The Second Pearl Harbor: The West Loch Disaster, May 21, 1944

The Second Pearl Harbor: The West Loch Disaster, May 21, 1944

by Gene Eric Salecker
The Second Pearl Harbor: The West Loch Disaster, May 21, 1944

The Second Pearl Harbor: The West Loch Disaster, May 21, 1944

by Gene Eric Salecker

Paperback(Reprint)

$21.95 
  • SHIP THIS ITEM
    Qualifies for Free Shipping
    Choose Expedited Shipping at checkout for delivery by Thursday, April 4
  • PICK UP IN STORE
    Check Availability at Nearby Stores

Related collections and offers


Overview



In May 1944, with American forces closing in on the Japanese mainland, the Fifth Fleet Amphibious Force was preparing to invade Saipan. Control of this island would put enemy cities squarely within range of the B-29 bomber. The navy had assembled a fleet of landing ship tanks (LSTs) in the West Loch section of Pearl Harbor. On May 21, an explosion tore through the calm afternoon sky, spreading fire and chaos through the ordnance-packed vessels. When the fires had been brought under control, six LSTs had been lost, many others were badly damaged, and more than 500 military personnel had been killed or injured. To ensure the success of those still able to depart for the invasion—miraculously, only one day late—the navy at once issued a censorship order, which has kept this disaster from public scrutiny for seventy years.

The Second Pearl Harbor is the first book to tell the full story of what happened on that fateful day. Military historian Gene Salecker recounts the events and conditions leading up to the explosion, then re-creates the drama directly afterward: men swimming through flaming oil, small craft desperately trying to rescue the injured, and subsequent explosions throwing flaming debris everywhere. With meticulous attention to detail the author explains why he and other historians believe that the official explanation for the cause of the explosion, that a mortar shell was accidentally detonated, is wrong.

This in-depth account of a little-known incident adds to our understanding of the dangers during World War II, even far from the front, and restores a missing chapter to history.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780806161921
Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
Publication date: 11/08/2018
Edition description: Reprint
Pages: 296
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.93(d)

About the Author

Military historian Gene Eric Salecker is the author of Disaster on the Mississippi: The Sultana Explosion, April 27, 1865 and Blossoming Silk against the Rising Sun: U.S. and Japanese Paratroopers in the Pacific in World War II.
 

Read an Excerpt

The Second Pearl Harbor

The West Loch Disaster, May 21, 1944


By Gene Eric Salecker

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS

Copyright © 2014 University of Oklahoma Press
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8061-4745-1



CHAPTER 1

Operation Forager


VADM Richmond Kelly Turner, the commander of 5th Fleet Amphibious Force, wanted his men to be well trained for the upcoming invasion of the Mariana island of Saipan. Accordingly, he scheduled five days of full-blown rehearsals to take place around Hawaii in mid-May 1944, "the biggest and longest held to date in the Pacific Campaigns."

The seizure of Saipan, along with the islands of Tinian and Guam, all within the Mariana Islands, only 1,270 miles from Japan, would put hundreds of Japanese cities, including the capital of Tokyo, within range of the B-29 bombers. Additionally, by capturing the Mariana Islands, the Americans would drive a wedge between Japan and its forward naval base at Truk, south of the Marianas, which would be left to wither on the vine.

The idea of invading the Mariana Islands had been suggested in 1943. ADM Ernest J. King, chief of naval operations in Washington, had wanted to win the Pacific war by driving straight through the Central Pacific toward Japan proper. GEN Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Southwest Pacific Theater, had wanted the Army to attack westward along the northern coast of New Guinea and then northward through the Philippines. Historian Charles R. Anderson reported, "A series of Allied planning conferences in 1943 failed to resolve the issue. The strong identification of each strategy with a different military service—Central Pacific with the U.S. Navy and Southwest Pacific with the U.S. Army—tended to undermine an unbiased appraisal of either course of action and to encourage the potentially dangerous pursuit of both with inadequate resources."

By the end of 1943, however, the development of the B-29 airplane made the choice for the drive through the Central Pacific the most plausible. In December 1943, the American commanders finally decided that the major thrust toward Japan would go through the Central Pacific, using captured islands as bases for the advancing B-29s. At the same time, General MacArthur would continue his drive toward the Philippines, thereby dividing the attention and resources of the Japanese. The date for the invasion of the Marianas was set for November 1944.

In November 1943, the 2nd Marine Division (2nd MarDiv) and the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division (27th IDiv) invaded the Gilbert Islands. Although the landing went well for the soldiers attacking Makin Atoll, the Marine Corps landing on Tarawa Atoll was almost turned back by the Japanese. Trouble with a shortage of amphibious tractors or amtracs (officially, Landing Vehicle, Tracked or LVTs), tides, a coral reef, and a dozen other things almost cost the Marines the capture of Tarawa. These problems, however, had taught the planners that better training, more rehearsals, and more cooperation between the Navy and the invading forces were necessary to pull off a more successful invasion the next time around.

