Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

by Torin Alter, Sven Walter

Overview

Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780190291365
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Publication date:	12/14/2006
Series:	Philosophy of Mind
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
File size:	658 KB

About the Author

Torin Alter is Associate Professor at the University of Alabama. Sven Walter is Assistant Professor at the University of Bielefeld, Germany.

Table of Contents

Contributors ix

Introduction Torin Alter Sven Walter 3

Part 1 Phenomenal Knowledge

1 What RoboMary Knows Daniel Dennett 15

2 So This Is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis Laurence Nemirow 32

3 The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism Frank Jackson 52

4 Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? Torin Alter 65

5 What Is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know about Color? Knut Nordby 77

Part 2 Phenomenal Concepts

6 What Is a Phenomenal Concept? Janet Levin 87

7 Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts David Papineau 111

8 Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint Joseph Levine 145

9 Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap David J. Chalmers 167

10 Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia John Hawthorne 195

11 Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise Stephen L. White 210

12 Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity Ned Block 249

13 Grasping Phenomenal Properties Martine Nida-Rumelin 307

Index 339

Editorial Reviews

"As might be expected from the contributors involved, the thirteen papers making up this collection provide an excellent, cutting-edge critique of some of the key arguments in the debates about phenomenal consciousness, or 'what it is like' to have conscious experiences."—Dr. David Wall, Metapsychology Online Reviews

"The issues discussed in the volume range from the nature of phenomenal consciousness and phenomenal concepts to the theory of concepts and the mind-body problem. Alter and Walter have contributed a helpful introduction, and put together an excellent collection that anyone with an interest in the philosophy of mind will find an essential volume to own." —Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

From the Publisher