Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis

by James G. Blight (Editor), David A. Welch (Editor)

Overview

This is the first study to examine throughly the role of US, Soviet and Cuban Intelligence in the nuclear crisis of 1962 - the closest the world has come to Armageddon.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780714648835
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis
Publication date:	10/31/1998
Series:	Studies in Intelligence
Pages:	248
Product dimensions:	5.44(w) x 8.50(h) x (d)

About the Author

Edited by Blight, James G.; Welch, David A.

Table of Contents

International Affairs - Zenen E Santana Delgado, Uni of Durham

"The book brings together contributions from well-known scholars and practitioners and is the best study of the relationship between the intelligence community and the decision-makers in the missile crisis and should be recommended to all students and scholars of internatioanl relations

Editorial Reviews

A collection of essays that examine the role and performance of American, Soviet, and Cuban intelligence communities in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Some of the contributing authors are scholars, while others offer insights based on their practical experiences as professional intelligence analysts during the crisis. The editors' introduction places the study in historical context. Three essays offer an empirical examination of the roles, activities, and assessments of the American, Soviet, and Cuban intelligence communications, focusing on the interplay between intelligence professionals and policy makers. The following two analytical essays concentrate on the organization and politics of intelligence, and on the cognitive and motivational explanations of Reagan's shift in Soviet policy. The editors' closing essay reflects on the implication of the foregoing essays, on evaluating intelligence performance, and on the theory and practice of intelligence assessment. Distributed by ISBS. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

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