect Strategy and Restricted Indiscernibility Principles 54

III.2.3.1 Coincident Objects 54

III.2.3.2 Relative Identity 56

III.3 What's Wrong with the Suspect Strategy? 58

III.3.1 The Purely Stipulative Response 58

III.3.2 Gibbard's Appeal to Failures of Substitutivity 61

III.3.3 Parsons' Appeal to the Paradoxes of Naive Set Theory 65

III.3.4 Deutsch's Expansion Principle 66

III.4 Concluding Remarks 67

II A Contemporary Structure-Based Mereology

IV A Different Kind of Whole 71

IV.1 Introductory Remarks 71

IV.2 PartingWays with the Standard Conception 72

IV.2.1 Fine's "Aggregative Objection" 72

IV.2.2 Fine's "Monster Objection" 73

IV.3 Fine's Theory of Embodiments 75

IV.3.1 Rigid Embodiments 76

IV.3.2 Variable Embodiments 78

IV.4 Discussion 82

IV.4.1 The Proliferation of Sui Generis Relations 82

IV.4.2 The Superabundance of Objects 83

IV.4.3 The Mysterious Nature of Variable Embodiments 85

IV.4.4 The Formal Properties of Parthood 88

IV.5 Concluding Remarks 89

III Ancient Structure-Based Mereologies

V The Role of Structure in Plato's Mereological Writings 93

V.1 Introductory Remarks 93

V.2 The Negative Mereological Undercurrent 94

V.3 The Positive Mereological Undercurrent 96

V.4 Platonic Wholes 100

V.4.1 Normativity, Teleology, Intelligibility and Unity 100

V.4.2 Structure and Content 105

V.4.2.1 The Aristotelian Regress in Met. Z.17 108

V.4.2.2 Parts as "Structure-Laden" 112

V.4.2.3 A Final Word on Content 117

V.5 Concluding Remarks 119

VI Aristotle's Refinements of Plato's Theory 122

VI.1 Introductory Remarks 122

VI.2 The Centrality of "Part" and "Whole" in the Aristotelian Corpus 123

VI.3 The Problem of the One and the Many 125

VI.4 A Reading of the Text 126

VI.4.1 One, Divisibility, Part, Quantity and Measure 126

VI.4.2 Kinds of Measure and Principles of Unity 128

VI.4.3 The Ways of Being a Part: Met. .25 134

VI.4.4 The Ways of Being a Whole: Met. .26 139

VI.4.4.1 Wholes and Totals 140

VI.4.4.2 Degrees of Wholeness 142

VI.5 Summary of Sections VI.3-4: The Highlights 150

VI.6 Discussion 157

VI.6.1 The Formal Properties of Parthood 157

VI.6.2 In Search of the Ultimate Mereological Atom 159

VI.7 Concluding Remarks 162

IV An Alternative Structure-Based Theory

VII Objects as Structured Wholes 167

VII.1 Introductory Remarks 167

VII.2 Outlines of the Theory 167

VII.2.1 Mereological Non-Proliferation: A Single Relation of Parthood 167

VII.2.2 The Restricted Nature of Composition 168

VII.2.3 An Ontology of Kinds 170

VII.2.4 Ontology and Mereology 171

VII.2.5 Form and Matter 172

VII.2.6 An Ontology of Structured Wholes 174

VII.2.7 The Dichotomous Nature of Wholes 176

VII.2.7.1 Material Components as Proper Parts 176

VII.2.7.2 Formal Components as Proper Parts 179

VII.2.7.3 Material and Formal Components as Proper Parts 183

VII.2.8 The Hierarchical Nature of Composition 186

VII.2.9 Change over Time 188

VII.2.10 Synchronic and Diachronic Identity 191

VII.2.11 Composition as Non-Identity 192

VII.2.12 The Unified Nature of Wholes 192

VII.3 Concluding Remarks 198

VIII In Defense of Kinds 200

VIII.1 Introductory Remarks 200

VIII.2 What Are Natural Kinds? 201

VIII.3 The Special Features of Natural Kinds 203

VIII.3.1 Induction and Projectibility 204

VIII.3.2 Laws of Nature 205

VIII.3.3 Causation and Explanation 207

VIII.4 Biological Taxa 210

VIII.4.1 The Ontological Status of Species 210

VIII.4.2 Species as Kinds 214

VIII.5 What Sorts of Entities Are Natural Kinds? 219

VIII.5.1 The Semantics of Natural Kind Terms 220

VIII.5.1.1 Rigid Designation 223

VIII.6 Incommensurability and Indeterminacy: Physical and Chemical Kinds 227

VIII.6.1 Impurities and Isotopes: Scientific and Ordinary Classifications 227

VIII.6.2 Meaning-Change and Theory-Change 230

VIII.7 Concluding Remarks 233

IX Structure 235

IX.1 Introductory Remarks 235

IX.2 Some Preliminaries 236

IX.2.1 Related Notions 236

IX.2.2 Different Grammatical Roles 238

IX.2.3 The Gestalt Theorists: Rescher and Oppenheim 239

IX.3 Some Case Studies 240

IX.3.1 Mathematical Structure 240

IX.3.2 Logical Structure 241

IX.3.3 Chemical Structure 244

IX.3.4 Musical Structure 246

IX.3.5 Linguistic Structure 248

IX.4 Structures as Objects 252

IX.5 The Grounding Problem Revisited 254

IX.5.1 A Potential Problem Case 256

IX.5.1.1 The Detachability of the Grounding Problem 256

IX.5.1.2 Giving Up the Transitivity of Parthood 257

IX.5.1.3 Individual Forms and Haecceities 257

IX.5.1.4 Denying the Existence of Heaps 258

IX.6 Concluding Remarks 259

Conclusion 261

Bibliography 265

General Index 281

Index of Names 286

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