Peace Lost to Expediency?
Thomas Ricks rightly states that the U.S. effort since 1991 should be characterized as a long war made up of four distinctive steps: 1) A short ground battle in 1991, 2) Twelve years of containment done largely from the air, 3) A second short ground battle in 2003, and 4) Another decade of containment ¿ this time on the ground, and inside Iraq (pp. 395-96, 433-39). To his credit, Ricks does not shy away from calling to task those who he deems responsible for a wide range of blunders made in the design and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unjustified optimism remains an enduring trait of the U.S. management of the Iraq war (pp. 246, 323, 360). Two of the first casualties of the Iraq war have been the irreparable damage to the credibility of some key players and a durable loss of both prestige and power of deterrence for the U.S. (pp. 90-96, 109, 128, 147, 167-72, 184-85, 212, 263, 268, 293-94, 304, 308-10, 325, 329, 341-48, 362, 385-86, 406-12, 430-33). Ricks uses mostly well-identified sources to back up his argumentation. Ricks reminds his audience that in the run-up to war, administration officials tended to assume the worst-case scenario for WMDs, disregarding contrary evidence that Saddam Hussein was largely contained in his cage. Contemporarily, the same administration officials made rosy assumptions about the welcome the U.S. military would get from grateful Iraqis, about the quick establishment of a new Iraqi government, and about the swift return of most U.S. troops to their home bases (pp. 58-59). Many ordinary Iraqis, especially in the South, did not forget how the U.S-led coalition ended the fighting prematurely and clumsily at their expense after expelling the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991 (pp. 5-6). Furthermore, Ricks does not spare either Congress or the Media for going AWOL during both the run-up to war and the ensuing occupation of Iraq (pp. 28, 35, 61¿ 65, 85-90, 380-88). The U.S. quickly squandered the blitzkrieg victory that it achieved in the spring of 2003. Ricks clearly enumerates the different factors that have contributed to that sad outcome: 1) Casual dismissing of the looting after the fall of Baghdad, which was made possible by insufficient manpower (pp. 135-36, 148, 150, 178, 182-83) 2) The quick turnover of staff with critical expertise to deal with the tribal structure of Iraqi society (pp. 157, 323) 3) The initial focus on mostly ghost WMDs, which allowed the first insurgents to plunder existing weapon dumps at will (pp. 146, 168, 191) 4) The lack of adequate troops and illegal guidelines to manage the overflow of detainees that led to the Abu Ghraib scandal, the most well-known among existing Iraqi scandals (pp. 147, 175, 197-200, 238-40, 258-61, 270-97, 378-80) 5) The excessive de-Baathification within Iraqi ministries, which fuelled the Sunni insurgency (pp. 158-61, 180) 6) The dissolution of the Iraqi army and national police force, for which the Sunni insurgency was also grateful (pp. 161-66, 180, 191) 7) An over-focus on foreign fighters, which have represented a small percentage of the insurgency (p. 194) 8) The postponement in the organization of elections and the formation of a sovereign Iraqi government with an eye on writing a constitution (pp. 165, 254-55, 413) 9) Hasty transition of Iraq to a free market economy, which alienated further the middle class, which was already on the receiving end of de-Baathification (pp. 165, 181) 10) The existence of largely unrestrained powerful militias such as the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army (pp. 244, 336-38, 353, 358, 395, 428) 11) The strategic confusion about the asymmetric warfare that the U.S. was compelled to wage (pp. 138-44, 152-54, 164, 179-85, 192-95, 203-13, 222-69, 301-02, 313-24, 371, 392-94, 405, 414-24) The initial heavy-handed approach of most of the U.S. military, the lack of unity of command, open borders, and the enduring isolation of most U.S. troops in their
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