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More About This Textbook
Overview
"Criticisms of Mancur Olson's theory of group membership and organizational behavior and discussions of the limits of his formulations are not new, but Terry Moe has set them forth in thoroughgoing fashion, has elaborated and extended them, and has made positive new contributions. The result is a book that is valuable and constructive, one that may well revive interest in the systematic study of political groups."—David B. Truman, American Political Science Review
"The Organization of Interests is a valuable addition to the literature. It reminds us that the interior life of groups has political significance and gives us a conceptual framework for exploring that life. It balances nicely between the pluralists—who tend to interpret interest group behaviour entirely in political terms—and Olson—who has no satisfactory explanation for behaviour that is not attributable to economic self-interest. In the concept of the entrepreneur Moe gives us a useful analytical device which deserves operationalization. The book is well worth study."—A. Paul Pross, Canadian Journal of Political Science
Editorial Reviews
Booknews
Selected from papers of the Third Workshop on Capitalist-Socialist Organizations, Helsinki, Aug. 1984 which brought together a group of academic researchers from 27 countries to engage in a dialogue about the management of innovation in organizations. A paper reissue of the 1980 edition. On the nature of interest groups as organizations. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)Product Details
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments Introduction
Part One - The Logic of Interest Organization
1. Elements of the Analysis
2. The Decision to Join
3. Organizational Formation and Maintenance
4. Internal Politics
5. Departures from the Economic Ideal
Part Two - Evidence on the Bases for Membership
6. The Traditional Background
7. Studies of Economic Interest Groups
8. Some New Data
9. Conclusion Appendix A. Selective Incentives and Dues Appendix B. Representational Structures and Internal Politics Appendix C. Economic Size and Political Membership Notes Index