In this detailed study, Donald K. Mitchener documents and analyzes the prewar development of this doctrine as well as its application and evolution between the years 19431945. The historical consensus is that the test at Tawara was successful and the experience increased the efficiency with which U.S. forces were able to apply the doctrine in the Pacific theater for the remainder of the Second World War. Mitchener challenges this view, arguing that the reality was much more complex. He reveals that strategic concerns often took precedence over the lessons learned in the initial engagement, and that naval planners' failure to stay up to date with the latest doctrinal developments and applications sometimes led them to ignore these lessons altogether.
Though the weapons, techniques, and strategies of the U.S. armed forces have changed dramatically over the years, Mitchener compellingly argues that a nuanced understanding of the historical application of doctrine is necessary in order to protect soldiers' and sailors' lives. U.S. Naval Gunfire Support in the Pacific War presents an important analysis that highlights the human cost of misinterpreting strategic and tactical realities.
About the Author
Table of ContentsPreface
Why Naval Gunfire Support?
Doctrine, the Tentative Manual, and FTP 167
Operation Stalemate II
Appendix A: Tables
Glossary of Terms