In January 1944, the Americans invaded the Marshall Islands, making sure that they had enough LVTs to get them over any outlying reefs—a definite problem at Tarawa. By the time Admiral Turner was ready for the invasion of Saipan, new LVT-4 troop carriers, with a ramp at the rear that allowed the occupants to exit without having to expose themselves by climbing over the sides, were beginning to replace the old LVT-2s, which did not have ramps. Since almost seven hundred LVTs would be needed for the invasion of Saipan, Turner had to use both the old and the new LVTs. He hoped that extensive training and rehearsals would get his men out of the vehicles and onto the beach no matter what type of amtrac carried them to shore.

The speed with which the Americans captured the Marshall Islands—by mid-February instead of May—presented the Americans with a golden opportunity. Realizing that the war could be shortened by advancing the Marianas timetable, the invasion date for Saipan was moved up to 15 June. An unfortunate outcome of the success in the Gilberts and Marshalls, however, was the fact that Admiral Turner now had to rush to assemble his equipment and men and get them ready to invade Saipan, Tinian, and Guam.

All of the ships involved in the invasion of the Marianas, codenamed Operation Forager, would come from the 5th Fleet (Task Force 50), commanded by ADM Raymond Spruance. Subordinate to Spruance was Vice Admiral Turner, a foul-mouthed, short-tempered man who had taken command of the Amphibious Force in August 1943 and had gained valuable experience in amphibious landings in the Gilberts and Marshalls.

Task Force 56, the invading force, was broken into two subgroups. Saipan and Tinian would be invaded by the Northern Troops and Landing Force (NTLF), consisting of the 2nd and 4th MarDivs, the XXIV Army Corps Artillery, and the Saipan and Tinian Garrison Force, a total of 71,000 men. The Southern Troops and Landing Force (STLF), made up of the 3rd MarDiv, the 77th IDiv, and the III Army Corps Artillery, 56,500 men, was assembled to capture Guam. Held in reserve was the 27th IDiv.

With the seizure of Saipan as the first objective of Operation Forager, Admiral Turner elected to take personal command of the men, ships, and transports of the northern attack force. However, realizing that the weight of joint control of both the entire operation and the NTLF would be too much for even himself, Turner parceled out some of his duties to his second in command, RADM Harry W. Hill, making Hill responsible for the ships and amtracs that would transport the Marines and soldiers to Saipan.

For the arduous task of transporting the men, equipment, and supplies of the NTLF 3,200 miles from Hawaii to Saipan, the Navy assembled 110 transport vessels including 10 high-speed destroyer transports (APDs) and 47 Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs). "Since the preferred beaches on Saipan were fringed by a reef and since it would be impossible to negotiate a crossing of the reef in conventional landing craft," wrote Marine Corps historian MAJ Carl W. Hoffman, "the landing plan contemplated the use of LVTs ... as the principal assault vehicles." In all, Admiral Hill collected 579 troop-carrying amtracs, plus 140 armored amphibian tanks, for the invasion of Saipan. As historian Gordon L. Rottman noted, the 719 LVTs "would be the largest use of amtracs to date and would set the standard for future operations."

All of the amtracs would be carried to Saipan inside LSTs. Since the long, slim LSTs had enough room to carry the assault troops assigned to the amtracs, there would be no need for the men to climb down rope nets and into waiting watercraft. Instead, the troops would simply climb into the amtracs inside the bellies of the LSTs and ride out the gaping bow doors toward the enemy beaches.

The large 105mm howitzers of some of the artillery units would be transported to the beaches in DUKWs (pronounced "ducks"), the amphibious version of the 2.5-ton truck. Because of their weight, the howitzers would be loaded aboard the DUKWs in Hawaii, and the amphibious trucks would then be carried to Saipan inside the big LSTs.

After the bloody battle of Tarawa, the ranks of the 2nd MarDiv had been refilled with fresh recruits from the states who had never seen combat, while most of the men of the 4th MarDiv were still considered "green," since they had captured the Marshall Islands in only two days. Likewise, most of the LVT and DUKW crews, and even the LST crews, had never before seen combat. In order to ensure coordination between the various units, Turner and Hill wanted the two Marine divisions to rehearse together, along with the LVT and DUKW crews and especially the LST crews. According to historian A. Alan Oliver, "The crews of the LSTs were ... largely fresh and untried. While most of these vessels had participated in previous invasions, the rapid expansion of the amphibious fleet saw all too many crews unfortunately thinned by the many transfers of experienced hands to newly commissioned ships. Wartime casualties, leaves, and normal crew rotations necessitated that youngsters fresh out of boot camp or specialist training be assigned to these veteran ships. [The rehearsal] was the attempt to weld these new crewmen into tight knit teams." The five-day rehearsal was set for 15–19 May at Maalaea Bay on Maui and at Kahoolawe Island, Territory of Hawaii.

