Among U.S. allies in the war against terrorism, Pakistan cannot be easily characterized as either friend or foe. Nuclear-armed Pakistan is an important center of radical Islamic ideas and groups. Since 9/11, the selective cooperation of president General Pervez Musharraf in sharing intelligence with the United States and apprehending al Qaeda members has led to the assumption that Pakistan might be ready to give up its longstanding ties with radical Islam. But Pakistan's status as an Islamic ideological state is closely linked with the Pakistani elite's worldview and the praetorian ambitions of its military. This book analyzes the origins of the relationships between Islamist groups and Pakistan's military, and explores the nation's quest for identity and security. Tracing how the military has sought U.S. support by making itself useful for concerns of the momentwhile continuing to strengthen the mosque-military alliance within PakistanHaqqani offers an alternative view of political developments since the country's independence in 1947.
|Publisher:||Brookings Institution Press|
|Sold by:||Barnes & Noble|
|File size:||1 MB|
About the Author
Husain Haqqani is a visiting scholar in the South Asia Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an associate professor of International Relations at Boston University. He is former adviser to Pakistani prime ministers, and has served as Pakistan's ambassador to Sri Lanka.
Table of Contents
|Map of the Region||xii|
|1||Introduction: Identity and Ideology||1|
|2||Defending Ideological Frontiers||51|
|3||Old and New Pakistan||87|
|4||From Islamic Republic to Islamic State||131|
|6||Military Rule by Other Means||199|
|7||Jihad without Borders||261|
|8||Conclusion: From Ideological to Functional State||311|
|About the Author||397|
|The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace||399|
Most Helpful Customer Reviews
'Pakistan:Between Mosque and Military' is a Pakistani's analysis of what has happened in the 50 odd years since Independence. The fact that the person writing it was a part of the government for many years lends it an authenticity which is much needed in today's age. As an Indian what I found 'different' about the book was that this was among the few books I have read, written by a Pakistani, which does not blame Indians for the mess that has been created. It also does not blame any particular leader or party for the present condition of Pakistan but instead tries to show the search for an identity - albeit different from 'Hindu India' - and the 'immense sense of insecurity' vis-a-vis India led to an appeal to Islam as an ideology and as an identity-definer and unifying force in Pakistan. In comparison to other books on Pakistan which trace the rise of Islamization to the policies of Gen Zia this book shows how this was something that had started long ago, soon after Independence. Another reason to read the book is that though one can find books which talk about US-Pak relations yet none of them go into the detail to analyze the reason why each country needs the other and the widespread impact this relationship has had not just on Pakistan's relations with India but also on its domestic politics. The last reason this book is a 'must-read' is that it is not too long and is reader friendly.
What is Pakistan? Is it an Islamic state, or is it a state for Muslims? The answer to that question is not unimportant.Husain Haqqani's Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military provides an historical account of which choice Pakistan's civilian and military leaders have made for the country and why. He also discusses the importance of that choice to Pakistan, Pakistan's neighbors, and the United States.Pakistan was initially supposed to be a state for Muslims. But as Haqqani shows, and in contravention to the conventional wisdom on Pakistan, very shortly after its birth, Pakistan's leaders altered course and decided to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state, at least on paper. Those leaders feared for the internal unity of Pakistan because of its rich ethnic and linguistic diversity, so they decided to use two things to unify the people into a nation: Islam and hatred of India.Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the leaders of Pakistan's army made this decision. Since independence, Pakistan's civilian leaders have generally seen economic growth and social modernization as the route to building a nation in Pakistan. This viewpoint sees Pakistan as a state for Muslims, not as an Islamic state, which is an indirect threat to the institutional interests of the Pakistan Army because for any indigenous economic development plan to succeed, the Pakistan military would likely have to get by with a much smaller share of national GDP than it has ever done.Although, Haqqani positions the repeated interference of the Army in politics not as an issue of the military protecting its institutional interests, but as a genuine disagreement between the civilian and military leaders over the proper way to secure Pakistan. But because of the genuine popularity of Pakistan's civilian leaders in the early part of the country's existence, the military had to foment unrest in the country and problems between the political parties if it was going to be able to justify taking power.According to Haqqani, it is for this reason that Pakistan's army has joined an unwritten alliance with Pakistani Islamists. The army uses Islamists to create unrest in society to give the appearance that civilians cannot govern the country in exchange for giving them a role in governance that they could not get in a free and fair election.This alliance of mosque and military has, according to Haqqani, caused serious damage to Pakistan's economic and political development. Moreover, while the military was the overwhelmingly dominant party to the alliance until the 1990s, as of late, the Islamists have started to act independently of the military to the point that Pervez Musharraf, the last military ruler of Pakistan, justified his continued rule in part on the threat that Islamists posed to the country.Haqqani makes some sensible suggestions for both Pakistan and the U.S. in how to get Pakistan out from between the rock and hard place that it currently finds itself with regard to jihadi terrorists that have started to target Pakistan itself. The most important one for the U.S. is to stop turning a blind eye toward the Pakistan Army's and intelligence service's support for terrorist groups because of some use that the U.S. can make of Pakistan in some important U.S. foreign policy. Haqqani makes the all too sadly necessary point that a Pakistan under the grip of radical Islamists would be a far greater threat to U.S. security than some terrorist organization hiding out in the mountains of Afghanistan, and the Pakistan military and intelligence services are bringing that terrible outcome closer to reality with every day that they pursue their policies of supporting jihadi terrorist organizations.
It was difficult to decide whether to call this history or current events. It is a history of Pakistan from the partitioning of India in 1947. It is primarily a political history written in the current context of the rise of Islamism. As such, it is a significant book for students of foreign affairs. It explores the complex relationship between the military and the United States on the one hand, but between the military and Islamism on the other.