Japan 1944-45 examines the only time in history that a major war was ended by the use of air power. It shows how the United States used a combination of industrial capability and geography to devastate Japan from the air, and why the Japanese, despite a promising start to their defense, proved unable to prevent the XXIst Air Force from destroying their country.
Since the early 1930s air power advocates had claimed that aerial bombardment alone could defeat a nation. Yet by January 1945, while it had been the key to winning ground campaigns, from the German Blitzkrieg to the Allies' advance across the Pacific, air power had failed to demonstrate their most audacious claim: that strategic bombing, by itself, could win a war.
The United States sought to prove it by reducing the Japanese Home Islands' military and industrial capability through bombing alone until they had to surrender.
About the Author
Mark Lardas has been fascinated by things related to the sea and sky his entire life. From building models of ships and aircraft as a teen, his maritime interest led him to study Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, but his interest in aviation led him to take a job on the then-new Space Shuttle program. Over the next 30 years he worked as a navigation engineer on the Shuttle program. Currently he works developing commercial aircraft systems as a quality assurance manager. He has written extensively about aircraft and warships and is the author of 25 books, all related to military, naval or maritime history. He lives and works in League City, Texas, USA.
Table of Contents
Introduction /Chronology /Attacker's Capabilities /Defender's Capabilities /Campaign Objectives /Order of Battle /The Campaign /Analysis /Conclusion /Bibliography /Index