List of tables and figures; Series editor's preface; Preface; PART I. INTRODUCTION: 1. Introduction; 2. Duverger's propositions; PART II. STRATEGIC VOTING: 3. On electoral systems; 4. Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems; 5. Strategic voting in multimember districts; 6. Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems; 7. Some concluding comments on strategic voting, PART III. STRATEGIC ENTRY: 8. Strategic voting, party labels and entry; 9. Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan; PART IV. ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THe SYSTEM LEVEL: 10. Putting the constituencies together; 11. Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties; PART V. COORDINATION FAILURES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: 12. Coordination failures and representation; 13. Coordination failures and dominant parties; 14. Coordination failures and realignments; PART VI. CONCLUSION; 15. Conclusion; Appendices; References; Subject index; Author index.
Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systemsby Gary W. Cox, Thrainn Eggertsson, Randall Calvert
Pub. Date: 03/28/1997
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
This book investigates strategic coordination in elections worldwide. Although the classics of electoral studies have dealt with issues of coordination, this is the first book that employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination--including both strategic voting and strategic entry--worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws.
- Cambridge University Press
- Publication date:
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions Series
- Product dimensions:
- 5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.94(d)
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