Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life. The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization. Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Product dimensions:||6.80(w) x 9.60(h) x 1.00(d)|
About the Author
Bruce Lyons is Professor of Economics and Deputy Director of the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy at the University of East Anglia, Norwich.
Table of ContentsList of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Preface; Introduction: the transformation of competition policy in Europe Bruce Lyons; Part I. Anticompetitive Behaviour by Firms with Market Power: Introduction; Section 1. Abuse of a Dominant Position: 1. Michelin II: the treatment of rebates Massimo Motta; 2. Interoperability and market foreclosure in the European Microsoft case Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen; Section 2. Market Investigations: 3. Mobile call termination in the UK: a competitive bottleneck? Mark Armstrong and Julian Wright; 4. Relationship between buyer and seller power in retailing: UK supermarkets (2000) Paul Dobson; Part II. Agreements Between Firms: Introduction; Section 1. Cartels: 5. The graphite electrodes cartel: fines which deter? Morten Hviid and Andreas Stephan; 6. Assessment of damages in the district heating pipe cartel Peter Møllgaard; Section 2. Other Horizontal Agreements: 7. Interchange fees in payment card systems: price remedies in a two-sided market Jean-Charles Rochet; 8. The orders and rules of British horseracing: anticompetitive agreements or good governance of a multi-sided sport? Bruce Lyons; Section 3. Vertical Agreements: 9. Efficiency enhancing or anticompetitive vertical restraints? Selective and exclusive car distribution in Europe Frank Verboven; 10. Beer - the ties that bind Michael Waterson; 11. Parallel trade of prescription medicines: the Glaxo dual pricing case Patrick Rey and James Venit; Part III. Mergers: Introduction; Section 1. Measurement of Unilateral Effects: 12. A merger in the insurance industry: much easier to measure unilateral effects than expected Christian Gollier and Marc Ivaldi; 13. Merger simulations of unilateral effects: what can we learn from the UK brewing industry? Margaret Slade; Section 2. Coordinated Effects: 14. The ups and downs of the doctrine of collective dominance: sing game theory for merger policy Eliana Garces-Tolon, Damien Neven and Paul Seabright; 15. Capacity constraints and irreversible investments: defending against collective dominance in UPM Kymmene/Norske Skog/Haindl Kai-Uwe Kühn and John Van Reenen; Section 3. Vertical and Conglomerate Effects: 16. Vertical effects between natural gas and electricity production: the Neste/IVO merger in Finland Rune Stenbacka; 17. Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate effects: the GE/Honeywell merger in the EU Xavier Vives and Gianandrea Staffiero; Index.