Truth and Objectivity available in Paperback
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Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.
|Edition description:||New Edition|
|Product dimensions:||6.00(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)|
About the Author
Crispin Wright is Leverhulme Research Professor and Bishop Wardlaw Professor at the University of St. Andrews and is Global Distinguished Professor at New York University.
Table of Contents
1. Inflating Deflationism
2. Minimal Truth, Internal Realism and Superassertibility
3. Convergence and Cognitive Command
Appendix: The Euthyphro Contrast
4. Cognitive Command and the Theoreticity of Observation
5. Realism and the Best Explanation of Belief
Appendix: On an Argument against the Coherence of Minimalism about Meaning