In preparation for the rehearsal, the LVTs and DUKWs were loaded aboard the various LSTs at Pearl Harbor, Kahului Harbor on Maui, or from the beaches of Maalaea Bay. ENS Carl V. Smith (LST #224) described the loading of the LVTs onto their ship. "Much of the cargo was placed by the Army quartermasters on the tank deck [lowest deck], piled about 3 feet deep. They then covered all their cargo with 1 by 6 inch rough lumber called dunnage. It was crisscrossed so that the [LVTs] could be parked on [top of] it securely." Once the lumber was in place, the LVTs or DUKWs were backed into the mouth of the LSTs and parked atop the wooden supports. Each LST could carry seventeen LVTs or LVT(A)s (amphibious tanks) or eleven DUKWs.

While the LVTs and DUKWs were being loaded at Pearl Harbor, some of the LSTs were getting an LCT (Landing Craft, Tank) hoisted up onto their main deck. According to MoMM2/c John H. Dougherty, "An LCT was over 120 feet long and was wide enough to just fit on the deck of an LST. They weighed more than one hundred fifty tons and were similar to a large powered barge, with an open cargo carrying area capable of carrying several tanks, a large bow ramp that lowered to open, and a navigation bridge, crew's quarters, and engine room at the stern. They were powered by three diesel engines and carried a crew of around twelve men and one officer."

To get the massive craft onto the open main deck of the LST, shipyard crews used large cranes or floating crane barges. Ensign Smith described the process of loading the massive LCT onto an LST: "[The LCT was] placed on our main deck with a huge crane, mounted in a massive wooden cradle, and placed on huge wooden skids with large quantities of lubricant between the cradle and the skids. They were securely attached to the deck and equipped with a restraining cable, so that when the time came to launch the craft, it could be done in a most efficient manner." Added George Gross of LCT-794, "Whoever had the idea to put an LCT on an LST had it all thought out.... The LCT is not resting on the deck, but on a series of wooden skids about 10" square and longer than the beam [width] of the LCT. Both the skids and the LCT are lashed down with cables and turnbuckles." In other words, the LCTs were carried to the warzone piggybacked on wooden skids on the top or main deck of the LSTs.

E3/c Kenneth Tidwell from LCT-982, which was placed aboard LST #274, recalled, "Before we went on maneuvers to Maui there was a big old crane at Pearl Harbor there that picked us up and put us on the deck of an LST. The way they did that is they had some big timbers about a foot square. They put three of them down on the deck of the LST and then put axle grease on each one of those three, and then put another two by four big timber. And then this crane lifted the LCT up and put it on the deck on those two timbers."

Once in the invasion zone, the LST no longer had the convenience of a huge crane to lift the LCT off the top deck and place it neatly in the water. Ensign Smith remembered the unloading process. "All restraining chains were removed at the time of launching. Water was pumped from the port ballast tanks [of the LST] over to the starboard side, causing the [LST] to list to starboard eleven degrees. On a given signal the restraining cable was cut with a fire axe, and the LCT slipped gracefully into the water." George Gross, however, recalled: "You release all cables except one which has a special hook on it. (I don't remember the name of the hook, but it is hinged and held closed with a ring.) You take a sledge hammer to bang off the ring, stand back to avoid the flying cable, and away she goes! When she hits the water she creates a huge splash between the LCT and the LST. This serves as a cushion to prevent any damage."

While the ballast tanks on one side of the LST were being filled (usually the starboard or right side), the LCT crew members were getting their own craft ready. "It takes a while to fill the tanks on the LST to put a list on her," said S1/c Walt Slater, from LCT-982. "On the LCT, they'd fill the void tanks, so that when it slid off into the water, the weight in the ballast would bring it back up against the side of the LST after it slid into the water." None of the crew was on board during the launching, since no one was sure if the craft had been ballasted right and would stabilize itself in the water. "Some of them did turtle [flip over]," Slater continued. "If you didn't have the void tanks filled, it would not come back up. If done right, it went off on the side, and the weight of the void tanks would bring the landing craft back to an even keel, and even bump up against the fenders of the LST."

