Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets
By Reinhard Selten (Editor), D. Abreu (Contribution by), W. Albers (Contribution by), K. Binmore (Contribution by), R. Gardner (Contribution by), W. Güth (Contribution by), R.M. Harstad (Contribution by), H. Kliemt (Contribution by), W. Leininger (Contribution by), A. Okada (Contribution by), E. Ostrom (Contribution by), D. Pearce (Contribution by), L. Philips (Contribution by), S.H. Schanuel (Contribution by), L.K. Simon (Contribution by), J. Sobel (Contribution by), G. Stephan (Contribution by), E. van Damme (Contribution by), J.W. Walker (Contribution by), F. Weissing (Contribution by), W.R. Zame (Contribution by)
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By Reinhard Selten (Editor), D. Abreu (Contribution by), W. Albers (Contribution by), K. Binmore (Contribution by), R. Gardner (Contribution by), W. Güth (Contribution by), R.M. Harstad (Contribution by), H. Kliemt (Contribution by), W. Leininger (Contribution by), A. Okada (Contribution by), E. Ostrom (Contribution by), D. Pearce (Contribution by), L. Philips (Contribution by), S.H. Schanuel (Contribution by), L.K. Simon (Contribution by), J. Sobel (Contribution by), G. Stephan (Contribution by), E. van Damme (Contribution by), J.W. Walker (Contribution by), F. Weissing (Contribution by), W.R. Zame (Contribution by)
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This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi r...


