Awarded NASOH's 2012 "John Lyman Book Award for Best U.S. Naval History," Allied Master Strategists describes the unique and vital contribution to Allied victory in World War II made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Based on a combination of primary and secondary source material, this book proves that the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization was the glue holding the British-American wartime alliance together. As such, the Combined Chiefs of Staff was probably the most important international organization of the Twentieth Century. Readers will get a good view of the personalities of the principals, such as Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. The book provides insight into the relationships between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Allied theater commanders, the role of the Combined Chiefs regarding economic mobilization, and the bitter inter-Allied strategic debates in regard to OVERLORD and the war in the Pacific. This book is a must-read for anyone interested in the British American alliance in World War II.
Careful attention is paid in the book to the three organizations that contributed the principal membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; i.e., the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, and (in the case of Sir John Dill) the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington. After providing a biographical background of the principal member so the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Rigby provides information on wartime Washington, D.C. as the home base for the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization.
Detailed information is given regarding the Casablanca Conference, but the author is careful to distinguish between the formal nature of the big Allied wartime summit meetings and the much less formal day-to-day give and take which characterized British-American strategic debates between the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, it is a major contention of the book that it is critical to remember that more than half of the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff took place in Washington, D.C. in a regularly scheduled weekly pattern and not at the big Allied conferences such as Yalta.
The role of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in directing the war in the Pacific and in planning the OVERLORD cross-channel invasion of western Europe, respectively, is covered in detail. These were the two most contentious issues with which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had to deal. Rigby attempts to answer the question of why two combative, fearless, warriors like Churchill and Brooke would be so unwilling to go back across the Channel, and to explain the tug-of-war the British Chiefs of Staff had to conduct with Churchill before a British battle fleet could join the American Central Pacific Drive late in the war.
The book also provides a wealth of information on the role played by members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the spheres of economic mobilization and wartime diplomacy. Most of all, what Allied Master Strategists does is to give the Combined Chiefs of Staff what they have long deserveda book of their own; a book that is not weighted towards the U.S. Joint Chiefs on the one hand or the British Chiefs of Staff on the other; a book that is not strictly a “naval” book, an “army” book, or an “air” book, but a book that like the western alliance during World War II, is truly “combined” in an international as well as an interservice manner.
|Publisher:||Naval Institute Press|
|Product dimensions:||6.20(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.10(d)|
About the Author
David Rigby holds a PhD in comparative history from Brandeis University. He has worked as a K–12 textbook editor. He teaches history as an adjunct instructor at Boston-area colleges and universities and lives in Belmont, MA.
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
The Joint Chiefs of Staff of WWII is a very good read. The chapters dealing with Overlord and the biographical sketches of the members of the CCS make the book worth the read. I think the book gets into uncertain territory when it makes comparisons with the Axis. He forgives the USSR for not coordinating their operations with the British and Americans due to the front being far distant and takes Japan to task for not coordinating their operations with Germany and Italy. Japan seemed to be in the same situation as the USSR. He also criticizes Japan for not attacking the USSR so as to help the Germans. The Japanese at the time were deeply involved in the bottomless pit of China and fighting the U.S., Britain and the Commonwealth. In a couple of border skirmishes with the USSR the Japanese suffered severe defeats. A better criticism is why didn’t the USSR attack Japan sooner? It is almost certain that it was better for the Japanese today that that did not happen. I am not quite sure why the author went off topic in discussing the three volume work of Lee’s Lieutenants. I realize that Marshall and King read the volumes but it seemed out of place to discuss the work in detail. In his criticism of Vice Admiral Ghormley he notes that hewas operating his HQ afloat. The author makes it appear that it was Ghormley’s choice alone. I find that hard to believe. From what I have read the French were extremely difficult to work with and very prickly about their sovereignty. I am guessing there was diplomacy above Ghormley’s level involved. Also there was the age old tradition of admirals commanding from ships that would have made him think that being on a ship even if at anchor or pierside was where he belonged. It takes courage and thinking outside the box to break old traditions. I would love for someone to research why and how the command was eventually moved from ship to shore. I am sure it is far more complex than how it has been portrayed by authors. In regards to the buildup of improperly loaded ships at Noumea, the author suggests that Ghormley should have sent the ships to Guadalcanal to be unloaded. The author seems to forget that the ships unloading at Guadalcanal were under attack and extra time unloading put them at greater risk. Later on he describes the proper solution taken by Halsey of unloading them at Noumea and then reloading them in a manner called a combat load. A combat load is loaded in manner where the offloading is sped up and the sequence is most logical for troops in combat. I am willing to bet the problems in shifting HQ ashore were also involved in authority to unload the ships at Noumea. A great person to have offered insight would have been Ghormley but to my knowledge he never wrote his account of Guadalcanal. My guess he understood that the winners write the history so that if he wrote an account that ended up challenging the account of Halsey it would have been discounted. It is a loss to history. Ghormley is also criticized for not visiting Guadalcanal. I also think the importance of visiting the front is overrated. What information could he have gained form going to the front that he not get by message? How much time would it take to go the front and for what period would he difficult to reach for command decisions? Isoroku Yamamoto was killed trying to show his face to his troops. Was Douglas MacArthur less effective for hunkering down on Corregidor? Was his effectiveness diminished by bugging out on his troops in the Philippines? Overall very good book.
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