To add a little extra punch to the invasion, Admiral Hill had turned three LCTs into floating gunships, equipping each with eight 4.2" mortars. VADM George C. Dyer noted, "These were desired primarily to protect the left flank of our Landing Force against Japanese reserves moving down the coastal road from Garapan [a city on Saipan's west coast just above the landing beaches]. By having the [mortar-laden] LCTs steam parallel to the beaches, they would also be able to cover the landing beaches with a blanket of heavy mortar fire while the assault waves were being formed."

As the big, flat-bottomed LSTs set out for the rendezvous point south of Maui on the night of May 14/15, they were fully combat loaded for the upcoming rehearsal, especially the new "LCT gunboats." Recalled ENS C. E. Gubellini, the commanding officer of LCT-963, a converted gunboat aboard LST #353, "Our LCT was loaded with approximately 5,000 to 5,500 rounds of 20mm ammunition, various .30 caliber, .45 caliber, and .22 caliber ammunition, and 700 cases of 4.2" mortar shells [two shells to a case], mostly high explosive and some white phosphorus." Loaded up and ready to go, with the LVTs and DUKWs tucked safely inside their bellies and the larger LCTs chained to their decks, the LSTs set off for the rehearsal beach, never suspecting that trouble was just around the bend.

CHAPTER 2

Rehearsal for Disaster


Unfortunately, the weather on the night of 14/15 May was "very rough." Marine Robert L. George, aboard one of the 2nd MarDiv LSTs, felt that the weather was akin to a "hurricane." "The ocean waves kept rolling back and forth across our decks and we kept waiting for [the LST] to capsize, but it seemed to stop short just in time," he wrote. "We were down below decks for a long time while the storm raged." Undaunted, the LSTs continued through the darkness and rough seas toward the rehearsal area off Lahaina Roads.

At 2:19 A.M. on 15 May, while the LSTs were about fifty air-miles south of the Hawaiian island of Lanai, the heavy seas suddenly became killing seas. Marine Corps historian Carl Hoffman reported, "Aboard LST #485, which was transporting a portion of the 2d [MarDiv], men were sleeping in a Landing Craft, Tank (LCT-988), which was secured on the deck of the LST. The weather was rough and the strain on the cables was too great ... the craft was pitched overboard with the sleeping men aboard. Nineteen men were either missing or killed, and five were injured as the craft was rammed and sunk by the next LST in column."

Marine Eldon Ballinger was asleep aboard LCT-988 when she went over the side. He wrote, "Around 2330 the sea began to get rough and within a two-hour period the sea became very turbulent with high waves. The flat-bottomed LST rocked back and forth so violently that the straps broke on the stacks of ammunition, falling on the sleeping men. Then the steel cables snapped, releasing the LCT, ripping the large skid beams loose, and the waves washed everything off the deck of the LST's starboard [sic] side. The LCT hit the water right-side up, except the ramp was down. I remember a crewman and I were trying to start the engine so that the ramp could be raised. It was then that the trailing LST [#29] hit us broadside, flipping the LCT completely upside down. The LCT sank within minutes with those that were still alive going down with the ship."

The officer of the deck on LST #485 at the time of the incident made the following notation in the ship's log:

0219 [2:19 A.M.] Straps on LCT 988 carried on foredeck parted allowing the boat to slide over port side carrying away all port life lines, two 20 millimeter guns and mounts, ships gangway, destroying the LCT skids, damaging a third 20 millimeter gun. Six men were injured.... Missing are as follows: (41) forty-one enlisted E Co. 8th Marines, 7 enlisted Naval Medical hdqtrs. 2nd Batt., 8th Marines, 12 enlisted of crew LCT 988 and officer in charge.

0220 All engines stopped. Twelve life rafts launched. All hands to general quarters. 0231 lowered ships boats. 0340 Ships boats carried away by heavy seas and all equipment lost.


(Continues...)

Excerpted from The Second Pearl Harbor by Gene Eric Salecker. Copyright © 2014 University of Oklahoma Press. Excerpted by permission of UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations ix

List of Maps xi

Introduction xiii

List of Abbreviations xv

1 Operation Forager 3

2 Rehearsal for Disaster 10

3 The LST 18

4 West Loch, Pearl Harbor 33

5 A Busy Saturday Morning 40

6 A Sunny Sunday Morning 46

7 Prelude to Disaster 52

8 Explosion 60

9 Hell 70

10 Hell from Afar 82

11 Nowhere Seemed Safe 92

12 The Second Big Explosion 105

13 Escape 118

14 Inaction and Indecision 127

15 The Rescuers 136

16 The Third Explosion 142

17 Another Victim 150

18 Safely Ashore 155

19 The Drifting Menace 162

20 The Last Big Hurrah 172

21 The Next Twenty-Four Hours 187

22 The Court of Inquiry 193

23 Salvage 205

24 Censored 211

Chronology 225

Notes 231

Bibliography 259

Index 269

From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews