Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity / Edition 1

Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity / Edition 1

by James W. Friedman
ISBN-10:
0792393813
ISBN-13:
9780792393818
Pub. Date:
12/31/1993
Publisher:
Springer Netherlands
ISBN-10:
0792393813
ISBN-13:
9780792393818
Pub. Date:
12/31/1993
Publisher:
Springer Netherlands
Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity / Edition 1

Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity / Edition 1

by James W. Friedman

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Overview

Coordination is extremely important in economic, political, and social life. The concept of economic equilibrium is based on the coordination of producers and consumers in buying and selling. This book reviews the topic of coordination from an economic, theoretical standpoint. The aim of this volume is twofold: first, the book contributes to the ongoing research on the economics of coordination; and second, it disseminates results and encourages interest in the topic. The volume contains original research on coordination including general game-theoretic questions, particular coordination issues within specific fields of economics (i.e. industrial organization, international trade, and macroeconomics), and experimental research.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780792393818
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Publication date: 12/31/1993
Series: Recent Economic Thought , #35
Edition description: 1994
Pages: 230
Product dimensions: 5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.03(d)

Table of Contents

I Introduction.- 1 Introduction and Overview.- 2 A Review of Refinements, Equilibrium Selection, and Repeated Games.- 3 Coordination in Games: A Survey.- II General Issues in Coordination.- 4 Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory.- 5 On the Concepts of Strategy and Equilibrium in Discounted Repeated Games.- 6 The “Folk Theorem” for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules.- 7 Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Preplay Communication.- III Coordination in Specific Economic Contexts.- 8 The Dynamics of Bandwagons.- 9 Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability.- 10 Coordination Theory, The Stag Hunt, and Macroeconomics.- Author index.
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