Value Solutions In Cooperative Games

by Roger A Mccain

Overview

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non—Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non—cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9789814417396
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Company, Incorporated
Publication date:	05/06/2013
Pages:	236
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.30(h) x 0.90(d)

Table of Contents

Foreword v

Chapter 1 Value Solutions for Superadditive Transferable Utility Games in Coalition Function Form 1

Chapter 2 Zeuthen-Nash Bargaining 21

Chapter 3 Nontransferable Utility Games and Games in Partition Function Form 39

Chapter 4 A Shapley Value Algorithm for Games in Partition Function Form 63

Chapter 5 Extension of the Nucleolus to Nontransferable Utility Games in Partition Function Form 85

Chapter 6 A Gore Imputation with Variable Bargaining Power 105

Chapter 7 Bargaining Power Biform Games 129

Chapter 8 Intertemporal Cooperative Games: A Sketch of a Theory 155

Chapter 9 A Theory of Enterprise 183

References 217

Index 223