In this book a distinguished economist suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning, one of the key theoretical developments in current economics. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing.
About the Author
H. Peyton Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University and a Professorial Fellow of Nuffield College Oxford. He is also Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Center on Social and Economic Dynamics at the Brookings Institution, Executive Vice President of the Game Theory Society, and a Fellow of the Econometric Society. His areas of research include cooperative and noncooperative game theory, the design of legislative systems, and the analysis of distributive justice.
Table of Contents
1. The Interactive Learning Problem
2. Reinforcement and Regret
4. Conditional No-Regret Learning
5. Prediction, Postdiction, and Calibration
6. Fictitious Play and Its Variants
7. Bayesian Learning
8. Hypothesis Testing