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The only journalist to have witnessed every Afghan military campaign under Obama, Anderson charts the progress of the President’s counter-insurgency strategy and shows how it has become a lost cause. Including interviews with military top brass, this book reveals the disturbing ...
The only journalist to have witnessed every Afghan military campaign under Obama, Anderson charts the progress of the President’s counter-insurgency strategy and shows how it has become a lost cause. Including interviews with military top brass, this book reveals the disturbing chasm between official rhetoric and the reality on the ground. While Afghan civilians doubt American resolve and miss the relative peace under the Taliban, the drug-addled local army is hopelessly unprepared for American handover.
Enjoying unrivaled respect from the troops (one marine described him as a “brave motherf***er”), Anderson offers the most intimate depiction of the war seen in print. Eating, sleeping, and being shot at with the troops, he witnessed first-hand IED explosions, American casualties, civilian deaths and Taliban soldiers that melt into the local population. The definitive book on the struggle for Helmand, No Worse Enemy is a bold and frightening exposé of the longest war in U.S. history.
“The most intense fighting footage and the best anatomy of a battle I’ve ever seen.”
— Spike Jonze (Academy Award-winning director) on Ben Anderson’s film Taking on the Taliban
Acronyms and abbreviations ix
A note on translations xxi
Part I The British Army, June to October, 2007 Queen's Company, the Grenadier Guards 1
Part II US Marine Corps, July to August, 2009 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines 59
Part III US Marine Corps, February to March, 2010 1st Battalion, 6th Marines 77
Part IV US Marine Corps, June 2010 1st Battalion, 6th Marines 175
Part V US Marine Corps, December 2010 to January 2011, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines 189
Recommended further reading 257
Journalist Ben Anderson has been visiting Afghanistan since the summer of 2007. He notes, “on each visit I was told that the Taliban were on their last legs, the Afghans were almost ready to provide security for themselves and the government was almost ready to govern.” But in the real world, “the only thing I ever saw happen was an increase in troop numbers and a corresponding increase in casualties, military and civilian. This, I was told, was further evidence of the Taliban’s desperation and proof that the insurgency was in its last throes.” He notes, “What happened next, after vital resources had been diverted to Iraq, was simply a return to predatory power politics and the rule of the warlords. To a place where the corrupt and vicious thrived and the most able and honest were sidelined. The state of affairs that had allowed the Taliban to sweep to power in the first place. The 2005 elections, which might have led to truly representative government, were a sham, with some observers claiming that fraudulent votes outnumbered the genuine.” Anderson reports, “People approached marines in the bazaar, saying: ‘Please don’t leave us alone with those guys’, referring to the police. The same thing happened in every town I’d seen cleared. The fact that the people being liberated were asking for protection from those we were fighting to introduce ought to have raised obvious questions. But it was too late in the day to admit such a terminal flaw in policy.” Anderson quotes Captain Peterson, the Commanding Officer of Lima Company, who said, “You’re trying to build a country up by destroying it and it seems like a paradox but those are people who have not been to Afghanistan.” Shades of Vietnam – where another US officer famously said, “We had to destroy the village to save it.” Anderson notes, “General McChrystal’s claim that [Operation] Mushtaraq was Afghan-led, a claim repeated by President Obama, a claim widely-spread and never seriously challenged, a claim backed by a massive media campaign, was the biggest fallacy of the entire operation. The Afghans were nowhere near ready to lead any military operation, leave alone one in the Pushtun south. Certainly not one as big as Mushtaraq.” As Anderson points out, “There was such desperation to increase the Afghan National Army’s numbers … that just about anybody could get in, especially as the desertion rate was so high. ... Often, they used the weapons and uniforms they’d been given to attack real security force members of their foreign mentors. This happened more and more, suggesting both the police and the army had been, heavily, albeit easily, infiltrated. But the problem was not properly addressed, because that meant admitting that the absurdly ambitious goal of having a national army able to secure every province of Afghanistan, on its own, by 2014, was a fantasy. But that goal was the exit strategy so publicly, everyone had to say it was plausible.” He concludes, “In huge swathes of the country, the government will not stand for twenty-four hours, much less three years, without foreign support. Every Afghan I have spoken to is convinced there will be another round of civil war as soon as we leave, with no rules of engagement or courageous restraint. They also think that the Taliban may well win. Perhaps the most damning indictment of our intervention is that there are also many Afghans who will think that if there is such a victory, the good guys will have won.”Was this review helpful? Yes NoThank you for your feedback. Report this reviewThank you, this review has been flagged.