How the wars of the near future will be fought and who will win them
Many nations, peoples and special interest groups believe that violence will advance their cause. Warfare has changed greatly since the Second World War; it continued to change during the late 20th century and this process is still accelerating. Political, technological, social and religious forces are shaping the future of warfare, but most western armed forces have yet to evolve significantly from the cold war era when they trained to resist a conventional invasion by the Warsaw Pact. America is now the only superpower, but its dominance is threatened by internal and external factors. The world's most hi-tech weaponry seems helpless in the face of determined guerrilla fighters not afraid to die for their beliefs.
Professor Colin Gray has advised governments on both sides of the Atlantic and in ANOTHER BLOODY CENTURY, he reveals what sort of conflicts will affect our world in the years to come.
|Publisher:||Orion Publishing Group, Limited|
|Sold by:||Hachette Digital, Inc.|
|File size:||3 MB|
About the Author
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
In this fascinating book, Colin Gray, Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at Reading University, continues the argument of his classic `Modern Strategy¿ - Clausewitz still rules. ¿Technology is important, but in war and strategy people matter most.¿ There is no golden key to military success. His argument is that war and warfare will always be with us. War has an unchanging nature but a variable character, so history is our best guide to the future. Irregular warfare between states and non-state foes may be the dominant form of warfare for some years, but interstate war, including great power conflict, is not over. The political context is the main driver of war¿s incidence and character. Above all, warfare is political, though also social and cultural. Surprise in future warfare is certain. Efforts to regulate war by international political, legal and moral measures and attitudes are worth pursuing however, perceived belligerent necessity can always trump them. His particular conclusions are unconventional but well argued: ¿the less active we are in attempting to speed reform in the Islamic world, the better. Such reform is the only comprehensively effective answer to Al Qaeda, but it cannot be imposed from outside.¿ ¿Terrorism will neither vanish nor be comprehensively defeated (technically an impossibility, since it is a mode of warfare), but it may resume its more usual position as a permanent background danger, typically of much lesser gravity than interstate war.¿ ¿nuclear weapons are useful. If they are not useful, why do the declared nuclear weapon states continue to hold them and why do others aspire to join their ranks? It so happens that biological, chemical, and radiological weapons also can be useful. The phenomenon that impedes comprehension and strategic empathy amounts to nothing less than demonization.¿ However, in contrast to these realistic judgements, he espouses the idealist notion that the US state is the prime defender of `world order¿, a notion that whitewashes all those illegal US aggressions to enforce selfish US interests. So he joins Bush and Blair in opposing `efforts to regulate war¿ - ¿we need to be careful lest an ill-advised and undue respect for UN rules and procedures is permitted fatally to obstruct the forces of order, which is to say principally the United States.¿ Bush and Blair see themselves as the sheriff and deputy of `world order¿, but why share their delusion?